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Abstract
Software system engineering is increasingly practised over globally dis-
tributed locations. Such a practise is termed as Global Software Develop-
ment (GSD). GSD has become a business necessity mainly because of the
scarcity of resources, cost, and the need to locate development closer to
the customers. GSD is highly dependent on requirements management,
but system requirements continuously change. Poorly managed change in
requirements affects the overall cost, schedule and quality of GSD projects.
It is particularly challenging to manage and trace such changes, and hence
we require a rigorous requirement change management (RCM) process.
RCM is not trivial in collocated software development; and with the pres-
ence of geographical, cultural, social and temporal factors, it makes RCM
profoundly difficult for GSD. Existing RCM methods do not take into
consideration these issues faced in GSD. Considering the state-of-the-art
in RCM, design and analysis of architecture, and cloud accountability,
this work contributes:
1. an alternative and novel mechanism for effective information and
knowledge-sharing towards RCM and traceability.
2. a novel methodology for the design and analysis of small-to-medium
size cloud-based systems, with a particular focus on the trade-off of
quality attributes.
3. a dependable framework that facilitates the RCM and traceability
method for cloud-based system engineering.
4. a novel methodology for assuring cloud accountability in terms of
dependability.
5. a cloud-based framework to facilitate the cloud accountability method-
ology.
The results show a traceable RCM linkage between system engineering
processes and stakeholder requirements for cloud-based GSD projects,
which is better than existing approaches. Also, the results show an im-
proved dependability assurance of systems interfacing with the unpre-
dictable cloud environment. We reach the conclusion that RCM with
a clear focus on traceability, which is then facilitated by a dependable
framework, improves the chance of developing a cloud-based GSD project
successfully.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter initially describes the motivations behind the thesis and the main topics
related to this work in Section 1.1. The research problem statement and our ap-
proaches are presented in Section 1.2, and the research contributions in Section 1.3.
Section 1.4 lists publications related to the thesis. Finally, the thesis structure is
presented in Section 1.5.
1.1 Motivation
Global software development (GSD) is characterised by globally distributed teams
which are made up of stakeholders from different geographic locations, and different
national and organisational cultures. Many software development companies nowa-
days strive for the utilisation of benefits offered by GSD such as: access to large skilled
labour pool, improving time to market, reduced software development costs by del-
egating work to countries with low labour cost, to produce better quality product
[175], [157], [115], [109], [8]. The collaboration among globally distributed teams is
based on the team members’ communication. However, the coordination and control
of communication forms the main challenges of GSD [193]. Such challenges are gener-
ally influenced by distance: geographical, socio-cultural and temporal. The physical
distance between remote team members is identified as the geographical distance.
Also, the extent to which members of a team vary with regards to language, so-
cial status, religion, economic conditions, politics, and basic assumptions constitutes
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socio-cultural distance. Furthermore, cultural issues, such as attitudes toward hier-
archy, communication styles, time, and need for structure, are often different. Some
researchers [180], [17] point out that the dispersion of work force constitutes a drop in
productivity in GSD. Others like [121], indicate that the productivity of globally dis-
tributed team members decreases by up to 50% compared to that of co-located team
members. However, an even more critical issue is that GSD is highly dependent on
requirements management. The specific challenge here is that system requirements
continuously change. Primarily, poorly managed change in requirements affects the
overall cost, schedule and quality of GSD projects [190], [124]. Here, it is particularly
challenging to manage and trace such changes. It is identified from literature [6],
[86], [116] that, issues related to coordination and control of communication affecting
requirement change management (RCM) arise when there is no effective information
and knowledge-sharing mechanisms towards change management and traceability.
This however requires a rigorous RCM process. RCM is not trivial in co-located
software development; and with the presence of geographical, cultural, social and
temporal factors in GSD, it makes RCM profoundly difficult for GSD. Existing RCM
methods do not take into consideration these issues faced in GSD.
In recent years, cloud computing has been identified as a well suited deployment
environment or delivery model for web-based services and especially for complex sys-
tems. Cloud computing [103] is a model for enabling convenient, on-demand network
access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g. servers, storage, etc.)
that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or ser-
vice provider interaction. System engineering stands to benefit from the scalability,
parallelism, cost-effectiveness, global multi-user access and flexibility features of the
cloud platform. With such a global-focused service delivery model, cloud computing
can suitably facilitate the deployment and operations of GSD.
However, the dependability challenge of cloud computing as a result of the rapid
evolution of the cloud topology as well as uncontrolled or malicious impact of co-
located systems, pose a major issue in its adoption. In the State of Cloud Security
2016 report [45] of the Cloud Security Alliance, it is noted that the challenge to the
adoption of cloud computing is mainly security, compliance, lack of expertise and/or
resources, and performance. That said, there have been some frequent occurrences
2
of cloud service failure events. Two of such events reported by [222] are first, the
Azure cloud services of Microsoft that had two service interruptions attributed to
system failure in March 2015. This affected most parts of their central and eastern
United States service areas. Secondly, with regards to the Apple Cloud Services,
about 11 iCloud-related features experienced serious technical issues on May 20, 2015.
This includes iCloud Account and iCloud mail, by which 2 million iCloud users were
affected. Here, the availability and reliability of cloud based systems are affected. In
such a situation, the efficient operation of GSD can be adversely affected.
In order for GSD to be dependable in the cloud environment, two approaches
need to be considered. Since the disciplined design of a system is as much relevant as
the influence on the behaviour of that system by its environment [65], the design as
well as the deployment environment are of immense importance. Firstly, the design
of GSD systems must master the costs and the quality of the development of such
software systems, relative to the rapid evolution of the topology of the cloud envi-
ronment. Here, it is imperative to consider the overall effect of design decisions, the
inherent trade-offs between quality attributes (such as availability, security, reliabil-
ity, performance), and the trade-offs required to address user, system, and business
requirements [20]. It is however essential to have a software system design approach
that yields itself readily to an implicit analysis or evaluation method for cloud-based
systems. Since the cloud environment is characterised by rapid interactions between
quality attributes, the state-of-the-art of evaluating cloud-based systems in this con-
text is lacking. Most notable software system evaluation methods mainly focus on
independent quality attributes: modifiability [111], [26], [129], maintainability [148],
flexibility [130], etc. Other methods [28], [24] that consider multiple quality attributes
do not factor the “trade-off analysis” of system quality attributes.
Secondly, the concept of cloud accountability [77], [11], especially for dependability
has not been adequately addressed. This means that the cloud behaviours affecting
system dependability should be transparent to relevant parties, hence the call for
accountability [11], [77], [187], [137]. It is important to mention that cloud account-
ability has been widely applied towards assuring the security of cloud-based systems
in several research such as [82], [179], [23], [191], [201]. In our literature review, we
found no work that employs the forensic auditing techniques of cloud accountability
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towards the assurance of dependability especially for “availability” and “reliability”.
It is relevant that cloud users, such as system engineers, are assured of the availability
and reliability of the cloud platform they use for GSD.
With these observations in mind, the problem statement for this thesis is formu-
lated below, as well as the thesis approach to the problem.
1.2 Problem Statement and Approach
1.2.1 Problem Statement
To design and evaluate an effective mechanism for requirements change management
and traceability, facilitated by a dependable framework to improve the chances of
successfully undertaking cloud-based GSD to meet stakeholders’ needs.
1.2.2 Research Aim and Objectives
In this thesis, we address the problems mentioned in the motivations by proposing
a cloud-based Reactive Architecture (RA), which supports cloud-based system engi-
neering. This alternative approach as against the current state-of-the-art, prioritises
the definition of an effective information and knowledge-sharing mechanism towards
change management and traceability, as well as providing a dependable framework
for the proposed mechanism. Our main aim is to design and evaluate this Reac-
tive Architecture. To achieve this aim, we propose an approach that relates two key
components with their associated objectives:
1. A set of GSD management guidelines for requirements change management and
traceability. Here, we identify the following objectives:
• OB1 : Define a change management and traceability (CM-T) process model,
which applies a software process improvement method to ensure the ma-
turity of the RCM and traceability processes,
• OB2 : Identify a standard quality management framework to facilitate a
significant level of quality for the proposed CM-T process model,
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• OB3 : Validate the CM-T process model using an expert panel review
process, and
• OB4 : Demonstrate the defined management guidelines by applying it to
an Airlock Control System case study.
2. A cloud-based Reactive Architecture to facilitate the defined GSD management
guidelines. This approach is undertaken in two ways:
(a) Provide a bespoke methodology that facilitates the design and analysis
of small-to-medium size GSD architectures like the Reactive Architecture,
interfacing with the unpredictable cloud environment. Here, the identified
objectives are below:
• OB5 : Define the methodology for small-to-medium size GSD archi-
tectures.
• OB6 : Validate the methodology using a comparative study with cur-
rent approaches,
• OB7 : Demonstrate the methodology by applying it to the design of
the Reactive Architecture, and then
• OB8 : Analyse the quality attribute trade-off of the Reactive Archi-
tecture.
(b) Present a method that is guided by a forensic model to perform virtual
machine introspection for the purpose of assuring the dependability of the
Reactive Architecture deployed to the cloud environment. Here, some
objectives are identified:
• OB9 : Define the cloud accountability methodology.
• OB10 : Develop a cloud accountability system which facilitates the
presented method,
• 0B11 : Demonstrate the method by applying it to a cloud-based test-
bed of the Reactive Architecture, and
• 0B12 : Conduct an evidence-based trust analysis on the derived evi-
dence for the purpose of dependability assurance of the cloud-based
Reactive Architecture.
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1.3 Research Contributions
The research presented in this thesis makes several key contributions:
1. The design, development and evaluation of a novel Reactive Middleware,
that supports a set of management guidelines for high quality GSD change
management and traceability. The middleware facilitates a novel change
management and traceability process model, within the context of qual-
ity management for GSD projects. An expert review panel process is
conducted to assess the maturity of the process model. Also, an Airlock
Control System case study is used to demonstrate the GSD management
guidelines.
2. The proposal of a novel methodology for the design and analysis of small-
to-medium size cloud-based systems. This method considers the unpre-
dictable character and rapidly evolving topology of the cloud deployment
environment, and its impact on dependability in the bespoke design of
systems to be deployed to the cloud. The methodology targets systems
that are classified within the range of small to medium size. A compar-
ative study of the current state-of-the-art methods is initially undertaken
to identify methods that present a high potential to remedy this challenge.
3. The design, development and evaluation of the Reactive Architecture,
which is used for cloud-based system engineering. The Reactive Archi-
tecture presents critical components for system engineering such as the
introduced Reactive Middleware, with a Shared Artefacts Repository, and
a System Engineering Toolbox.
4. The proposal of a novel methodology for assuring cloud accountability in
terms of dependability. A forensic analysis process is taken to guide the
data collection, examination, evidence analysis, and reporting of informa-
tion.
5. The design and development of the Cloud Accountability System to fa-
cilitate the cloud accountability methodology. The Cloud Accountability
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System is used to conduct virtual machine introspection of some key com-
ponents of the Reactive Architecture, where data is collected also from
the Cloud Service Providers based on availability and reliability related
metrics. Also, an evidence-based trust analysis of the reported informa-
tion from the forensic process is conducted, to assure cloud users of the
dependability of the cloud environment.
1.4 List of Publications
Our list of eleven publications are classified based on the technical chapters they
support, or as other publications below:
• Chapter 3: Reactive Architecture
(a) D. E. Adjepon-Yamoah, A. Romanovsky, and A. Iliasov. A Re-
active Architecture for Cloud-Based System Engineering. In Proceed-
ings of the International Conference on Software and Systems Process,
ICSSP 2015 (Tallinn, Estonia), pages 77-81, August 2015.
• Chapter 4: Managing Change and Traceability
(b) D. E. Adjepon-Yamoah. Towards Dependable Change Manage-
ment and Traceability for Global Software Development. In Fast Ab-
stract Proceedings of the 12th International European Dependable
Computing Conference, EDCC 2016 (Gothenburg, Sweden), Septem-
ber 5-9, 2016.
(c) A. Iliasov, L. Laibinis, E. Troubitsyna, D. E. Adjepon-Yamoah,
and A. Romanovsky. Refinement-based Approach to Co-engineering
Requirements and Formal Models. In (CS-TR-1456) Technical Re-
port, Newcastle University, 13 pages, March 2015.
The following three works are considered in Chapter 4 as cloud-based
tool support in the Reactive Architecture:
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(d) A. Iliasov, P. Stankaitis, D. Adjepon-Yamoah, and A. Romanovsky.
Rodin Platform Why3 Plug-In. In Proceedings of the 5th International
ABZ Conference 2016 ASM, Alloy, B, TLA, VDM, Z, ABZ 2016 (Linz,
Austria), 6 pages, May 2016.
(e) A. Iliasov, P. Stankaitis, and D. E. Adjepon-Yamoah. Event-B and
Cloud Provers. In Proceedings of the Automated Reasoning Work-
shop 2015 Bridging the Gap between Theory and Practice, ARW 2015
(Birmingham, UK), pages 11-12, April 2015.
(f) A. Iliasov, D. E. Adjepon-Yamoah, P. Stankaitis and A. Romanovsky.
Putting Provers on the Cloud. In “Work In Progress” of the 23rd Eu-
romicro International Conference on Parallel, Distributed, and Network-
Based Processing, PDP 2015 (Turku, Finland), March 4-6, 2015.
• Chapter 5: Designing Architectures for Global Software Development
(g) D. E. Adjepon-Yamoah. cloud-ATAM: Method for Analysing Re-
silient Attributes of Cloud-Based Architectures. In book: Software
Engineering for Resilient Systems, Chapter: Engineering Resilient Sys-
tems, pp.105-114.
This publication introduces our method for designing dependable small-
to-medium size cloud-based architectures. Here, it is demonstrated by
designing the Reactive Architecture.
• Chapter 6: Cloud Accountability
(h) D. E. Adjepon-Yamoah, and Z. Wen. Assuring Dependable Cloud-
Based System Engineering: A Cloud Accountability Method. In Pro-
ceedings of the 12th International European Dependable Computing
Conference, EDCC 2016 (Gothenburg, Sweden), September 5-9, 2016.
• Chapter 7: Evaluation
(i) D. E. Adjepon-Yamoah. cloud-ATAM: Method for Analysing Re-
silient Attributes of Cloud-Based Architectures. In book: Software
Engineering for Resilient Systems, Chapter: Engineering Resilient Sys-
tems, pp.105-114.
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In this chapter, the method introduced in Chapter 5 is used to conduct
the trade-off analysis of relevant quality attributes of the developed
Reactive Architecture.
• Other Publications:
(j) A. Iliasov, P. Stankaitis, and D. Adjepon-Yamoah. Static Verifi-
cation of Railway Schema and Interlocking Design Data. In book:
Reliability, Safety, and Security of Railway Systems. Modelling, Anal-
ysis, Verification, and Certification, pp.123-133.
(k) A. Iliasov, P. Stankaitis, D. Adjepon-Yamoah, and A. Romanovsky.
A Rodin Plug-in for Constructing Reusable Schematic Lemmas. In
Proceedings of the 6th Rodin User and Developer Workshop, pp.5-6,
23rd May 2016.
1.5 Thesis Structure
Chapter 2 - Background and Related Works
Presents an overview of the research areas relevant to this work, and
terms that will be used in later chapters.
Chapter 3 - Reactive Architecture
The solutions to the problems introduced in the previous chapters are
described as high-level functions of a cloud-based framework proposed
in this thesis as the Reactive Architecture. Here, all the solutions are
justified, and the definition of our original contributions are clearly
presented.
Chapter 4 - Managing Requirements Change and Traceability
Presents the Reactive Middleware component of the Reactive Ar-
chitecture, that facilitates a set of GSD management guidelines for
change management and traceability. We propose a novel change
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management and traceability process model, within the context of
quality management of GSD.
Chapter 5 - Designing Architectures for Global Software Development
This chapter presents a novel methodology for designing and analysing
dependable small-to-medium sized cloud-based systems. Also in this
chapter, the cloud-focused Architecture Trade-off Analysis Method-
ology (i.e. cloud-ATAM) is demonstrated by designing the Reactive
Architecture to meet stakeholders’ requirements.
Chapter 6 - Cloud Accountability
Presents a novel cloud accountability methodology for assuring the de-
pendability of cloud-based systems. This chapter defines the method-
ology, and introduces it as a forensic process model in terms of data
collection, examination, analysis and reporting. Also, an evidence-
based trust analysis approach is introduced as a means of providing
trusted information for the assurance of the dependability of the cloud
environment.
Chapter 7 - Evaluation
Presents the evaluation and analysis of the Reactive Architecture
and its components. First, the change management and traceabil-
ity process model facilitated by the Reactive Middleware introduced
in Chapter 4 is reviewed by an expert panel review process. Also,
the GSD management guidelines facilitated by the Reactive Middle-
ware is demonstrated using an Airlock Control System. Secondly, the
Cloud Accountability System facilitating the Cloud Accountability
Method introduced in Chapter 6, is demonstrated by applying it to
a cloud-based test-bed of some components of the Reactive Archi-
tecture. Then, an evidence-based trust analysis is conducted on the
information generated. Finally, the cloud-ATAM introduced in Chap-
ter 5 is validated through a comparative analysis with state-of-the-
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art methods for analysis software architectures. Also, the two-staged
qualitative analysis approach (i.e. Utility Tree mechanism and Stake-
holders’ Brainstorming mechanism) provided by cloud-ATAM is used
to analyse the Reactive Architecture.
Chapter 8 - Conclusions
Presents a summary of the findings presented throughout this doc-
ument and speculates on potential future research made possible by
our findings.
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
This chapter provides an overview of the relevant background material moti-
vating and underpinning the work conducted in this thesis. We begin by intro-
ducing GSD and approaches with the potential of improving the development
experience in Section 2.1. An overview of software architecture as a suitable
GSD framework is presented in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 presents a discussion
about cloud computing as a deployment environment for GSD, and its account-
ability in the context of the provided service level agreement. A discussion on
trust assurance methods is provided in Section 2.3.5. We draw our conclusions
in Section 2.4.
2.1 Global Software Development
2.1.1 Overview
Many software development projects are globally distributed in nature [180],
resulting in the evolution of the term Global Software Development (GSD)
[83], [85]. Many factors motivate the need to implement models such as GSD,
including: the need to capitalise on globally dispersed resources, wherever they
are located [181]; the business advantages of proximity to the market, including
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knowledge of customers and local conditions, as well as the good will engendered
by local investment [218]; the quick formation of virtual corporations and virtual
teams to exploit market opportunities; and, pressure to improve time-to-market
by using time zone differences in “follow-the-sun” development [83]; the need
for flexibility to capitalize on merger and acquisition opportunities wherever
they present themselves [21], [84]. This model typically involves a team in a
so-called “home” site, generating requirements based on customer interactions,
and farming out parts of those requirements to several geographically diverse
“global” sites for implementation [150].
GSD seems to have become a business necessity for various reasons, includ-
ing cost, scarcity of resources, and the need to locate development closer to
the customers. In fact, it is fast becoming a pervasive business phenomenon
[50]. Some companies like IBM, British Airways, British Telecom and General
Electric have moved parts of their internal software development operations to
countries like India and Ireland [118]. Fundamentally, GSD involves communi-
cation for information exchange, coordination of teams, activities and artefacts
so they contribute to the overall objective, and finally the control of teams [46].
2.1.2 Requirement Management
Communication, coordination and control issues arise largely when there is no
effective information and knowledge-sharing mechanisms [6], [86]. In GSD, due
to lack of common understanding between geographically dispersed teams, re-
quirements management is particularly difficult. Problems in the requirements
phase have a wide impact on the success of software development projects, but
have an even greater impact on the success of GSD projects [138]. Here, changes
to requirements have to be adequately managed, effected, traceable, and all rele-
vant stakeholders have to be informed. Changes that are inadequately managed
affect product quality [190], [124]. Hence, the requirement change management
plays a vital part of software requirements engineering process in GSD. How-
ever, the communication issue and requirement change management in GSD are
given very little consideration as compared to localised software development
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[115], [30], [119], [117]. In order to make any meaningful headway for GSD, the
closely related concepts of requirements change management, and traceability
of these requirements through the development life-cycle in the context of the
distributed development resources, need to be appropriately considered.
We therefore briefly introduce and discuss current research approaches for change
management (Section 2.1.2.1) and traceability (Section 2.1.2.2) as critical areas
that have the potential of facilitating effective requirements management for
GSD.
2.1.2.1 Change Management
An important aspect of software system engineering is change management.
Since change in the system engineering process is inevitable and has a high
influence in determining the success of the process, it must be managed with
utmost discipline. Change management is a disciplined process for introducing
required changes into the information technology environment [214], [188]. It
ensures that changes to software (and sometimes, hardware) are managed and
conducted in a way that costs are met, risks are reduced, and that the business
needs and goals of a company are satisfied with the highest degree of confidence
and optimisation. We first discuss some relevant models for change management
in collocated software development.
Olsen’s Change Management Model
This change management model [161] identifies the software development pro-
cess as a queue of changes that need to be made. A primary assumption of this
model is that all work done by software designers change. Here, the model can
be applied to both software development and maintenance as it is not life-cycle
dependent (refer to Figure 2.1). The sources of changes are made available by
the users who suggest possible requirement changes. These changes are then
passed to the “manage change” section where these changes are managed by
change managers. The approved changes are passed on to the implementation
section where necessary changes are made in the software. After completing
implementation, “verification” begins by testing code and by inspecting papers.
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Figure 2.1: Olsen’s Change Management Model [161]
Figure 2.2: Ince’s Change Process Model [100]
When a change has been implemented and verified it is then passed back to
change managers who will then release the change in a product.
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Ince’s Change Process Model
Ince’s model [100] focuses on how software configuration management relates
to software change management. This model (refer to Figure 2.2) has two main
sources of change requests, i.e. customer and development team. In order for the
change process to be initiated, a change request must be initiated in a software
project. All such change requests are recorded in a change request note. The
change control board then considers the suggested change. The change control
board can reject the change, batch the change (the change will take place but
not immediately) or accept the change. If the request for the change is success-
ful, a change authorisation note must be filled. After this the change can be
implemented and a system’s documentation is modified. After implementation
the change is validated. Validation and test records are then produced to docu-
ment the changes that have taken place. Finally, the configuration records are
updated and the staff is informed about the new changes.
Figure 2.3: Spiral Like Change Management Process [145]
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Spiral-Like Change Management Process
This model [145] presents the change management process as a four-cycle or
round process (refer to Figure 2.3): the first cycle is “problem owning”, the
second is “problem solving”, the third is “system engineering”, and the final
cycle is technology-specific. The first cycle of this model is the initial cycle; here
the owner of a problem begins this cycle. A problem can be a request to add a
new feature or services in the system, or to fix a problem in the existing system.
At the end of the first cycle the owner decides whether a change needs to be
made, and if necessary, how it should be accommodated. The second cycle is
required only if the change needs to be investigated from a non-technical view-
point. This leads to the third cycle, which is the planning stage. This involves
the examination of the change from a system viewpoint, and makes implemen-
tation plans for the final cycle. The fourth cycle generates, implements and
verifies the technical solution. The change is finished and the results of this
change are recorded.
Figure 2.4: Requirement Change Management Model [153]
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At this point, our attention is drawn to relevant change management models
and approaches that focus on requirements management for GSD. We begin
by discussing a prominent work [153] in this area, that further motivates some
similar works ([115], [200], [125]) during the decade. We conclude this section
by also considering other approaches that suggest agile and hybrid methods as
potential solutions.
Niazi’s Requirement Change Model
In this work [153], a requirements change management model as well as its
framework [138] are presented for GSD. This work implements a CMMI Level 2
specific practice - SP 1.3-1 - manage requirements changes. The model is based
on both an empirical study that have been carried out, and then an extensive
literature review of software process improvement (SPI) and requirements engi-
neering (RE). The model is based on five core elements identified from literature
and interviews: request, validate, implement, verify and update (refer to Fig-
ure 2.4). Within each of these elements, there are some specific activities that
need to take place during requirements change management process. This work
shows that the requirements change management model is clear, easy to use
and can effectively manage the requirements change process. However, more
case studies are needed to evaluate this model in order to further assess its
effectiveness in the domain of RE process.
It is also important to point out that the agile concepts and methods [19], [51],
[146] are also receiving attention in this area. Agile and lean practices are used
to support a more dynamic handling of software products, especially in terms of
RE. The notable approach found from literature is Scrum [168], [107]. Also, oth-
ers [211] point to the use of hybrid approaches as viable options. That said, [136]
identifies that GSD and agile seemingly creates a contradiction, since distributed
software engineering requires a number of rules and formalisms to coordinate
the different teams spread across the globe, but agile software development is,
on the other hand, strongly driven by immediate and direct communication
and collaboration of people - quite often in small and co-located teams. Hence,
agile approaches need more collaboration which cannot be effectively achieved
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in a distributed setting for GSD [88]. Also, the lack of requirements documen-
tation causes problems especially when managing changes to requirements and
maintaining traceability [151]. Furthermore, Wagner [219] emphasises that the
lack of written, and traceable requirements can make it difficult to maintain
developed tool support in the long run.
2.1.2.2 Traceability
Software requirements traceability enables software engineers to ensure consis-
tency among the artefacts created during the development and maintenance
of software products [55]. Requirements express needs and constraints of a
software product, and traceability allows to describe and follow requirements
steps [171],[122]. That said, traceability facilitates an easier verification and
validation of requirements. Hence, traceability supports software management,
software evolution, and validation. Here, when changes are made in a software
product, traceability is fundamental to analyse the impact of such changes.
Also, it facilitates the understanding, capturing, tracking, and verification of
software artefacts, their relationships, and dependencies with other artefacts
during the software life-cycle [71].
An effective traceability approach depends on several factors such as architec-
ture, technical modelling tools, among others. The implementation of traceabil-
ity in the industry is still a challenge. Literature [42; 55; 72; 73] has shown some
reasons for that: cost of implementation, different viewpoints of stakeholders,
difficulties of maintaining updated requirements’ information, and integrating
all generated data or artefacts from software development life-cycle. From these
reasons, it is apparent how critical requirements traceability is to the software
development RCM processes. Some approaches have been introduced to address
various aspects of the traceability challenge, and are discussed briefly below.
Focusing on the communication challenge introduced by the inevitable involve-
ment of a group of stakeholders in GSD, [13] presents a multi-perspective re-
quirements traceability (MUPRET) framework which deploys ontology as a
knowledge management mechanism to intervene mutual “understanding” with-
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out restricting the freedom in expressing requirements differently. This work
provides an approach to handle and resolve issues resulting from such hetero-
geneity, by tracing and managing changes relating to GSD requirements. On-
tology matching as a reasoning mechanism is applied here to automatically gen-
erate fine-grained traceability relationships. Such relationships are identified by
deriving semantic analogy of ontology concepts which represent requirements
elements. Finally, the precision and recall of these traceability relationships
generated by the framework are verified by comparing with a set of traceability
relationships manually identified by users as a proof-of-concept of the frame-
work. However, this framework is limited in two ways: (1) it emphasises on
tracing multi-perspectives in the requirements analysis phase, and (2) it also
focuses on requirements that are expressed in terms of natural language.
In this work [170], the concept of Just-In-Time RE which presents the idea
of reactivity to requirement changes is applied to agile projects to record their
requirements (so-called feature requests) in an issue tracker. This work observes
that in open source projects, there are large networks of feature requests that
are linked to each other. They stress that in both situations when trying to
understand the current state of the system, and to understand how a new
feature request should be implemented, it is important to know and understand
all these tightly related feature requests. However, the authors identify that
there is still a lack of tool support to visualise and navigate these networks of
feature requests. The first step the authors provide in this direction is to see
whether they can identify additional links that are not made explicit in the
feature requests, by measuring the text-based similarity with a Vector Space
Model (VSM) [135] using Term Frequency - Inverse Document Frequency (TF-
IDF) [105] as a “weighting factor”. Also, they show that a high text-based
similarity score is a good indication for related feature requests. With this
in place, they conclude that a TF-IDF VSM can aid the creation of horizontal
traceability links. This then provides a new perspective for developers exploring
the feature request space. That said, there are three shortcomings of this work:
(1) there are no measures on thresholds, recall and precision for the retrieval of
those links before hand, (2) there is no tool support for the automatic creation of
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feature request networks so that developers can benefit more from the horizontal
traceability links, and (3) it does not compare additional information retrieval
approaches for a given problem domain.
Finally, the main focus of the authoritative European CESAR project (Cost-
Efficient Methods and Processes for Safety Relevant Embedded Systems) [178] is
the facilitation of full traceability of a requirement throughout the development
chain and even the entire supply chain. To achieve this aim, CESAR adopted
interoperability and traceability technologies proposed by the Open Services for
Life-cycle Collaboration (OSLC) [27], [31], [160]. OSLC is a cross-industry ini-
tiative aiming to define standards for compatibility of software life-cycle tools.
It is critical to the CESAR project because OSLC aims to make it easy and
practical to integrate software used for development, deployment, and moni-
toring or tracing applications. The elementary concepts and rules are defined
in the OSLC Core Specification which sets out the common features that ev-
ery OSLC Service is expected to support using the terminology and generally
accepted approaches of the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C). Here, the
OSLC-CM (Change Management) specification provides details of its approach
to traceability by adopting known technologies like resource description frame-
work (RDF) and linked-data [80]. Another significant work [142] that looks at
a common industry challenge where a system model which is composed of sev-
eral sub-models, and which may have been developed using different tools. In
this work, the authors present a new approach facilitated by OSLC to support
traceability in the OpenModelica software where the traceability information
is exchanged with other life-cycle tools through a standardised interface and
format. The main limitation of this work is that, it focuses largely on the
requirements and specification phases of the development life-cycle.
2.1.3 Artefact Repositories
Central to the achievement of a high standard of RCM and traceability, lies in
a common facility to support communication and collaboration of GSD team
resources. This facility is a common repository of artefacts. Such a repository
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stores all artefacts that are either created or generated during the SDLC phases.
We consider some of such repositories below.
The Open Source Component and Artefact Repository System (OSCAR) [33] is
provided with in the European Commission backed GENESIS project [34]. This
work introduces a software artefact repository that provides its contents with
some awareness of their own creation. To achieve such awareness, the concept of
“active” artefacts are introduced and are distinguished from their passive coun-
terparts by their enriched meta-data model. Such a meta-data model reflects the
work-flow process that created them, the actors responsible, the actions taken to
change the artefact, and various other pieces of organisational knowledge. This
enriched view of an artefact is intended to support re-use of both software and
the expertise gained when creating the software. A distinguishing feature from
other organisational knowledge systems is that, the meta-data is intrinsically
part of the artefact and may be populated automatically from sources includ-
ing existing data-format specific information, user supplied data and records
of communication. The authors emphasise the increased importance of such a
feature in the world of “virtual teams” where transmission of vital organisa-
tional knowledge, at best difficult, is further constrained by the lack of direct
contact between engineers and differing development cultures. Our work draws
inspiration from the notion of active artefacts and their awareness for change.
Another repository [54] identified in literature is used for the storage of artefacts
for controlled experimentation in software testing. This repository is presented
within an infrastructure that supports controlled experimentation with testing
and regression testing techniques. This infrastructure primarily stores, artefacts
(programs, versions, test cases, faults, and scripts) that enable researchers to
perform controlled experimentation and replications. However, the challenges
of this infrastructure is that it has no mechanisms for artefacts sharing, as well
as to facilitate community development of the infrastructure. Also, it has no
mechanisms for the contribution of additions to it in the form of new fault data,
new test suites, and variants of programs and versions that function on other
operational platforms.
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Also, Sysiphus [37] is identified as a distributed environment providing a uni-
form framework for system models, collaboration artefacts, and organisational
models. Fundamentally, Sysiphus encourages participants to make communi-
cation and issues explicit in the context of system models and become aware
of relevant stakeholders. The authors specifically focus on the problem of ex-
ternalising issues with their context, stakeholders, and organisational roles in
distributed settings such as GSD. This work addresses the challenge of captur-
ing sufficient knowledge as a side effect of development, while structuring it for
long-term use.
Figure 2.5: ISO/IEC 12207 Software Processes [102]
In practice, software version control repositories such as Git [197], GitHub [70],
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SVN [10], and Mercurial [143]. are largely being used in the industry. The main
challenges we identified in our experience of this set of repositories are that, their
application is often focused narrowly on the development (or implementation)
phase of SDLC, and also change management is often enforced based on trust
of the change actor (i.e. a Software Developer).
2.1.4 Global Software Development Tool Support
The current challenges in Global Software Development (GSD) necessitate sup-
port from software tools with special features. We briefly consider some works
from literature that identify tools that facilitate some operations that are crucial
in GSD.
The first work [174], presents a set of tools with special features and explains
why these features are desirable for the tools in the context of GSD, and how
these features are related to the principal challenges in this environment. The
authors therefore present a survey of the tools that provide such features. The
tools included in the survey were classified through the use of the ISO/IEC
12207 standard processes [102] (see Figure 2.5) to determine which process is
supported by each tool. Generally, they provide two main groups. The first
group is made up of tools that support Project Processes such as ActiveCol-
lab [4], Assembla [14], Maven [208], Jira [15], Rational Team Concert [92], etc.
Here, these tools mainly support activities relating to project management.
These tools specifically integrate features to support the Project Planning Pro-
cess and Project Assessment and Control Process of the ISO/IEC 12207. Also,
the second group is composed of tools supporting Implementation Processes
such as Rational Requirements Composer [93], IBM Rational DOORS [92], etc.
The processes included in this group are Software Requirements Analysis Pro-
cess, Software Architectural Design Process, Software Detailed Design Process,
Software Construction Process and Software Integration Process.
Another work [126], identifies that the distribution of tasks to sites is one cen-
tral activity in global software development project planning. Due to the large
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number of assignment possibilities, tool support seems to be adequate for sup-
porting the evaluation and selection of task assignments. This work presents
TAMRI, a planning tool for identifying task assignments based on multiple cri-
teria and weighted project goals. Its implementation combines a distributed
systems approach with Bayesian networks. The tool can be adapted to specific
organisational environments by exchanging the underlying Bayesian network.
The authors present an overview of task distribution approaches, gives three
application scenarios for the tool, and shows the implementation of the tool as
well as its application in the scenarios.
Also, in this work [49], the authors propose TIPMerge, a novel tool that rec-
ommends developers who are best suited to perform merges, by taking into
consideration developers’ past experience in the project, their changes in the
branches, and dependencies among modified files in the branches of distributed
projects. They evaluate TIPMerge on 28 projects, which included up to 15,584
merges with at least two developers, and potentially conflicting changes. On
average, 85% of the top three recommendations by TIPMerge correctly included
the developer who performed the merge. Best results of recommendations were
at 98%. Their interviews with developers of two projects reveal that in cases
where the TIPMerge recommendation did not match the actual merge devel-
oper, the recommended developer had the expertise to perform the merge, or
was involved in a collaborative merge session. This work like most past works,
considers the fact that the integration of changes across branches is not easy,
and often leads to failures. They also emphasise that there has been little work
to recommend developers who have the right expertise to perform a branch
integration. That said, the identified challenge with this work is that, without
a consistently stringent facility to effect changes through the merging process,
reliance or trust based on past experiences can be subjective and not very ef-
fective.
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Figure 2.6: CMMI’s Maturity Levels [22]
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2.1.5 Software Process Improvement Methods
Software Process Improvement (SPI) has been a widely used approach promoted
by software engineering researchers, with the intention of helping organisations
to develop high quality software more efficiently [153]. SPI frameworks such
as the process capability maturity models (e.g. Capability Maturity Model
Integration (CMMI) [41] and ISO/IEC 15504 (SPICE) [155], [154], [156]) are
provided for defining and measuring processes and practices that can be used by
organisations that develop software. We will briefly discuss the CMMI model,
which is the most widely used SPI process capability maturity model [7]. Also,
ISO/IEC 15504 (SPICE) will be discussed, and then an overview of the current
state of SPI frameworks is presented to conclude this section.
2.1.5.1 Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI)
The CMMI model is consistent with the international standard ISO/IEC 15504
[226]. The most well-known representation of CMMI is the “staged” repre-
sentation, which has five “levels” of process maturity for organisations [153]
(refer also to Figure 2.6). Here, each of the five levels is composed of several
“process areas” [205], and for each process area, there are several goals that
are defined, and in turn contain different practices. To reach a maturity level,
the goals of the process areas for that level and all lower levels must be sat-
isfied. These practices help in understanding how to achieve maturity goals,
and serve as examples of the activities to be addressed when undertaking a
SPI programme. Level 2 maturity is the first level that defines a collection of
“process capabilities” that focus on supporting process areas, but also includes
some project management and engineering process areas. The two goals in Level
2 are Specific Goal one (SG1): Manage Requirements, and Generic Goal two
(GG2): “Institutionalise Managed Process”. To achieve CMMI maturity level
2, projects must ensure that processes are planned and executed in accordance
with a defined policy; projects must employ skilled people who have adequate
resources to produce controlled outputs; must involve relevant stakeholders; are
monitored, controlled, and reviewed; and are evaluated for adherence to their
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process descriptions. Here, the process discipline shown by maturity level 2
helps to ensure that existing practices are retained during times of stress.
Figure 2.7: Comparison of CMMI & SPICE Models
2.1.5.2 ISO/IEC 15504 (SPICE)
The International Standards Organisation’s ISO/IEC 15504 standard for Soft-
ware Process Improvement and Capability Determination (SPICE) [156] is an
important model for software process assessment, improvement and capability
determination. The ISO/IEC 15504 much like CMMI comprises of maturity
levels and each maturity level has attributes assigned to it. An organisation
fulfilling all the attributes of a level is said to be on that maturity plane. Also,
CMMI and SPICE models are similar in their major classifications: “Process
Categories”, “Capability Levels”, and composing processes (see Figure 2.7). In
terms of differences, an obvious one is that SPICE introduces one new pro-
cess area (i.e. Customer-Supplier). Also, researchers (such as [57]) identify the
SPICE model as relatively complex than the CMMI model; the SPICE model
contains extra process areas (i.e. Operational Process, Management Process,
Process Alignment Process).
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2.1.5.3 Overview of SPI Frameworks
The challenge here is that, the failure rate of SPI initiatives is generally very
high; estimated as 70% [152]. Also, it is a very complex set of practices or
activities, with its accompanying costs. The significant investment and limited
success are reasons for many organisations (especially small to medium-sized)
being reluctant to embark on a long path of systematic process improvement.
Fundamentally, the population of organisations that have adopted process ca-
pability maturity model is only a part of the entire population of software de-
veloping organisations [134], [153]. It takes significant time to fully implement
an SPI initiative [155], [154], [156]. Some experts (such as [22]) in SPI have at-
tempted to provide a streamlined set of activities/practices for CMMI, that are
reasonably applicable in the industry. This above mentioned research largely
motivates our work. CMMI is a popular choice because it is freely available,
trained resources and quality professionals of CMMI are available, and there is
also not much awareness in industry about ISO/IEC 15504.
2.1.5.4 Using An Expert Panel In A Model Validation Exercise
From [56], it is noted that small samples of experts can be used to develop and
test explanations, and more so in the early stages of model development. Others
such as [59], have used small samples to gain expert feedback to evaluate and
support model development. The value of expert knowledge is also recognised
in an evaluation of software quality that suggests methods to formally capture
expert judgement [183]. The reliability of using expert judgement is shown in
other work such as [131], [120]. Some notable studies such as [22], [58], [59],
and validate improvement models and measurement ’instruments’ by inviting a
panel of experts to complete a detailed questionnaire.
2.1.6 Quality Management of Software Processes
A widely applied approach for managing the quality of software processes is the
Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK) [176]. It is a collection of
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processes and knowledge areas accepted as best practice for the project man-
agement profession. PMBOK is an internationally recognised standard (AN-
SI/PMI 99-001-2008 and IEEE 1490-2011) that provides the fundamentals of
project management. PMBOK introduces five basic process groups, as well as
ten knowledge areas, which is typical of almost all projects. The basic concepts
are generic and hence applicable to a wide range of projects, programmes and
operations. The five basic process groups are: (1) Initiating, (2) Planning, (3)
Executing , (4) Monitoring and Controlling, and (5) Closing. Processes overlap
and interact throughout a project or system engineering phase. In PMBOK,
processes are described in terms of: i) inputs - such as documents plans, designs,
etc.; ii) tools and techniques - such as mechanisms applied to inputs; and iii)
outputs such as documents, products, etc. Also, the ten knowledge areas are:
(1) project integration management, (2) project scope management, (3) project
time management, (4) project cost management, (5) project quality manage-
ment, (6) project human resource management, (7) project communications
management, (8) project risk management, (9) project procurement manage-
ment, and (10) project stakeholder management. Each knowledge area contains
some or all of the project management processes.
Other approaches such as OSLC [160] and CMMI [41] provide features to achieve
or support quality management in software processes. First, OSLC as an indus-
trial standard that targets tools used during a products life cycle and enables
their integration and interoperability [63]. To enable interoperability, different
specifications, called domains, need to be provided. More precisely, an OSLC
Domain is one ALM (Application Lifecycle Management) or one Product Life-
cycle Management (PLM) topic area such as Quality Management (QM), Ar-
chitecture Management (AM), Requirements Management (RM). With regards
to quality management, OSLC defines a common set of resources, formats and
RESTful services for Quality Management tools to interact with other Appli-
cation Lifecycle Management (ALM) tools. This includes test execution tools
such as functional and performance test tools in addition to source control,
defect management, and code development tools. Second, CMMI integrate tra-
ditionally separate organisational functions, set process improvement goals and
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priorities, provide guidance for quality processes, and provide a point of reference
for appraising current processes.
2.2 Software Architecture
2.2.1 Overview
With the increasing size of software systems now spanning global scale, the
concept of software architecture continues to provide a disciplined process for
planning and building frameworks that can sustain such systems. Even though
different researchers provide different perspectives to the disciplined processes of
software architecture, it is strongly argued that they permit designers to describe
complex systems using abstractions that make the overall system intelligible
[66]. Furthermore, software architecture is identified as a more disciplined basis
for architectural design that has the potential to significantly improve the ability
of software engineers to construct effective software systems. Some leading
literature in system engineering indicate that software architecture can have a
positive impact on at least four aspects of software development: understanding
([207], [67], [65]), reuse ([169], [18]), evolution ([87]), and analysis ([20], [169]).
Software architecture design focuses on understanding a system, its reusabil-
ity, evolution and analysis to meet a desirable quality, as well as controlling
development cost. The quality of such systems are usually identified as depend-
ability quality attributes such as performance, reliability, availability, security,
etc. In essence, software architecture seeks to build a bridge between business
requirements and technical requirements. A good design is sufficiently flexible
to be able to handle the natural drift that occurs over time in hardware and
software technology, as well as in user scenarios and requirements [65]. It is
crucial to consider the overall effect of design decisions, the inherent trade-offs
between quality attributes, and the trade-offs required to address user, system,
and business requirements [20]. In view of this, we first provide an overview of
the dependability of software architecture, and briefly introduce some relevant
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quality attributes. Then, an assessment of some widely used software architec-
ture evaluation methods are discussed in light of quality attribute sensitivity
and trade-off analysis below.
2.2.2 Software System Dependability
Dependability is defined in [16] as the ability to avoid service failures that
are more frequent and more severe than is acceptable. Here, the concept of
dependability leads to trust (i.e. accepted dependence). In this context, the
delivered service is the behaviour of the system, as it is perceived by its user,
which is another system that interacts with the provider and receives the service.
Another work [164], points out that dependability advocates user trust and
customer confidence from a value perspective in doing business, it affects the
bottom line of an organisation in product development or service provision
demanding attention to ascertain dependability performance value. However,
to assess whether a system satisfies the requirements of dependability is not
an easy task, especially when complex and globally distributed systems are
involved. Moreover, such an assessment is further hampered by the fact that
dependability is an encompassing concept which embraces a set of different
attributes, whose emphasis and importance depends on the characteristics of
the system or application being analysed. We provide further definitions and
taxonomy of dependability in the following sections.
2.2.2.1 Definitions and Taxonomy
As mentioned earlier, dependability is an integrating concept which embraces
a number of different, but complementary attributes [16], that correspond to
different viewpoints of the system. Here, we briefly introduce some system
quality attributes:
• Availability - ability of a system to be in a state to perform as required;
• Reliability - ability of a system to perform as required, and without failure
for a given time under a given set of conditions;
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• Safety - absence of disastrous results for the users and the environment;
• Performance - ability of a system to satisfy the service application for a
series of operational time interval;
• Security - ability of a system to prevent unauthorised access and to pro-
tect from intrusions without revealing sensitive information;
• Recoverability - ability of a system to recover from a failure, without
corrective maintenance.
We further discuss some of these quality attributes, which can quantify the de-
pendability of software systems in different perspectives. We begin by providing
an overview of the dependability metrics that facilitate the definition of a set of
quality attributes.
Metrics are commonly used in engineering as measures of system performance
for a given quality attribute [52]. Most often, metrics are computed based on
an analytical model that describes the behaviour of a system as a function of
parameters associated with these attributes. Generally, this analytical model
contains the notion of state, which when combined with the inputs to a system
provides a way to uniquely identify the system at any time. Here, the probability
of the occurrence of a given state as a function of time, and the average time
before a given system state occurs are considered to compute such models. Such
dependability metrics are the:
(a) Mean Time To Failure (MTTF): Average time a system takes to fail. This
metric is often referred to as the average uptime.
(b) Mean Time To Recover/Repair (MTTR): Average recovery time for a sys-
tem.
(c) Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF): Average time between two succes-
sive failures.
(d) Operational Time: The total time an operational system is under obser-
vation.
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We introduce the three quality attributes and their corresponding dependability
metrics that define them below.
Availability of Software Architecture: As introduced earlier, availabil-
ity of a system is its ability to be in a state to perform as required. It also
describes a system’s behaviour in the presence of error treatment mechanisms
such as redundancy (i.e. system replication, checkpointing). Availability can
be classified as either instantaneous or steady-state. Instantaneous availability
is the probability that a system is performing correctly at time, t, and its equal
to reliability for non-repairable systems. On the other hand, steady-state avail-
ability is the probability that a system will be operational at any random point
of time. Usually in practice, the steady-state availability is considered when
observing an operational system over a period of time. Here, availability is the
ratio of uptime and the sum of uptime, scheduled downtime, and unscheduled
downtime. Mathematically, steady-state availability (A) is expressed as:
A =
MTBF
MTBF + MTTR
(2.1)
Reliability of Software Architecture: The reliability of a system (i.e. soft-
ware, hardware) is defined to be the probability that the system performs as
required, without failure, for a given time interval, under given conditions. Re-
liability is a function of time, and it gets smaller as time increases. Here, the
assumption is that the system is fully operational at t=0, and it indicates failure-
free interval of operation. Reliability (R) can be expressed mathematically as:
R = e−(
Time
MTBF
) (2.2)
Performance of Software Architecture: Performance involves the alloca-
tion and adjustment of resources in order to meet the timing requirements of a
system. In this situation, timing behaviour is determined by allocating resources
according to the demands for such resources, choosing between conflicting re-
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(a) Availability Characterisation
(b) Performance Characterisation - Stimuli
(c) Performance Characterisation - Architectural Parameters
(d) Performance Characterisation - Responses
Figure 2.8: Quality Attributes Characterisation (from [43])
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quests for resources, and managing resource usage [140]. To manage perfor-
mance, three main techniques are worth mentioning:
• resource allocation - these are policies for meeting resource demands by
allocating various resources,
• resource arbitration - these are policies for choosing between various re-
quests of a single resource, and
• resource usage - these are strategies affecting the usage of resource.
In assessing the performance of a software system, some of the metrics con-
sidered are system availability, response time, latency, completion time, service
time, bandwidth, throughput, etc.
2.2.3 Quality Attributes Characterisation
Evaluating an architectural design against quality attribute requirements re-
quires a precise characterisation of the quality attributes of concern. From
the knowledge that is already in the various quality attribute communities, we
identified the characterisations from [43] as widely used, due to its effective-
ness. These characterisations serve as starting points, which can be detailed
when preparing to conduct the architecture design or analysis. Here, each qual-
ity attribute characterisation is divided into three categories: external stimuli,
architectural decisions, and responses. The external stimuli are the events that
cause the architecture to respond or change. Also, to analyse an architecture
for adherence to quality requirements, these requirements need to be expressed
in concrete and measurable or observable quantities. Such quantities are de-
scribed as the responses. Then, architectural decisions are those aspects of an
architecture that have a direct impact on achieving attribute responses.
With regards to the availability quality attribute, its stimuli are from Source
(i.e. hardware or software faults), and Type (i.e. value, timing, and stopping).
The parameters that apply to the stimuli are the hardware redundancy, soft-
ware redundancy, voting, retry, and failover. Finally, the responses generated
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are usually in the form of availability, reliability, levels of service, and mean
time to failure. The availability characterisation is depicted in Figure 2.8(a)
with further details. The performance quality attribute presents a relatively
elaborate characterisation. Figure 2.8(b) shows the stimuli for performance as
mode, source, and frequency regularity. The performance parameters considered
in architectural decisions are mainly resource such as CPUs, sensors, networks,
memories, actuators, etc. and resource arbitration in the form of queuing and
pre-emption (see Figure 2.8(c)). Finally, the responses from the performance
characterisation for architectural decision are latency, throughput, and prece-
dence (see Figure 2.8(d)).
2.2.4 Designing Software Systems
In the design of software architecture, quality attributes are a fundamental
consideration in determining the level of dependability of that architecture. This
determination is achieved by using architectural evaluation methods. In this
section, we discuss some architectural evaluation methods. Then we conduct
comparative studies to identify a suitable evaluation method. To achieve this,
some relevant evaluation criteria are defined.
2.2.5 Dependability Evaluation Methods
Architecture evaluation has attracted many researchers and practitioners dur-
ing the last 20 years. Software Architecture can be evaluated at different stages
of software development life-cycle (SDLC). An architecture is evaluated to com-
pare alternatives for identifying strength and weaknesses, at the early phase of
design. Several approaches to evaluate software architecture exist: scenario-
based, mathematical modeling, simulation-based, and experience-based [184].
It is observed that, scenario-based approaches are most widely used in practice.
This approach is considered as a more matured, reliable and easy to implement
in practical situations [166]. Here, we briefly introduce some relevant approaches
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(in two parts: (1) old but relevant methods, and (2) relatively current methods)
below:
First among the old but relevant methods, is the Software Architecture Analy-
sis Method (SAAM) [111] which performs evaluation on software architecture
to identify risks present in architecture, and also able to express the modifia-
bility quality attribute. SAAM is an established method and has been applied
in several case studies, which includes user interface development environment,
internet information systems, keyword in context (KWIC), revision control sys-
tem, global information system, and embedded audio system [112], [43]. SAAM
meets the criteria of involving all major stakeholders, and it is the only method
that has tool support (i.e. Ex:SAAMTOOL), even though partial.
Secondly, the Architecture Trade-off Analysis Method (ATAM) is inspired by
the notion of architectural styles, the quality attribute analysis communities,
and the SAAM (i.e. the predecessor to the ATAM). The ATAM is intended for
sensitivity and trade-off analysis of an architecture with respect to its quality
attributes which covers a broader scope (i.e. performance, availability, security,
modifiability, etc.) [113]. ATAM is also relatively flexible since it allows for
the definition of new quality attributes. In such a situation, the properties of
interest for these attributes will have to be explicitly described during its early
steps. The ATAM easily accommodates new quality-dependent analysis [43]. It
also involves all relevant stakeholders. ATAM consists of nine steps: (1) Present
the ATAM, (2) Present the Business Drivers, (3) Present the Architecture, (4)
Identify Architectural Approaches, (5) Generate the Quality Attribute Utility
Tree, (6) Analyse the Architectural Approaches, (7) Brainstorm and Prioritise
Scenarios, (8) Analyse the Architectural Approaches, and (9) Present Results.
Note that steps (6) and (8) are similar and can be considered redundant.
Also, the SAAM for Complex Scenarios (SAAMCS) extends the SAAM. Its
main goal is to assess risk during system modification. SAAMCS handles spe-
cific problems, and hence it is designed to implement modifiability or flexibility
quality attributes [130]. This method is applied to the final document of ar-
chitecture design. Here, stakeholder involvement is same as SAAM. SAAMCS
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defines a measurement instrument to identify complex scenarios in the system.
To this end, SAAMCS presents a two dimensional framework diagram to lo-
cate complex scenarios. Currently, SAAMCS has no tool support for method
automation.
Another method is the Scenario-Based Architecture Re-engineering (SBAR)
[24]. It drives the architecture re-design for reliability and performance qual-
ity attributes. The main goal of SBAR is to introduce an iterative process of
quality evaluation and architecture transformation. It supports multiple qual-
ity attributes like ATAM but differs from ATAM since it uses different eval-
uation techniques: scenario-based, mathematical modelling, simulation, and
experience-based. In scenario-based approach, SBAR defines scenarios for each
quality attribute and maps the performance of architecture. SBAR has been
applied in fire-alarm system [35], measurement system [112], and dialysis system
[24].
The Extending SAAM by Integration in the Domain (ESAAMI) is similar to
SAAM, however it differs as it considers the existence of a reusable knowledge-
base. ESAAMI integrates the existing knowledge in the reuse based develop-
ment and domain-centric process [148]. It introduces the concept of reusable
products (or “protoscenario”) that are deployed during the steps of the method.
The stakeholder involvement here is the same as in SAAM.
The Architecture-Level Modifiability Analysis (ALMA) is also a scenario-based
architecture evaluation method, which analyses software architecture for modi-
fiability quality attribute. ALMA assesses modifiability property by employing
indicators, such as risk assessment, and maintenance cost prediction. Origi-
nally, ALMA is a combination of two architecture evaluation methods, created
by [26], and [130]. Here, both methods are based on scenarios and uses similar
structures. ALMA provides five steps for evaluation: (1) setting the analysis
goal, (2) describing software architectures, (3) eliciting scenarios, (4) evaluating
change scenarios, and (5) interpreting the results. It has been applied to anal-
yse various software architecture case studies, such as haemo-dialysis system (a
medical treatment device), mobile positioning center assessment (a telecommu-
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nications service provider system), ComBAD Framework assessment (a domain
specific architecture for administrative systems) [129]. ALMA considers various
sets of stakeholders for different activities.
The Architecture Level Prediction of Software Maintenance (ALPSM) has been
developed to predict software maintainability during software architecture de-
sign [25]. Such predictions are used for balancing maintainability of quality
attributes, or to compare architectural alternatives. ALPSM considers inputs
such as requirement specification, architecture design, software engineer ex-
pertise, and historical maintenance data. However, its outputs are estimated
maintenance efforts and maintenance profile. Some benefits of ALPSM are that
it is practically used in architecture design and it gives not only prediction but
also gives improved understanding of requirements. ALPSM has been validated
for Haemo-Dialysis System [25].
The final method is the Software Architecture Comparison Method (SACAM),
which provides basis for selecting architecture by comparing different candidate
architectures [28]. A set of criteria based on business goals of an organisation
is used by SACAM to compare architectures. It helps organisations to explore
architecture design mainly in product line architectures. That said, SACAM
is used for architecture design in many architectures from different vendors or
contractors.
2.2.5.1 Comparative Study
We conduct a comparative study of the software architecture evaluation meth-
ods, based on a defined set of criteria. Considering software systems that are
distributed and deployed using the cloud deployment model, we focus on the
fact that this environment is characterised by random evolution which affects
the dependability of deployed systems. The main criteria for our comparative
study are that the evaluation methods should have:
(a) A goal of sensitivity and trade-off analysis:- In a rapidly evolving
environment, an efficient evaluation method should be capable of identi-
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fying the quality attributes that change relative to others. Also, it must
be able to inform architectural decisions regarding an acceptable trade-off
between quality attributes.
(b) A focus on multiple quality attributes:- In the described environment
above, typically there will be multiple competing quality attributes. It
is, however, relevant that an appropriate evaluation method can consider
varying quality attributes.
(c) The involvement of multiple or all architecture stakeholders:-
Stakeholders are the custodians of architecture requirements, and their in-
volvement in the evaluation and development processes are critical. That
said, an appropriate evaluation method should actively involve many rel-
evant stakeholders (for requirements coverage).
We are also interested in identifying (d) the SDLC stage(s) that the methods
apply to, (e) application of methods in projects, and (f) whether there are tools
that support the methods.
A: Summary of Comparative Study
A summary of our comparative study is shown in Figure 2.9. For Criteria
(a), we identified that ATAM is the only method that has a goal to analyse
system sensitivity and trade-off. Criteria (b) is met by ATAM, SBAR, and
SACAM for focusing on multiple quality attributes. Finally, ATAM, SAAM,
ALMA, SAAMCS, and ESAAMI involve multiple or all stakeholders to meet
Criteria (c). An overall assessment shows that even though ESAAMI met two
criteria (i.e. Criteria 2 and 3 ), ATAM on the other hand met all three criteria.
Furthermore, ATAM can be applied iteratively to SDLC improvement processes,
but it has no tool support. Some reported successful applications of ATAM are
the role-playing game to teach ATAM [149], architectural evaluation of a data
center system [177], assessment of a battlefield control system [110], war game
simulation [106], product line architecture [199], control of a transportation
system [36], credit card transactions system [133] and a dynamic map system
[203].
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To ensure that ATAM is effective as a method compared to more recent meth-
ods, we compare some relatively recent architecture evaluation methods and
approaches to ATAM based on the set criteria above. We begin by providing
an overview of the considered methods, and then tabulate their features in the
context of a set of relevant criteria.
The first method [206] proposes the aspectual software architecture analysis
method (ASAAM) which explicitly identify and specify the architectural as-
pects and make them transparent early in the software development life cycle.
In software architecture analysis, it is implicitly assumed that an appropriate
refactoring of the architecture design can help in coping with critical scenar-
ios and mending the architecture. The authors also show that, similar to the
notion of aspect at the programming level, there are concerns at the architec-
ture design level which inherently crosscut multiple architectural components.
Such concerns are referred to as architectural aspects. Here, they indicate that
such concerns cannot be localised in one architectural component and which,
as such, can not be easily managed by using conventional abstraction mecha-
nisms. In this context, ASAAM introduces a set of heuristic rules that help to
derive architectural aspects and the corresponding tangled architectural com-
ponents from scenarios. They illustrate their approach for architectural aspect
identification with the architecture design of a window management system.
Another work [215], that applies scenario-based architecture analysis, provides
a motivation that scenarios are especially helpful for visualising and under-
standing the incorporation of new systems within systems of systems. They
argue that, if used as the basis for decisions about candidate designs, then it is
important that such decisions can be rationalised, and quantitative assessment
is particularly important. Their work introduces an approach for developing
complex scenarios, which incorporates the phases of systems development and
deployment, is presented and a quantitative method of comparison is described.
Their approach is based on the development of measures of merit and measures
of performance. The techniques are illustrated using cases that are relevant to
Network Enabled Capability.
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The use of Representational State Transfer (REST) as an architectural style for
integrating services and applications introduces some risks. Importantly, this
work, [48] indicates that such risks are failures to effectively address quality at-
tribute requirements such as security, reliability, and performance. They argue
that, an architecture evaluation conducted early in the software life-cycle can
identify and help mitigate these risks. This work presents guidelines to assist
architecture evaluation activities in REST-based systems. These guidelines can
be systematically used in conjunction with scenario-based evaluation methods
to reason about design considerations and trade-offs. This work also presents
a proof of concept to describe how to use the guidelines in the context of an
Architecture Trade-off Analysis Method (ATAM) evaluation.
The final approach, [172] begins by describing an exploratory study for the eval-
uation of the performance quality attribute for releases of the same system. This
work aims mainly to reveal performance degradations of architectural scenarios
and their possible causes. The study uses three software systems from differ-
ent domains: (1) a large-scale web system, (2) a UML modeling tool, and (3)
a client-server framework for development of network applications. The data
collection of the study is accomplished using a scenario-based approach that
uses dynamic analysis and code repository mining to provide an automated way
to reveal degradations of scenarios on releases of software systems. The results
of the study show the feasibility of the approach to determine the causes of
the performance degradations of scenarios, including the degraded and changed
methods of scenarios, and the issues that have affected them.
B: Summary of Comparative Study of Some Relatively Current Meth-
ods and ATAM
A summary of our comparative study of ATAM and some recent architecture
evaluation methods is tabulated in Figure 2.10. Considering the goal of the
methods in Criteria (a), we identified that the method provided for “evaluat-
ing REST architecture” is the only one that considers “risks” and “trade-offs”
related to multiple quality attributes in designing an architecture. Even though
ASAAM identifies risks in its analysis, it classifies them as “concerns” and do
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not consider them in relation to multiple quality attributes. With Criteria
(b), it is only the method for evaluating REST architecture that meets the
expectation of considering “multiple quality attributes” (i.e. more than two at-
tributes). It must be mentioned that the “scenario-based method for designing
and evaluating architectures for capability” considers two quality attributes (i.e.
capability and performance). Finally, even though all the methods consider ma-
jor stakeholders in their analysis, it is only the method for “evaluating REST
architecture” that considers all stakeholders. Here, the method for “evaluating
REST architecture” effectively meets Criteria (c).
2.2.5.2 Observations from Final Comparative Study
We identified two features that we consider to be relevant to our work:
(a) Two of these methods (i.e. ASAAM [206] and method for evaluating REST
architecture, [48]) introduce a form of directives to guide system archi-
tects and relevant stakeholders on how to analyse architectures with their
methods (refer to the “Evaluation Approaches” in Figure 2.10). Here,
[206] presents “heuristics” to identify architectural concerns (as defined by
SAAM), and [48] also provides “guidelines” for identifying risks and trade-
offs during the design of an architecture (as defined by ATAM). With
these directives, the mentioned works are able to narrow the context and
applicability of their proposed methods.
(b) In the work [48], the evaluation method is applied to a “web ecosystem
of physical devices” designed as a REST architecture. As all composing
services of the cloud environment are designed and deployed as REST
web services, this work has a potential of being scaled up to apply to
systems that are designed for the cloud environment. With the cloud
environment being characterised by rapid topological evolution, and the
random interactions of quality attributes, it will be particularly interesting
to apply a custom method to facilitate the design and/or evaluation of
systems in such an environment.
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2.2.6 Classifying the Size of Architectures for Target Anal-
ysis
These discussed architecture analysis methods are effective with regards to the
quality attributes of concern, team size, etc. However, we identify that none of
them consider the size of architecture being analysed. This is relevant because
a very large architecture can introduce complexities to the analysis process,
which may render it ineffective. Some widely used architecture classification
approaches can be used as a reference point in order to focus the analysis pro-
cess to a particular size of architecture. We consider the Common Software
Measurement International Consortium (COSMIC) Functional Size Measure-
ment [141] as a viable option for classifying architectures. This process is sim-
ple to achieve, and yet effective in its application. It takes into account that a
functional process (FP) can be derived from at least one identifiable Functional
User Requirement (FUR) within the agreed scope. The FP is an elementary
component of a set of FUR, comprising a unique, cohesive and independently
executable set of data movements. The COSMIC measurement phase distin-
guishes four types of data movements: entry, exit, read, and write. To measure
the functional size, COSMIC assigns a single unit of measure, one 1 to each
data movement. By convention, it is called 1 CFP (Cosmic Function Point).
The total size of the software being measured, corresponds to the addition of
all data movements recognised by the COSMIC FSM method.
The COSMIC FSM method is based on the application of a set of models,
rules, and procedures to a given piece of software, as it is defined from its
Functional User Requirements (FUR). The FUR is a subset of the user require-
ments describing what the software does in terms of tasks and services. This
FSM standard is suitable for measuring various types of software (such as busi-
ness application software, real-time software or web-based and Internet applica-
tions, etc). Furthermore, in conformity with ISO 14143-1 (specifically ISO/IEC
19761) [101], the COSMIC method is independent of the implementation deci-
sions embedded in the operational artefacts of the software to be measured and
it excludes both the software quality and technical characteristics.
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COSMIC FSM is often applied to the International Software Benchmarking
Standards Group (ISBSG) [210] release 8 dataset for categorising software project
size.
Related Work on Frameworks that Support System Engi-
neering
In this section, we consider related works spanning frameworks or architectures
that support system engineering. We discuss these works along two strands:
non-cloud-based frameworks and cloud-based frameworks.
2.2.6.1 Non-Cloud-Based Frameworks
With regards to the Evidential Tool Bus [186], the authors propose a tool com-
bination of theorem provers, model checkers, static analysers, test generators,
etc. where many tools and methods are used in an ad-hoc combination within
a single analysis. This sort of combination requires an integrating platform - a
tool bus - to connect the various tools together; but the capabilities required
go beyond those of platforms such as Eclipse. In the tool bus, all tools are co-
equals, and are mainly coordinating components of the tool bus. The entities
exchanged among clients of the bus - proofs, counterexamples, specifications,
theorems, abstractions - have logical content, and the overall purpose of the bus
is to gather and integrate evidence for verification or refutation. Even though
this work provides a roadmap for a tools combination framework for system
engineering, it focuses exclusively on applications to formal methods. This fo-
cus in our opinion, is very narrow with regards to system engineering. Also,
such a tool bus is accessible to a limited number of stakeholders of a system
engineering project, and at a limited geographic location.
Another work is the Open Framework for Software Engineering Tools (OPHE-
LIA) [225], [53] platform which provides a unified software engineering tools
integration technology. The concept behind the project involves the definition
of standardised set of interfaces abstracting functionalities of different kinds
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of software development tools. To maintain implementation language inde-
pendence, Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) technology
[158] is used to define the interfaces. As part of the Object Management Group
(OMG) [159] work, they have developed a comprehensive distributed open sys-
tems framework known as CORBA. It is a standard for object middleware used
in the heterogeneous environment. The main weakness of OPHELIA is of poor
memory management, which is inherited from the CORBA platform. Also, the
use of the CORBA platform as a middleware for integration introduces overhead
costs through its use of brokers or translators.
2.2.6.2 Cloud-Based Frameworks
The cloud platform is currently being applied in various ways to support differ-
ent combinations of software and system engineering phases. Such applications
are generally presented in a form of software systems or architectures. Among
other benefits, this platform provides global access to distributed teams for
global software development. Some of these systems or architectures for system
development are discussed below:
In the Design Assistant Agent for a Vendor (DAAV) system [108], the authors
propose a design assistant agent for defining requirement specifications for a
multi-lingual design team, which plays a roll of a bridge engineer. They ar-
gue the necessity of a bridge engineer for a multi-lingual development team,
who bridges gaps between different languages, cultures and social systems of a
client and a vendor to define a requirement specification of an application sys-
tem. Also, they propose a concept of agent-based support system for defining
requirement specifications, consisting of two design assistant agents: a defini-
tion support subsystem and a language translation web service. The subsys-
tem consists of Graphical Modeling (GM) functions for clients and developers
to draw Unified Modeling Language (UML) diagram or Mindmap for defining
requirement specifications. In essence, this work introduces a multi-lingual ex-
pert system for distributed global software development. This expert system
plays a very important role in terms of catering for the socio-cultural aspect
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of distributed global software development. However, other essential develop-
ment aspects involving project co-ordination and control using information and
knowledge sharing mechanisms are not considered.
The scalability of the cloud (i.e. Amazon Web Service [1]) is used to test a
complex set of test cases of the Google Chrome software. Testing is a critical
phase in the software life-cycle. While small-scale component-wise testing is
done routinely as part of development and maintenance of large-scale software,
the system level testing is much more problematic due to low level of coverage of
potential usage scenarios by test cases and high costs associated with wide-scale
testing of large software. Wide scale software testing requiring substantial com-
putation and storage resources and where the testing process can be automated
through a workflow needing minimal human intervention is representative of
the type of testing that may benefit from the use of the cloud. Such testing
is generally not practicable on typical desktop computers, due to limitation of
resource scalability and consequently time and cost limitations. The ultimate
aim of this work is to verify applicability of network analysis methods to analyse
software engineering data, so that these methods may be adopted for software
analysis to support software testing [212], [163]. That said, only one type of
testing tool is used as multiple instances to process the set of test cases. This
however, presents a limited perspective in terms of the results from the test
tool. A set of multiple test tools with different versions can be coordinated to
facilitate a comprehensive testing process, as well as further demonstrate the
scalability of the cloud.
Eclipse has an on-going project named Eclipse Orion which is building an in-
tegrated web-based tool-set, and targets first the web client languages such as
JavaScript, CSS, and HTML. The project aims to move software development
to the web as a web browser experience and not by cloning the desktop IDE ex-
perience. This is not particularly the direction of our work. We aim to support
system engineering lif-cycle processes on the cloud, and not a complete move-
ment of software engineering. A further look into Orion shows that it consists of
loosely coupled components written in JavaScript, and server-side services ex-
posed via REST-oriented HTTP APIs. These components and services can be
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combined in many different ways to create various kinds of browser-based appli-
cations. However, parts of Orion can also be used in traditional desktop clients
as well as server side applications. The data being manipulated by such tools
can reside either on a remote server or a local machine [209]. Our assessment
of local and remote IDEs is that operating on local data offers better perfor-
mance and facilitates offline usage, but does not provide the always secure, and
backed-up nature of storing data on the server [209].
Similar to the Eclipse Orion project is the Codenvy project [47]. The Co-
denvy structure is also developed as a RESTful web service, which supports
IDEs for Java/Android, PHP, JSP, XML, Python, Perl languages, etc. The
browser-based clients deploy projects to target platforms on the Cloud. The
Codenvy web service is developed to make Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) such
as Amazon Elastic Beanstalk, CloudBees, etc. flexible and convenient to use.
Codenvy is built upon a scalable, extensible plug-in architecture that includes
an embedded cloud-local builder and runner to package and debug applications.
Codenvy includes the usual IDE tools, integrations, and plug-ins such as syntax
highlighting, code completion, refactoring, packages, build manager, continuous
integration, git, and PaaS deployment. It also provides the flexibility to devel-
opers to use their provided software development kit (SDK) to build their own
extensions. It integrates a wide range of technologies which can be classified
into Languages, Databases, Platforms/Continuous Integration and Build Sys-
tems, Repositories and Agile System Development. The developer can create a
project and virtually navigate the entire Codenvy IDE in a similar way as in
Eclipse. Codenvy does not integrate into desktop IDEs.
2.3 Cloud Deployment Environment
2.3.1 Cloud Computing
Cloud computing [103] is one of the best service provider in the information
technology (IT) industry. The on-demand service is the most important char-
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acteristic, and others are resource pooling, measured service, broad network
access, and rapid elasticity. Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) offer services in
three main categories: Infrastructure as a service (IaaS), Platform as a service
(PaaS) and software as a service (SaaS). Also, there are four deployment mod-
els: private cloud which is owned or operated by a single organisation, public
cloud is available to the general public, but owned and operated by government
organisations, institutions, businesses, etc., community cloud involves a com-
mon infrastructure for organisations of the same community, and hybrid cloud
which is a composition of two or more clouds. Cloud computing offers some
benefits such as low cost, unlimited smart storage, flexibility, improved perfor-
mance, increased data reliability [78]. Some studies have shown that businesses
that adopt SaaS enjoy a return-on-investment of almost 600% [194].
2.3.2 Issues with Cloud Computing
In spite of the mentioned benefits, the cloud platform is faced with some chal-
lenges. We identify some of these challenges from literature as lack of customer
trust, vague SLAs, perceived lack of reliability, threats to security and privacy,
absence of independent quality assurance body, etc. Some of these challenges
are discussed below.
2.3.2.1 Lack of Customer Trust
Cloud computing raises more than economical and technical challenges, but also
has implications on trust [128]. The highly distributed and non-transparent na-
ture of cloud computing represents a considerable obstacle to the acceptance
and market success of cloud services. Potential users of these services often
feel that they lose control over their data and they are not sure whether cloud
providers can be trusted [74]. Also, with the growing number of CSPs, the cus-
tomers are facing a challenge to select the best and most appropriate providers
from numerous offers. In a typical scenario [61], it is pointed out that a CSP can
offer a reasonably secure service while another may not. If the latter charges
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half the price, the majority of organisations will opt for the latter one as there
is no real way to explore the difference.
2.3.2.2 Weak Service Level Agreements (SLAs)
Standard SLAs in the present cloud market are also one of the obstacles that
the cloud users face while adopting the services offered by the cloud providers.
These SLAs are perceived to be weak in terms of assuring the needs of users, and
require non-ambiguous descriptions to cater for clear definition of responsibili-
ties to all cloud stakeholders. Cloud users might face problems that occur from
insufficient security measures, data unavailability, CSP lock-in, hidden costs,
and non-transparent infrastructure. In most cases, SLAs are created to protect
the CSPs and not the customers. CSPs do not provide SLAs guaranteeing min-
imum levels of performance [104]. Most of the above mentioned problems are
sidelined in current SLAs offered by the CSPs.
2.3.2.3 Perceived Lack of Reliability
Availability of resources in cloud computing is identified as one of the biggest
concerns for the cloud users [12]. Here, reference to availability is not only
with respect to the reachability of the cloud service, but also the success rate of
the transaction. The cloud platform’s quality of service involving availability,
reliability and performance are of interest. Most cloud providers do not define
the availability in this way. CSPs use the availability term to show their cloud
users the level of reliability they would get regarding the cloud services. Most
CSPs offer 99.99% availability for their servers, but it is not clear whether
the availability is for a single server where the virtual instance of particular
cloud user resides or for all the servers placed in geographically distributed
datacenters. Many reported outage incidents in the datacenters of the CSPs,
indicate a negative image to the cloud users about the providers regarding
reliability [12].
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2.3.2.4 Absence of Independent Quality Assurance Body
Some CSPs are offering monitoring tools for the cloud users to monitor their
service’s availability and performance in real-time with extra charges [75]. An
example is Amazon Web Service’s CloudWatch service. However, most of the
CSPs are not offering these kind of solutions. Those that provide it do not
really monitor the SLA compliance. This calls for independent quality assurance
bodies for monitoring the performance or quality of the Cloud services, in the
context of SLA compliance.
2.3.3 Cloud Dependability Assurance
To gain some understanding of the assurances provided by CSPs for cloud re-
sources, it is important to be able to have reference points, and widely accepted
benchmarks that clarify such reference points. This work identifies the cloud
SLA as the main reference point for cloud dependability assurance. Also, some
dependability assurance information sources are provided to guide the under-
standing of the SLA.
2.3.3.1 Cloud Service Level Agreements
In this work, we consider Amazon Web Services (AWS) as the choice for the
type of cloud computing platform. In light of this, we assess AWS’ service
level agreement (SLA) for their Elastic Cloud Compute (EC2) service [1]. We
identified that this SLA guarantees two things:
(a) That the EC2’s application programming interface (API) will be available
to allow for the launching of new instances 99.9% of the time.
(b) That at least one user instance will be able to access the Internet 99.9% of
the time (specifically, it’s an outage if 100% of user instances cannot reach
the Internet 99.9% of the time).
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The AWS SLA does not specifically cover the reliability of the AWS EC2 in-
stances. Even with the assurances provided for the availability of the AWS
EC2 instances, they are rather vague. That said, the AWS SLA provides some
grounds for the definition of the boundaries for the assurance of system avail-
ability. The AWS SLA however provides some definitions, service credits and
service commitments. These are presented below:
• “Monthly Uptime Percentage” is calculated by subtracting from 100% the
percentage of minutes during the month in which Amazon EC2 was in the
state of “Region Unavailable”.
• “Region Unavailable” and “Region Unavailability” mean that more than
one Availability Zone in which an instance is running, within the same
Region, is “Unavailable” to users.
(a) “Unavailable” and “Unavailability” mean:- For Amazon EC2, when
all of the user’s running instances have no external connectivity.
(b) A “Service Credit” is a dollar credit, calculated as set forth below,
that AWS may credit back to an eligible account.
Service Credits are calculated as a percentage of the total charges paid by users
(excluding one-time payments such as upfront payments made for Reserved In-
stances) for either Amazon EC2 in the Region affected for the monthly billing
cycle in which the Region Unavailability occurred. For a Monthly Uptime Per-
centage of less than 99.95% but equal to or greater than 99.0%, and less than
99.0%, Service Credit Percentage of 10% and 30% are provided respectively. Fi-
nally, the Amazon EC2 SLA commitment is 99.95% availability for each Amazon
EC2 Region.
2.3.3.2 Cloud IaaS 2016 Benchmark
Standard Performance Evaluation Corporation (SPEC)’s first benchmark suite
to measure cloud performance - SPEC Cloud IaaS 2016 [198]. However, the
benchmark addresses the performance of infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) pub-
lic or private cloud platforms, which is designed to stress provisioning as well
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as runtime aspects of a cloud using input-output (I/O) and central processing
unit (CPU) intensive cloud computing workloads. SPEC selects the social me-
dia NoSQL database transaction and K-Means clustering using Map Reduce as
two significant and representative workload types within cloud computing. Also,
the test uses the Red Hat Enterprise Linux Openstack Platform 7 and a KVM
hypervisor in the Dell Inc. USA cloud environment. The key benchmarking
metrics are scalability, elasticity, and mean instance provisioning time.
Figure 2.11: The “Nines” of Availability [224]
2.3.3.3 The “Nines” of Availability
High-demand systems that are commonly in around-the-clock service, the avail-
ability is frequently measured by the number of “nines” [224]. If availability is
99.0%, it is stated to be “2 nines”, and so on. Figure 2.11 depicts the amount
of downtime a system exhibits within one year (365 days) of continuous desired
operation and its associated number of nines, which are calculated using this
formula using the availability equation (2.1) introduced in Section 2.2.2.1. Ob-
taining 5 nines or 99.999% availability is an ambitious goal that often requires
critical system components that are redundant. Such redundant components
can help reduce the time to repair a system.
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2.3.4 Cloud Accountability Analysis
Digital forensics is playing an increasing important role in digital introspection
for evidence collection especially for investigating criminal activity. According
to the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) [182], 4,263 tera-bytes (TB) of
data was processed for digital forensic in 7,629 criminal examinations in 2011,
as opposed to 439 TB and 880 criminal cases in 2003. With the increased migra-
tion of critical information technology services into the cloud, digital forensics
is poised to become instrumental in investigating vulnerabilities and possible
criminal activities committed in cloud environments as well [68]. Such a pro-
cess can be classified as cloud accountability. Here, we define accountability as
a clear disclosure of service obligations; faithfully honouring of disclosed obliga-
tions, or otherwise assuming the liability for the unsatisfactory performance of
the obligations [227] by cloud agents (i.e. service providers, software engineers).
Typically, accountability in service is achieved through the enforcement of a
legal and paper-based contract. In a cloud service context, using a paper-based
contract is no longer effective [228]. The current practice is for service providers
to publish a terms and conditions page and a text-based SLA for their offerings
on their website does. In its plain-text form, a web-enabled paper-based con-
tract can neither be interpreted by software agents, nor be used as a basis for
monitoring the execution of a contract.
It is important for cloud computing services to provide assurance based on
detailed trust-focused auditing to enable forensic conclusions to be drawn for the
purpose of accountability. It is relevant to note that, the indiscriminate addition
of auditing to a run-time environment introduces performance overheads. With
cloud accountability:
• the cloud users can investigate whether the provider is meeting their ex-
pectations according to the service level agreement,
• if violations are reported, the cloud users can provide evidence to verify
who is responsible, and
• if there is a dispute, the cloud users can present proof to a third party (i.e.
57
regulator or judge).
Figure 2.12: Architecture of Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI)
2.3.4.1 Digital Forensic Approach
Digital forensic is about obtaining, preserving, analysing, and documenting dig-
ital evidence from digital devices [39]. Digital forensic has been widely accepted
and largely used in investigating cloud security issues [147], [192], [195]. This
activity is called cloud forensic, which is defined broadly by [185] as “an applica-
tion of digital forensic science in cloud computing environments”. Technically,
it consists of a hybrid forensic approach (e.g., remote, virtual, network, live,
large-scale, thin-client, thick-client) towards the generation of digital evidence.
Generally, cloud forensic is based on the well-established and widely accepted
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standard of NIST SP800-86 [114]. The concept of Virtual Machine Introspection
(VMI) for digital evidence collection is briefly presented. Also, some sources for
digital evidence are introduced.
Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI)
VMI [173] is the technique of locating and accessing the digital forensic evidence
on a running virtual machine (VM) (i.e. user-VM) from another isolated running
VM (i.e. admin-VM) which is co-located on the same hardware and which has
required privileges to access the hypervisor layer. VMI is transparent and does
not interrupt the work-flow of the target user-VM nor can it be detected from
there. VMI is especially of interest for security-related techniques, e.g. intrusion
detection. Fine-grained VMI techniques are used to locate, read and write
potential configuration settings of running applications (see Figure 2.12).
The open-source programming library, “LibVMI” is focused on reading and
writing memory from virtual machines [127]. Therefore monitoring applica-
tions can access the memory state, CPU registers and disk activity of target
operating systems in a safe and efficient manner [123]. Memory can directly be
read during runtime of virtual machines. Thus, it is possible to create memory
dumps for further processing. In order to meet safety and integrity require-
ments, target VMs can be paused in order to eliminate the chance of acquiring
inconsistent snapshots. The library itself is written in C and comes with a
Python wrapper to be able to integrate access to VMs to Python scripts [139].
Sources of Evidence
Digital evidence is collected from multiple sources across a cloud system:
• Hypervisor: Hypervisors, also known as virtual machine monitors (VMMs),
such as Citrix’s Xen, VMWare ESXi and Microsoft HyperV, are used to
manage virtual machines (VMs) and their various hardware resources (i.e.
CPUs, RAM, NICs, hard drive, etc.) [202]. It can provide runtime statis-
tics, but also information can be derived from the hypervisor using ad-
vanced techniques like Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI). Evidence col-
lected from the hypervisor can be invaluable, since a VM can be observed
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from the outside.
• The Cloud Management System (CMS): CMS is a large source for
evidence information. It is the central controlling component of a cloud
infrastructure and provides information about user logins, cloud service
usage, access rights, configuration, resource provisioning, policies, loca-
tion, etc. CSPs like Amazon Web Services (AWS) provide monitoring
features such as the AWS CloudWatch and application programming in-
terface (API) for such information gathering.
2.3.4.2 Net Present Value
The idea of Net Present Value (NPV) involves the concept of the time value
of money and takes into consideration that money spent or obtained in future
periods will have a different value than money spent or obtained in the present
[132]. NPV has been a standard method for the financial appraisal of projects.
NPV calculations can be currently found in every project document (i.e. busi-
ness case, project plan, etc.), and project managers throughout the world use
this methodology to compare the value of different projects against investment
targets [223]. In the same light, users of cloud resources should be able to know
the value of their cloud investments relative to their investment expectations.
2.3.4.3 Related Work
We identify some related works that provide an approach to ensuring a level
of transparency or accountability from CSPs. To this end, we first consider
some approaches that encourage or measure transparency towards security on
the cloud platforms. First, the A4Cloud FP7 Project [29] is focused on the ac-
countability of the cloud in terms of data security. In the context of the A4Cloud
FP7 Project, accountability concerns data stewardship regimes in which organ-
isations that are entrusted with personal and business confidential data are
responsible and liable for processing, sharing, storing and otherwise using the
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data according to contractual and legal requirements from the time it is col-
lected until when the data is destroyed (including onward transfer to and from
third parties). Similar works are Cloud Controls Matrix (CCM) Framework
[44] developed by the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA); the Information Assur-
ance Framework [38] also developed by the European Union Agency for Network
and Information Security (ENISA), SMICloud Framework [64] which relies on
the service measurement indexes that have been identified by the Cloud Service
Measurement Index Consortium (CSMIC) [196], and the Complete, Auditable,
and Reportable Approach (C.A.RE) [162]. All of these works are mainly for
intrusion detection, including [82], [179], [23], [191], [201].
However, we consider the few related systems for assuring dependability in
the cloud which are more in line with our work. The three main identified
related works are conceptually similar to our work. The first work [69], measures
and uses quality of service (QoS) information to predict availability, quantify
risk, and consider liability in case of failure. They demonstrate that there is
a pressing need for such an understanding and explore a set of benchmarks
that offers an interesting characterisation of resource performance variability
which can be quite significant. Also, they identify how such information can be
used both directly by a user and indirectly via a Cloud Broker in the automatic
construction and management of SLAs which reference certain kinds of financial
portfolios (i.e. pricing models, risk management). However, this work focuses on
cloud performance and considers the automatic construction of SLAs that would
incorporate expectations over quality of service by referencing benchmarks.
The second work is the Phantom [76] which uses fault injection as a means
of assessing the dependability of cloud systems. Generally, it observes probe
responses to monitor the cloud environment, and generates an alarm when the
quality degrades beyond an acceptable range. It consists of three main com-
ponents, namely Havoc, Monitor, and Analysis. These components interact
independently with the cloud service. More specifically, Havoc injects simu-
lated failure events into the cloud, while Monitor “actively” monitors the cloud’s
behaviour through probes it issues towards the cloud. Phantom’s Analysis com-
ponent observes probe responses, creates a profile of the cloud’s failure detector
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and recovery system performance, and generates an alarm when the quality de-
grades beyond an acceptable range. With this work however, events of failure
are simulated instead of actually observing the cloud platform for actual occur-
rences of failure. That said, Phantom uses its “active meta-monitor” approach
to detect degradation of the cloud’s own failure detector and recovery systems.
On the other hand, the recorded failures are not analysed with respect to the
CSPs SLA. Also, evidence gathering is mainly by observing the metric provided
by the CSP of an open cloud platform.
Similarly, the Cloud Broker Architecture [3] is concerned with fault detection,
fault evaluation and taking decision for recovery or migration as a means for
assuring dependability. It is composed of five modules that collaborate to assure
trust in cloud services with focus on dependability properties. The cloud broker
architecture for dependability involves the main actors of the cloud chain namely
the cloud consumer and the cloud provider and operates consequently. The three
main modules (i.e. service discovery, service composition and service delivery)
are aimed to fulfil the commonly inquired roles from the cloud broker. Each
module can operate independently. The main shortcoming of the Cloud Broker
Architecture is inherited from the CORBA platform [217]. This weakness is
that of poor memory management. This weakness leads to ad-hoc solutions
with regards to avoiding memory leaks. This has the potential of introducing
large overhead cost.
2.3.5 Trust Assurance Methods
Trust is a critical factor in cloud computing; in present practice it depends
largely on perception of reputation, and self assessment by providers of cloud
services. Here, we briefly discuss some mechanisms generally classified under
(a) reputation-based trust, (b) SLA verification based trust, and (c) evidence-
based trust, that have been introduced in literature to assure trust for cloud
services.
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2.3.5.1 Reputation-Based Trust
Trust and reputation are related, but different. Basically, trust is between two
entities; but the reputation of an entity is the aggregated opinion of a community
towards that entity. Usually, an entity that has high reputation is trusted by
many entities in that community; an entity, who needs to make trust judgment
on an trustee, may use the reputation to calculate or estimate the trust level
of that trustee. Reputation systems are widely used in e-commerce and P2P
networks. The reputation of cloud services or CSPs will undoubtedly impact
cloud users’ choice of cloud services; consequently, cloud providers try to build
and maintain higher reputation.
Provisioned cloud resources on-demand are especially vulnerable to cyber at-
tacks (i.e. security breaches, copyright violations, and privacy abuses). The
cloud platforms built by Google, IBM, and Amazon all reveal this weaknesses.
In this work, [91] the authors propose a new approach to integrating virtual
clusters, security-reinforced data-centers, and trusted data accesses guided by
reputation systems. A hierarchy of P2P reputation systems is suggested to
protect clouds and data-centers at the site level, and to safeguard the data ob-
jects at the file-access level. Different security countermeasures are suggested
to protect cloud service models: IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS, currently implemented
by Amazon, IBM, and Google, respectively.
In this work, [2] they investigate the problem of establishing trust in hybrid
cloud computing environments for resource sharing and collaboration. As the
scope of federated cloud computing enlarges to ubiquitous and pervasive com-
puting, there will be a need to assess and maintain the trustworthiness of the
cloud computing entities. This work presents a fully distributed framework that
enables trust-based cloud customer and cloud service provider interactions. The
framework aids a service consumer in assigning an appropriate weight to the
feedback of different raters regarding a prospective service provider. Based on
the framework, the authors developed a mechanism for controlling falsified feed-
back ratings from iteratively exerting trust level contamination due to falsified
feedback ratings. The experimental analysis shows that the proposed framework
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successfully dilutes the effects of falsified feedback ratings, thereby facilitating
accurate and fair assessment of the service reputation.
Many existing reputation based systems either ignore or give less importance to
uncertainty linked with the evidence. The authors in this work, [167] propose an
uncertainty model linked with the evidence and define their approach to com-
pute opinion for cloud service providers. Using subjective logic operators along
with the computed opinion values, they also propose mechanisms to calculate
the reputation of cloud service providers.
Also, this work [216] proposes a combinatorial model for assessing trust dy-
namism in the cloud services. Cloud services and trust value are assessed based
on compliance and reputation. Service logs-based compliance reflects dynamic
trust. The reputation has been calculated from cooperative user feedback. Feed-
back rating is the sight of each user about the appealed services. The exposed
services that fulfill the user necessities are ranked according to their trust values
and top-k cloud services are suggested to the user. The method is well-organised
and noticeably improves service-selection process in cloud applications, in terms
of security, reliability, and dynamicity.
In [40], they have proposed a method for trust and reputation evaluation in the
cloud through the recommendations of “opinion leaders” and eradicating the
effect of troll entities. Trust value was assessed using five factors; accessibility,
reliability, data integrity, identity, and ability. Also, they offered a method for
opinion leaders and malicious entity identification via three topological metrics,
including input degree, output degree, and reputation measures. The method
being assessed in various situations where displays the results of accuracy by
eliminating the effect of malicious entities and the recommendation of opinion
leaders. The results have been obtained with a program, MATLAB. It offers
suitable security, integrity, and safety.
2.3.5.2 SLA Verification Based Trust
After establishing the initial trust and employing a cloud service, the cloud user
needs to verify and re-evaluate the trust. A service level agreement (SLA) is
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a legal contract between a cloud user and a cloud service provider. Therefore,
quality of service (QoS) monitoring and SLA verification is an important basis
of trust management for cloud computing. A number of models that derive
trust from SLA verification have been proposed and some are discussed below.
In this model [79], the authors argue that for business workflow automation in a
service-enriched environment such as a grid or a cloud, services scattered across
heterogeneous Virtual Organisations (VOs) can be aggregated in a producer-
consumer manner, building hierarchical structures of added value. In order to
preserve the supply chain, the Service Level Agreements (SLAs) correspond-
ing to the underlying choreography of services should also be incrementally
aggregated. This cross-VO hierarchical SLA aggregation requires validation,
for which a distributed trust system becomes a prerequisite. Elaborating their
previous work on rule-based SLA validation, the authors propose a hybrid dis-
tributed trust model. This new model is based on Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) and reputation-based trust systems. It helps to prevent SLA violations
by identifying violation-prone services at service selection stage and actively
contributes in breach management at the time of penalty enforcement.
Also, the work [62] points out the problem of trust management in a multi-cloud
setting based on a set of distributed Trust Service Providers (TSPs). TSPs are
divided over the clouds, and they evoke raw trust proof from different sources
and in different formats. This proof is information concerning the adherence of
the cloud service providers (CSPs) to the Service Level Agreement (SLA) for
the offered services and the feedback sent by cloud service users(CSUs). Using
this information, they calculated an objective trust and a subjective trust of
CSPs. TSPs interconnect between themselves through a trust journal network
that permits a TSP to get trust information about a CSP from other TSPs.
Examinations showed that their proposed framework is effective and relatively
constant in differentiating trustworthy and untrustworthy CSPs in a multi-cloud
setting.
In this work [204], the authors have proposed a selection middleware for the
cloud service based on trust. They suggest an integrated trust evaluation
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method which joins objective trust evaluation and subjective trust evaluation.
The objective trust evaluation is based on quality of service (QoS) monitoring
while the subjective trust evaluation is based on user feedback scores. Exper-
imentations conducted using a synthesised data set display that their offered
technique suggestively outperforms the other trust and reputation approaches.
The experiments have been developed using MATLAB.
An issue with this trust mechanism is that many cloud users lack the capability
to do fine grained QoS monitoring and SLA verification on their own; a pro-
fessional and independent third party is needed to provide these services. In a
private cloud, there may be a cloud broker or a trust authority, which is trusted
in the trust domain of the private cloud; so the trusted broker or trust author-
ity can provide the users in the private cloud the services of QoS monitoring
and SLA verification. In a hybrid cloud or inter-clouds, a user within a private
cloud might still rely on the private cloud trust authority to conduct QoS mon-
itoring and SLA verification; however, in a public cloud, individual users and
some small organisations without technical capability may use a commercial
professional cloud entity as trust broker.
2.3.5.3 Evidence-Based Trust
Evidence-based trust is tightly linked to QoS monitoring and SLA verification.
Here, the actual performance attributes (i.e. evidence) from the cloud service
will have to be compared or analysed relative to the contract (i.e. SLA) provided
by the CSP. A trustor’s belief in the expected behaviour of trustee is based
on the evidence about the trustee’s attributes of competency, goodwill, and
integrity, with respect to that expectation [89]. In evidence-based trust, the
focus is dependent on evidence of the trustee’s attributes of competency or
performance in the context of the service provided. We briefly introduce some
approaches for evidence-based trust below.
We first consider the work [220], which investigates a model dynamic trust-level
scheduling (DLS) for the cloud computing. They have been inspired by Bayesian
cognitive model and mentioning to the trust relationship models of sociology.
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They first proposed a novel Bayesian method based cognitive trust model, then
proposed a trust dynamic level scheduling algorithm via mixing the existing
DLS algorithm. Theoretic analysis and simulation are demonstrated that the
Cloud-DLS algorithm can proficiently meet the requirement of cloud computing
workloads in trust and assure the performance of jobs in a secure way. But it
provided low dependability, integrity and safety in terms of confidentiality.
In terms of assuring system developers of the trustworthiness of the cloud envi-
ronment, a joint project between IBM and Microsoft [165] aims to instil greater
confidence in computations outsourced to the cloud. System developers are
able to verify the correctness of the results returned to them. Pinocchio, a
built system for efficiently verifying general computations while relying only
on cryptographic assumptions is developed. With Pinocchio, the system de-
veloper creates a public evaluation key to describe the computation; this setup
is proportional to evaluating the computation once. The cloud-based worker
system then evaluates the computation on a particular input and uses the eval-
uation key to produce a proof of correctness. Since computational power is often
asymmetric (particularly for mobile devices), a relatively weak client may wish
to outsource computation to one or more powerful workers. Here, the system
developer is able to verify the results returned, to guard against malicious or
malfunctioning workers. They allow the worker to also shed liability; any unde-
sired outputs are provably the result of data the client supplied. Anyone can use
a public verification key to check the proof. The main challenge of Pinocchio is
that, it is co-located with the workers in the same cloud environment, related
to the same set of cloud hardware infrastructure and management software. To
better guard against malicious or malfunctioning workers, Pinocchio should be
deployed to a different cloud environment such that security and dependability
issues affecting the workers cannot compromise the operations of Pinocchio.
In [5], the authors have explained the role of trust in the cloud computing ser-
vices based on empirical proof from interviewing managers of financial organi-
sations in Ghana. This is a descriptive paper that is based on literature review
and experimental data on exploring reasons for the cloud service acquisitions. A
mixture of conferences and attention group discussions was used as approaches
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for data collection. Information and technology, and electronic banking man-
agers of five main mercantile banks in Accra, Ghana, between January and July
2013 were interviewed. A sum of ten respondents was interviewed, two in each
of the selected banks. A purposive sample technique was used in the choice
of informants. This method let the selection of qualified informants to ensure
extensiveness and diversity of opinion.
Another work, [90] proposes a fuzzy trust evaluation based on consistency inten-
sity for cloud services. The main objective of this work is to define an assessment
model for the cloud services to deal with the fuzzy information and offer a novel
fuzzy assessment method based on reliability intensity to examine the quanti-
tative value from the fuzzy information. The offered method can dissolve the
problem on the analysis and synthesis of the fuzzy assessment information. An
instance of trust assessment of the cloud storage service is presented to con-
firm that the proposed method can express the opinions of all assessors more
adequately. It offered suitable security, reliability, and dynamicity.
Furthermore, another work [221] proposes a cloud trust capacity model for
reducing threats of internal troll services. It was used to manage the trust
relationship among the guest services, to evaluate the threats to the unknown
troll services, and to diminish risk associated with leasing the cloud services and
limiting the resource drain caused by troll guest services. Experimental results
showed that the suggested model can effectively limit the scale of the troll
services and considerably lessen the threats of internal attacks. The proposed
mechanism provided better reliability and security.
Another work, [189] have proposed a fuzzy-based trust evaluation scheme for
the cloud services. A dynamic trust model based on evidence was also suggested
to define the dynamic trustworthiness on services in the cloud environment. It
employed fuzzy logic to develop trust in order to handle the uncertainty and
uses ordered weight averaging operator to gather the trust values, thus allowing
the real-time performance. The proposed scheme uses the QoS parameters as a
validation to evaluate the trust for the cloud services. The results in terms of
efficiency and effectiveness of the model were established through simulations.
68
It offered suitable security, reliability, and dynamicity, but it suffered from low
integrity, low dependability, low confidentiality and low safety.
Finally, a current work [204] has proposed a new method for recognising the
moderating effect of trust on the adoption of cloud-based services. The purpose
of this research is the identification of the trust factors in the hypothesis of
the cloud services in semiconductor industries. Furthermore, the moderating
efficacy of these trust elements related to the technical, organisational, and
environmental success factors has been propounded. On the base of a literature
survey, an assumptive model has been expanded, and the relations among the
hidden variables have been studied by utilising structural equations.
2.4 Summary
We have introduced the concept of global software development (GSD) as a
pervasive business phenomenon, and its associated benefits for geographically
distributed system engineering. Some leading companies such as IBM, British
Airways, British Telecom and General Electric are increasingly adopting this
model. However, from the literature, we have identified that the absence of
effective information and knowledge-sharing mechanisms, form a crucial part
of GSD’s state-of-the-art problem affecting collaborative software system devel-
opment. Due to the lack of understanding between geographically distributed
teams in GSD, requirements management is particularly difficult. This problem
can be addressed by providing guidelines for the quality management of GSD
projects, and apply a software process improvement model for change man-
agement and traceability. Here, a change management and traceability process
model that is capable of managing the increased scale of requirements’ changes
and their traceability which are characteristic of GSD, has to be introduced by
the guidelines. The guidelines must ensure that all major GSD activities such as
user management, requirement management, change management, and trace-
ability meet a quality management standard. In this regard, a shared artefacts
repository will play a central role for information and knowledge-sharing. We
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believe that such guidelines are capable of facilitating a tight linkage between
system requirements, change management and traceability towards quality man-
agement of GSD projects. This however, informs our objectives (i.e. OB1 to
OB4 ) in Section 1.2.2. We introduce four objectives: Objective 1 defines a
change management and traceability (CM-T) process model, which applies a
software process improvement method to ensure the maturity of the RCM and
traceability processes; Objective 2 identifies a standard quality management
framework to facilitate a significant level of quality for the proposed CM-T
process model; Objective 3 validates the CM-T process model using an expert
panel review process; and Objective 4 demonstrates the defined management
guidelines by applying it to an Airlock Control System case study.
Also, the challenge of appropriate methods to design and evaluate dependable
architectures that support system engineering, directly affects the successful
implementation of GSD. GSD frameworks are defined as software architectures.
The design and evaluation of the dependability of software architectures are
based on quality attributes. In these processes, it is important to consider
the overall effect of design decisions, the inherent trade-offs between quality
attributes, and the trade-offs required to address user, system, and business
requirements. In our opinion, we argue that the existing architecture evalu-
ation methods have limitations when assessing architectures interfacing with
unpredictable environments such as the Cloud. This is because the Cloud en-
vironment is fundamentally different from the classical environments for which
most software evaluation methods were developed. The unpredictability of this
environment requires a bespoke and holistic approach that combines aspects
of both dynamic (i.e. trade-off) and static evaluation of the quality attributes
of software architectures for GSD. Such an approach will be in line with our
objectives (i.e. OB5 to OB8 ) in Section 1.2.2. Here, we present four objectives:
Objective 5 defines a methodology for small-to-medium size GSD architectures;
Objective 6 validates this methodology using a comparative study with current
approaches; Objective 7 demonstrates the methodology by applying it to the
design of a small-to-medium size architecture, Reactive Architecture; and then
Objective 8 analyses the quality attribute trade-off of the Reactive Architecture.
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Finally, Cloud computing has been introduced as a suitable delivery model
for GSD. In fact, GSD seems to be organically integrable with Cloud comput-
ing. Some argue that GSD can be improved by the main characteristics of
cloud computing such as virtualisation, reduced cost, performance, and multi-
tenancy support. That said, this facilitating environment is challenged with lack
of customer trust, vague SLAs, perceived lack of reliability, threats to security
and privacy, and the absence of an independent quality assurance body. Such
concerns lead to the call for cloud accountability. Cloud accountability with
respect to security has been explored to a great extent. Here, outlines for the
technical requirements have been provided. However, from our literature review
we observed that cloud accountability for dependability in areas such as avail-
ability and reliability has not been explored. This is a matter of concern since
cloud users such as system engineers need to be assured of the dependability
of the cloud platform they use for GSD. We believe that a cloud accountability
methodology for assuring the dependability of cloud environments is necessary
(see our objectives OB9 to OB12 in Section 1.2.2). We present these objec-
tives as: Objective 9 defines a cloud accountability methodology; Objective 10
develops a cloud accountability system which facilitates the presented method;
Objective 11 demonstrates the method by applying it to a cloud-based test-bed
of the Reactive Architecture; and Objective 12 conducts an evidence-based trust
analysis on the derived evidence for the purpose of dependability assurance of
the cloud-based Reactive Architecture.
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Chapter 3
Reactive Architecture
This chapter mainly contributes a cloud-based framework for system engineer-
ing. We refer to this framework as Reactive Architecture. Considering the state-
of-the-art in RCM, design and analysis of architecture, and cloud accountability,
this work mainly contributes:
1. an alternative and novel mechanism for effective information and knowledge-
sharing towards RCM and traceability.
2. a novel methodology for the design and analysis of small-to-medium size
cloud-based systems, with a particular focus on the trade-off of quality
attributes.
3. a dependable framework that facilitates the RCM and traceability method
for cloud-based system engineering.
4. a novel methodology for assuring cloud accountability in terms of depend-
ability.
5. a cloud-based framework to facilitate the cloud accountability methodol-
ogy.
In this chapter, we provide an introduction of the Reactive Architecture as a
cloud-based framework to support system engineering in Section 3.1. Also, the
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challenges to the state-of-the-art of GSD is discussed in Section 3.2. In Sec-
tion 3.3, the Reactive Architecture is discussed as a framework that introduces
three approaches that attempt to resolve the discussed challenges. Here, an
approach that presents a mechanism for requirements change management and
traceability is introduced and justified. This mechanism is facilitated by the cen-
tral component of the Reactive Architecture called the Reactive Middleware,
discussed in Section 3.3.1. We follow up in Section 3.3.2 with a description
and justification of our approach for designing and evaluating a cloud-based
architecture. Section 3.3.3 describes and justifies our approach to assure the
dependability of cloud-based systems. We conclude this chapter by providing a
summary in Section 3.4.
3.1 Introduction
The Reactive Architecture aims to support the system engineering process by
employing some state-of-the-art methods. This is necessary to meet the com-
plexities of the systems we are building now and in the future. These complex-
ities introduce challenges that are inherent in the nature of system engineering:
the changing needs of system stakeholders which is more critical for global soft-
ware development (GSD), dependable system composition or integration, and
automated processes. An overview of these challenges are discussed next.
3.2 Challenges of GSD
3.2.1 Effective Information and Knowledge Sharing
Software development is increasingly carried out in a distributed manner with
stakeholders based in different geographical locations. Issues caused by this
trend are related to knowledge management, quality control, synchronous col-
laboration, and risk, project and process management concerns. Here, the ab-
sence of effective information and knowledge-sharing mechanisms, form a crucial
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part of GSD’s current problem affecting collaborative software system develop-
ment. Due to the lack of understanding between geographically distributed
teams, requirements management is particularly difficult. Specifically, GSD,
where teams are distributed worldwide, introduces an additional level of com-
plexity to artefact consistency management tasks. In this respect, areas of
concern are creating and maintaining links among distributed artefacts, mul-
tiple versions of artefacts, and the availability and accessibility of the latest
version of any given artefact. Artefact repositories and version control systems
are often used to mitigate the effects of distribution however, these facilities are
largely limited to the implementation phase of system engineering.
3.2.2 Automation
Tasks associated with artefact consistency management in system engineering,
when performed manually, are error-prone, tedious and require substantial ef-
fort. Some aspects of artefact consistency management can be more easily
automated, such as checking consistency violations, while others may present
non-trivial challenges. For example identifying relationships between diverse
representations is a complex task due to the heterogeneity of artefacts and the
fact that semantics and intentions are not explicitly captured. The extent to
which automation is possible is an open problem.
3.2.3 Diversity of Tools
Software life-cycle tasks are undertaken by stakeholders using a variety of soft-
ware engineering tools. Integrated development environments (IDEs) provide
support to produce source code and tests. Higher-level artefacts are created
using diagram and analysis tools. An ideal framework, to maximise its appli-
cability in software projects, should not impose any specific application on the
user and should be configurable to work with any tool. This therefore, brings
forward the issue with the integration of such tools in a seamless manner.
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3.2.4 System Dependability
Cloud computing has been introduced as a suitable delivery model for GSD.
In fact, GSD can be improved by the main characteristics of cloud computing
such as reduced cost, performance, global multi-tenancy support, etc. However,
the unpredictability and rapid evolution of the topology of the cloud environ-
ment affect the dependability of deployed systems for GSD. In order for GSD
to be dependable in the cloud environment, the design of GSD systems must
master the costs and the quality of the development of such software systems,
relative to the rapid evolution of the topology of the cloud environment. Here,
it is imperative to consider the overall effect of design decisions, the inherent
trade-offs between quality attributes (such as availability, security, reliability,
performance), and the trade-offs required to address user, system, and business
requirements. It is however essential to have a software system design approach
that yields itself readily to an implicit analysis or evaluation method for cloud-
based systems. Since the cloud environment is characterised by rapid interac-
tions between quality attributes, the state-of-the-art of evaluating cloud-based
systems in this context is lacking. Most notable software system evaluation
methods mainly focus on independent quality attributes, and the few that con-
sider multiple quality attributes do not factor the trade-off analysis of system
quality attributes for complex enterprise deployment environments, such as the
cloud.
3.2.5 Accountable Cloud
The concept of cloud accountability, especially for dependability has not been
adequately addressed. This means that the cloud behaviours affecting system
dependability should be transparent to relevant parties, hence the call for ac-
countability. It is important to mention that cloud accountability has been
widely applied towards assuring the security of cloud-based systems, however,
there is no work that employs the forensic auditing techniques of cloud account-
ability towards the assurance of dependability especially for availability and re-
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liability. It is relevant that cloud users such as system engineers are assured of
the availability and reliability of the cloud platform they use for GSD.
3.3 Reactive Architecture
The Reactive Architecture provides approaches (related to the contributions of
this work) intended to remedy the discussed challenges. These approaches are
presented and justified below.
3.3.1 Mechanism for Requirements Change Management
and Traceability
Considering the introduced challenges of (1) effective information and knowledge
sharing, (2) automation, and (3) diversity of tools, we present the definition
of guidelines for managing GSD projects that implement the specific goal -
manage requirements changes - of CMMI Level 2 (discussed in Section 2.1.5.1).
We justify the use and validity of using guidelines or heuristics for identifying
risks and trade-offs during the design and analysis of architectures in Section
2.2.5.2. The GSD guidelines present a process model for change management
and traceability that supports the implementation of the mentioned specific
goal. Also, to support the effective management of the system engineering
processes, the GSD guidelines apply a lean derivative of the PMBOK quality
management process group (discussed in Section 2.1.6) for project life-cycle
practices.
An underlying technology used in the change management and traceability
process model is the open services for life-cycle collaboration (OSLC). This
technology was briefly introduced in Section 2.1.6. OSLC is an open commu-
nity, where the main goal is to create specifications for integrating tools, their
data and workflows in support of life-cycle processes. Fundamentally, OSLC is
based on the concept of linked data. Here, OSLC is organised into work-groups
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Figure 3.1: Overview of Proposed Mechanism for Requirements Change
Management and Traceability
that address integration scenarios for individual topics such as change manage-
ment, traceability, test management, requirements management and configu-
ration management. Such topics are called OSLC domains. Each work-group
explores integration scenarios for a given domain and specifies a common linked
data vocabulary for the life-cycle artefacts needed to support the scenarios. In
very simple terms, OSLC specifications focus on how the external resources of
a particular tool can be accessed, browsed over, and specific change requests
can be made. OSLC is not trying to standardise the behaviour or capability of
any tool. Instead, OSLC specifies a minimum amount of protocol and a small
number of resource types to allow two different tools, data or workflows to work
together relatively seamlessly. To ensure coherence and integration across these
domains, each work-group builds on the concepts and rules defined in the OSLC
Core specification. OSLC Core consists mostly of standard rules and patterns
for using HTTP (Hypertext Transfer Protocol) and RDF (Resource Descrip-
tion Framework) that all the domains must adopt in their specifications. It also
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defines a small number of resource types that help tools to integrate their activ-
ities. In OSLC, each artefact in the life-cycle - a requirement, test case, source
file, etc. - is an HTTP resource that is manipulated using the standard methods
of the HTTP specification (GET, PUT, POST, DELETE). Each resource has
its RDF representation, which allows statements about resources (in particular
web resources) in the form of subject/predicate/object (i.e. RDF triple) ex-
pressions, such as in linked data. OSLC also supports representations in other
formats, like JSON, XML or HTML. The central organising concept of OSLC is
ServiceProvider, enabling tools to expose resources and allowing consumers to
navigate to all of the resources, and create new ones. Importantly, OSLC allows
artefacts (e.g. requirement document) to be exposed as a unit and even specific
elements of the artefacts (e.g. individual requirements) can also be exposed as
sub-units for monitoring.
Figure 3.1 provides an overview of the requirements change management and
traceability mechanism. The GSD guidelines apply a widely used quality man-
agement approach to a change management and traceability (CM-T) process
model for GSD projects. The CM-T process model complies to or reflects the
CMMI Level 2 capability. This mechanism is facilitated by a Reactive Middle-
ware. The Reactive Middleware plays a key role in the Reactive Architecture,
and provides a novel Change Management and Traceability-as-a-Service (CM-
TaaS) on the cloud platform for system engineering.
3.3.1.1 Reactive Middleware
After considering literature on requirements engineering; both old but signifi-
cant, and current (discussed in Section 2.1.2) approaches, the identified areas
that have not been sufficiently addressed can provide a basis for extracting a
high-level set of requirements. Such areas are the independence of artefacts,
globally accessible framework for development, large capacity to store differ-
ent and changing artefacts, automation of change management and traceability
processes, and seamless tool integration. Furthermore, we introduce these re-
quirements under the three discussed challenges of effective information and
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knowledge sharing, automation, and diversity of tools below:
(a) Effective information and knowledge sharing:
• R1: Artefact independence - The suitable framework should have the
capacity to cater for different types or formats of artefacts.
• R2: Supports globally distributed development - Software system de-
velopment is now practiced globally, a suitable approach should be
globally accessible and also provide avenues for solving challenges re-
lated to globally distributed software system development.
• R3: Ability to handle different and large numbers of changing artefacts
- Since software systems are different in terms of their complexity and
size, a suitable approach should consider handling artefacts of vary-
ing complexities and large numbers. Also, its capacity for handling
changes to such artefacts should scale appropriately (such that it does
not affect performance).
(b) Automation:
• R4: Automated as far as possible - In order for the framework to be
adopted in software projects and to reduce manual effort, it should
provide automated support for consistency management tasks.
(c) Diversity of tools:
• R5: Tool integration - The suitable approach should consider that
software artefacts are created and edited in a variety of tools. It should
work with both new and existing tools, new and old versions of a tool,
and should support seamless integration into different environments.
The Reactive Middleware provides cloud-based services for quality requirements
change management and traceability. It is “reactive” because it responds to
changes made to artefacts and such changes are consistently propagated to all
dependent artefacts and relevant stakeholders. The cloud platform identified
and used as a deployment platform for the Reactive Middleware because of
the global accessibility of services for collaboration in GSD, scalability to meet
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varying complexity of GSD projects, and cost-efficiency. To achieve an effec-
tive change management and traceability process, some key steps are adopted.
These steps are:
Figure 3.2: Requirements Change Management and Traceability Processes
(a) trace creation and maintenance,
(b) detect change,
(c) analyse change impact,
(d) check for consistency, and
(e) propagate change.
Refer to Figure 3.2 for the interaction of the above mentioned steps. The Arte-
fact Data is a repository of specific details of artefacts, and more contextual
data such as the dependencies between artefacts and the trace information of
a set of artefacts. Avenues for conflict resolution are also provided. Also, the
Reactive Middleware introduces a structured role-based management of system
development artefacts. Role in this context is described as stakeholders’ re-
sponsibility (i.e. privilege) to system artefacts. This approach assigns priority
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to system requirements relative to their importance. Also, the approach uses six
main privileges (with roles): None:- Have no access to the system artefact(s) for
PAWNS, View:- Only sees the system artefact(s) for PAWNS, Modify:- Can see
(view) and change the system artefact(s) for MODIFIERS, Review:- Can see
and change a modification to system artefact(s), in response to a set of notifica-
tions for REVIEWERS, Create:- Can create and modify (view, modify) system
artefact(s) for CREATORS, and Own:- Full access (view, modify, review, delete,
recall) to the system artefact(s) for TEAM LEADERS. Here, recalled artefacts
are reinstated deleted artefacts. In the Reactive Middleware, the original for-
mats of artefacts are maintained but their metadata which identifies the trace
links are represented in XML format.
This work aims to answer the research question (RQ): “How can the Reactive
Middleware guide system engineering to ensure the continual tight linkage of
stakeholders’ requirements and system engineering processes?”. It hypothesises
that changes in system requirements’ artefacts are captured and consistently
propagated to all the related system engineering processes and stakeholders
using a matured process model. This hypothesis constitutes the conceptual
foundation of the proposed approach, which is aimed at fulfilling the high-level
requirements discussed earlier.
3.3.2 Design and Analysis Methodology for Cloud-Based
Architecture
We argue that the existing architecture evaluation methods have limitations
when assessing architectures interfacing with unpredictable environments such
as the Cloud. The unpredictability of this environment is attributed to the
dynamic elasticity, scale, and continuous evolution of the cloud topology. More
specifically, this is as a result of the rapid introduction of new services, mash-
ups, unpredictable modes of service use, fluctuations in QoS provision due to
unpredictable load or growth, etc. As a result, architectures interfacing such
unpredictable environments are expected to encounter many uncertainties. This
is also relevant because the cloud environment is fundamentally different from
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the classical environments for which most software evaluation methods were
developed. It is however, important to focus on, and present holistic approaches
combining aspects of both dynamic and static analysis of architecture resilience
attributes. From literature, we identify a set of twelve relevant architecture
analysis or evaluation methodologies, and conduct comparative studies (refer
to at Section 2.2.5.1) based on a set of justified criteria:
(a) A goal of sensitivity and trade-off analysis,
(b) A focus on multiple quality attributes, and
(c) The involvement of multiple or all architecture stakeholders.
Figure 3.3: cloud-ATAM: Adapted ATAM with Two-Staged Analysis Ap-
proach
The comparative studies resulted in the identification of the Architecture Trade-
off Analysis Method (ATAM), which satisfied the three criteria above. ATAM
has the potential of considering several architectural quality attributes and ap-
propriately represent an architecture, and analysing the sensitivities of and
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trade-offs between these multiple quality attributes in a hyper dynamic en-
vironment such as the cloud.
That said, ATAM is presented as a generic methodology for analysing the qual-
ity attributes of all sizes of architectures. The nine-step approach of ATAM
is perceived to be complex especially in terms of analysing small-to-medium
sized architectures. There is an obvious need for tailor-made variations of this
methodology to fit small-to-medium sized architectures, which are considered
to be the largest classification of architectures worldwide.
In this work, we provide an enrichment to ATAM with a derived methodology
called cloud-ATAM, which is used to guide the design, analysis and evaluation of
cloud-based architectures. The cloud-ATAM also presents a two-stage approach
for the qualitative analysis and evaluation of small-to-medium size cloud-based
software architectures. Here, the derived methodology is used to design, analyse
and evaluate the Reactive Architecture as a proof of concept.
The introduced methodology (i.e. cloud-ATAM) depicted in Figure 3.3, is mo-
tivated by the complex and iterative nature of the ATAM even for small-to-
medium scale architecture. Typically, small-to-medium scale systems do not
need to undertake all the steps of the ATAM. Due to the limited size of such
projects, some steps can be combined into a new step and some activities of
some steps can be optional. Here, “generating the quality attribute utility tree”
process of “Step 5” can be combined with the “prioritising scenarios” process of
“Step 7”. Also, the duplication of the “analysing the architectural approaches”
process of “Step 6” and “Step 8”, can be combined into one process. This
new step (i.e. “analysing the architectural approaches”) can be extended by
“noting the impact of scenarios on the architectural approaches” as undertaken
in “Step 8”. Activities such as critical requirements, technical constraints, and
quality attributes are necessary under “Step 2: Present Project Drivers”. These
changes are particularly important especially in addressing the perceived weak-
ness of ATAM due to its iterative nature which requires a substantial number of
human experts on the team at different times. It is often expensive to speculate
the availability of such domain experts for small-to-middle size software projects
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due to budgetary or time constraints. The resulting steps for cloud-ATAM is
provided below:
1. Present the cloud-ATAM
2. Present the Project Drivers
3. Present the Architecture
4. Identify Architectural Approaches
5. Generate the Quality Attribute Utility Tree and Scenarios
6. Analyse the Architectural Approaches
7. Present Results
Table 3.1: Utility Trees vs. Scenario Brainstorming
Utility Trees Facilitated Brainstorm-
ing
Stakeholders Architects, Project
Leader
All stakeholders
Typical
Group Size
2 Evaluators; 2-3
Project Personnel
4-5 Evaluators; 5-10
Project-Related Personnel
Primary
Goals
1. Elicit, concretise
and prioritise the driv-
ing quality attribute
requirements.
2. Provide a focus for
the remainder of the
evaluation.
Foster stakeholder commu-
nication to validate quality
attribute goals elicited via
the utility tree.
Approach Top-down (general to
specific)
Bottom-up (specific to gen-
eral)
Here, steps (1) to (5) are used to design small-to-medium size architectures.
Also, cloud-ATAM presents an enrichment in terms of analysis coverage under
steps (6) and (7) to ATAM in the form of a two-stage scenario-based analysis
and evaluation approach:
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(a) Utility Tree, and
(b) Stakeholders’ Brainstorming
Table 3.1 highlights the differences between the utility tree mechanism and the
stakeholders’ brainstorming mechanism.
Utility Tree Analysis Mechanism
Utility tree analysis mechanism provides a top-down mechanism for directly
and efficiently translating the project drivers of a system into concrete quality
attribute scenarios. We need to understand the relative importance of these
project drivers as against other quality attribute drivers to determine where
the architecture evaluation focus should be. Utility trees help to detail and
prioritise quality goals. We empirically analyse the Reactive Architecture by
qualitatively reasoning (i.e. using the Utility Tree Mechanism) about a set of
scenarios of the Reactive Architecture, with the goal of identifying sensitivities
and trade-offs with system quality attributes, and providing a healthy balance
between the risk points identified among the quality attributes of the cloud-
based Reactive Architecture.
Stakeholders’ Brainstorming Mechanism
The scenario brainstorming mechanism is stakeholder-centric, which elicits points
of view from a more diverse and larger group of stakeholders, and verifies, and
then builds on the results of the first phase. It involves the evaluation of the
cloud-ATAM, and this is undertaken through an organised group work of stake-
holders who analyse the trade-off themes on the project drivers. Here, it uses
the expert panel review process to evaluate the architecture. The expert panel
review process has been discussed in Section 2.1.5.4. This mechanism is rele-
vant in facilitating communication among stakeholders and also the stakeholders
with the team of architects of the architecture.
These analysis approaches (i.e. utility tree and stakeholders’ brainstorming
mechanisms) are based on quality attributes in identified scenarios of an archi-
tecture. This work focuses on the sensitivities and trade-offs between multiple
dependability quality attributes such as availability and performance. The jus-
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tification of the choice of availability and performance is mainly as a result of the
nature of the cloud environment, which in turn affects the deployed system such
as the Reactive Architecture. As discussed in Section 2.3.2, the cloud environ-
ment is characterised by rapid evolution of the cloud topology, which has a high
potential of resulting in hardware faults and software errors. Since hardware
and software faults are stimuli for availability (discussed in Section 2.2.3), it is
very relevant to focus on availability as a quality attribute. In characterising
availability, the strategies adopted or parameters are redundancy, voting, retry
and failover support. Also, the responses are service availability, reliability, and
the level of the service. Here, the cloud service providers (CSPs) use the service
level agreements (SLA) to assure clients of the availability and performance of
their platforms. However, these SLAs are perceived to be weak and hence, lack
customer trust, and the cloud platforms are perceived to lack reliability (see
Section 2.3.2.2).
In Section 2.2.2.1, we provide the definitions and taxonomy of software system
dependability. Here, a directly proportional correlation is identified between
availability and performance. The presence of faults as a result of internal
and external events in the cloud platform can affect latency, throughput and
precedence. Since cloud resources are mainly shared (e.g. co-tenancy of virtual
instances), uncontrolled and malicious activities can also affect the performance
of other deployed systems. Even though security is a major area of concern now
and essential, we identify availability and performance as more fundamental.
Security attacks such as distributed denial of service (DDoS) fundamentally
affect availability of service and performance. More so since current literature
(see Section 2.2.5.1) do not effectively address the issues of availability and
performance for software systems deployed to the cloud environment.
cloud-ATAM generates a number of outputs such as: a prioritised list of quality
attributes, a list of architectural decisions made, a map linking architectural
decisions to attributes, lists of risk and non-risks, and lists of sensitivities and
trade-offs. In this work, we use the derived cloud-ATAM to design the Re-
active Architecture, and to analyse the trade-off between the availability and
performance attributes. To support the analysis of the Reactive Architecture,
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cloud-ATAM considers a non-trivial set of scenarios, and uses a two-staged anal-
ysis approach. We answer the research question: “What is the trade-off between
availability and performance quality attributes identified by the cloud-ATAM
for the cloud-based Reactive Architecture?”
3.3.3 Assuring Dependability in the Cloud
The cloud computing technology of today and the future promises to bring
demonstrable benefits to people’s lives. It presents an outsourcing model which
is attractive for businesses that wish to minimise their computing and storage
infrastructure cost. Here, the cloud service provider (CSP) is responsible per
the service level agreement (SLA), for the availability of services and clients
are free from maintenance and management problems of the resource machines.
However, the responsibility of the CSP is often called to question. Literature
review (refer to Section 2.3.4.3) shows that these concerns are largely related
to the assurance of security (in terms of intrusion detection) and dependability
on the cloud. This work pays a closer attention to the dependability assurance
provided by the CSPs, with specific focus on availability and reliability. This
choice is justified by the large quantity of literature focusing on security (see
Section 2.3.4.1), and a few for dependability. From our observation, most of
these literature identify some aspects of dependability as very critical. Such
aspects are the level of service and reliability (see availability charaterisation in
Section 2.2.3). These two aspects are the responses or character of availability
and also reliability. Here, a good plan for availability and reliability in terms
of software and hardware redundancy can also help to mitigate the impact of
security attacks.
With the movement of software engineering from local computers to the cloud
for global software development (GSD), software developers need to be assured
of the dependability of the engineering support deployed to the cloud and the
cloud environment. The predefined and mutually agreed upon business logic
and SLA provided by CSPs attempt to assure developers of the cloud per-
formance, availability, reliability, etc. However, due to the cloud platform’s
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inherent complexity and large scale, production cloud computing systems are
prone to various run-time problems caused by hardware and software faults,
cloud run-time management decisions and environmental factors (see Section
2.3.2). Such SLAs in this context are considered weak, and unable to guar-
antee minimum levels of performance (see Section 2.3.2.2). Cloud agents such
as system developers, CSPs, and cloud regulators need to be informed about
possible or actual violations of the SLAs (when for instance, there is a request
time-out due to the developer specifying a longer time-out than the cloud’s SLA
provides). A robust mechanism is needed for violation detection, notification,
logging and a means towards resolution. Once the cause of the violation is
found, each violator is regarded as being accountable for their fault.
This however highlights the need for cloud accountability (discussed in Section
2.3.4). Creating accountability in the cloud is seen as a solution to users’ lack of
trust. Accountability refers to a situation, where both the CSP and the clients
are able to check whether the cloud is running the service as agreed. If a prob-
lem appears, they should be able to determine which of them is responsible,
and to prove the presence of the problem to a third party, such as an arbitrator
or a judge. Such an activity should be based on evidence. An advanced ap-
proach for using the cloud infrastructure’s hypervisor for providing evidence in
digital forensics is Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI) (Section 2.3.4.1). VMI
leverages the capabilities of the hypervisor to look “inside” the virtual machine
during runtime and using information collected this way for evidence-based au-
diting. The VMI is largely used for system security investigations (i.e. digital
forensic) especially in the area of intrusion detection (e.g., detecting malware).
To support the trustworthiness of the data collected and methodology, we
consider some trust assurance methods: reputation-based, SLA-based, and
evidence-based (see Section 2.3.5). However, we identify that the reputation-
based trust assurance methods are very subjective as this trust assurance method
considered the opinions of cloud agents. These agents may be biased and will
not accurately assess the cloud platform and associated CSPs. In this work, a
combination of SLA-based and evidence-based trust assurance methods is con-
sidered. These methods are dependent on evidence which can provide a more
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accurate representation of the level of trust assurance.
A contribution of this work is a Cloud Accountability System (CAS) which is
a component of the Reactive Architecture. It provides dependability assurance
of cloud resources to cloud agents. This assurance is provided relative to the
cloud SLA and evidence collected from the cloud platform. The CAS facilitates
the Cloud Accountability Methodology which is guided by the NIST SP800-
86 forensic model, that motivates the collection, examination and analysis of
data from the cloud infrastructure, and the generated evidence including logs
and context are reported to appropriate cloud agents. This work also presents
a novel approach to collecting digital evidence to support cloud-based system
dependability, using the VMI technique. This methodology aims to:
• Assure cloud agents of the dependability of the cloud infrastructure with
reference to cloud SLAs.
• Quantify (in monetary terms) the violations to SLAs, using the Net Present
Value (see Section 2.3.4.2). This can serve as a reference point for com-
pensating cloud agents, as well as providing punitive charges to violators.
• Serve as an evidence-based benchmark for choosing a relatively dependable
cloud provider.
The broad research question (RQ) that we seek to answer is “Can a cloud
accountability method be used to meaningfully assure availability and reliability
of deployed systems, relative to the cloud platform’s service level agreement
(SLA)?”. To answer this question, we validate the hypothesis (H1): “The cloud
accountability method can be used to meaningfully assure the availability and
reliability of cloud-based systems”.
3.4 Summary
This chapter initially discusses the challenges of GSD as the absence of an
effective information and knowledge sharing facility, automation of such facility,
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application of diverse set of tools, the dependability of such facility, and an
accountable cloud as a GSD operational environment. We introduced a cloud-
based framework called the Reactive Architecture which has the potential to
address the discussed challenges (this meets contribution 3 in Section 1.3). Here,
the Reactive Architecture presents three approaches to the challenges:
(a) mechanism for requirement change management and tracebility which is
facilitated by the Reactive Middleware (which meets contribution 1 in
Section 1.3),
(b) design and analysis methodology for cloud-based architectures (which meet
contribution 2 in Section 1.3), and
(c) a methodology for assuring the dependability of systems in the cloud
(which meets contributions 4 and 5 in Section 1.3).
The following chapter looks at managing requirement change and traceability.
It also elaborates on the design decisions pertaining to the Reactive Middleware,
software engineering artefact and their trace links, as well as data representa-
tion.
90
Chapter 4
Managing Requirement Change
and Traceability
This chapter contributes a Reactive Middleware which facilitates a set of guide-
lines defined to manage change and traceability in Global Software Develop-
ment (GSD). The Reactive Middleware is a critical and central component of
the Reactive Architecture, as it provides cloud-based services for user manage-
ment, requirement management, change management, and traceability of GSD
project requirements and system development phases. We first present a gen-
eralised process model for change management and traceability for GSD, and
then detail our management approach for system engineering processes as part
of the presented GSD guidelines. This contribution satisfies Objectives 1 and 2
presented in Section 1.2.2.
In this chapter, Section 4.1 introduces our work, and the Reactive Middleware
that facilitates the defined system engineering guidelines is presented in Section
4.2. Here, the components of the Reactive Middleware are discussed as well
as the management guidelines, which is composed of the change management
and traceability process model and the system engineering management process
approach. Also, Section 4.3 discusses the approaches and services provided by
the Reactive Middleware in the context of an optimal set of high level require-
ments for a GSD framework operating in the cloud environment, presented in
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Section 3.3.1.1. Finally, the conclusions of this chapter is drawn and presented
in Section 4.4.
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we present details of the Reactive Middleware for coordinat-
ing and tracing changes made to system engineering artefacts created and/or
used at various system engineering phases. In this vein, we present the core
process model for change management and traceability along with discussion
of the management approach for system engineering processes and coordinat-
ing agents. Our GSD management guidelines involving the application of the
presented management approach for the change management and traceability
process model, are easily generalised to other system engineering phases.
4.2 Reactive Middleware
4.2.1 Overview
The Reactive Middleware (RM), which is the chapter’s main contribution in-
troduces a structured role-based management of system development artefacts.
Role in this context is described as stakeholders’ responsibility (i.e. privilege) to
system artefacts. Also, this approach assigns priority to system requirements
relative to their importance. The role-based management approach uses six
main privileges (with roles): None: Have no access to the system artefact(s)
for PAWNS, View : Only sees the system artefact(s) for PAWNS, Modify :
Can see (view) and change the system artefact(s) for MODIFIERS, Review :
Can see and change a modification to system artefact(s), in response to a set of
notifications for REVIEWERS, Create: Can create and modify (view, mod-
ify) system artefact(s) for CREATORS, and Own: Full access (view, modify,
review, delete, recall) to the system artefact(s) for TEAM LEADERS. Here,
recalled artefacts are reinstated deleted artefacts.
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Figure 4.1: Reactive Middleware Interactions
4.2.2 Change Management and Traceability as a Service
The RM is composed of the Publish/Subscribe system (PSS) and the Artefacts
Monitoring system (AMS), which together provides cloud-based services to-
wards user management, requirement management, change management, and
traceability. The PSS facilitates the subscription of system stakeholders to
relevant artefacts, to which they will initiate change requests or will receive
change notifications. Also, the AMS is responsible for monitoring the relevant
artefacts for changes, and then triggers the PSS to notify appropriate stakehold-
ers or change agents. The RM interacts with the system stakeholders, System
Engineering Tools, and a Shared Artefacts Repository. The RM facilitates man-
agement guidelines for GSD projects that applies quality process management,
to a change management and traceability process model. From Figure 4.1, the
GSD Team Members have the flexibility to adopt any type of software devel-
opment life-cycle (SDLC) approach (e.g. waterfall, agile, spiral, etc.) that suits
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their development style (i.e. Step 1 ). Then following the prescribed manage-
ment guidelines featured by the Reactive Middleware, the GSD Team Members
manage the development process with the PMBOK process group for system
engineering life-cycle (i.e. Step 2 ). When there are change requests that are
related to the high priority requirements, the GSD change managers apply the
change management and traceability process (CM-T) model to either approve,
note (i.e. to be applicable in the future) or disapprove the request (i.e. Step
3* ). This CM-T model takes into consideration the bidirectional traceability
of the change agents (i.e. system stakeholders, artefacts and tools) involved in
the change request. System engineering tools form an important change agent
in the development process (i.e. Step 4 ).
Table 4.1: Mapping the Key Steps for Effective Requirements Manage-
ment and Traceability Processes with Proposed Change Management and
Traceability Services
5 Key Steps Proposed Change Management and
Traceability Services
Trace creation and
maintenance
The PSS facilitates the initiation of change re-
quests and receiving change notifications.
Detect change The AMS monitors the relevant artefacts for
changes, and then triggers the PSS to notify ap-
propriate stakeholders or change agents.
Analyse change im-
pact
the GSD Team Members manage the develop-
ment process and change with its impact using
the GSD guidelines.
Check for consis-
tency
When there are change requests that are re-
lated to the high priority requirements, the GSD
change managers apply the change management
and traceability process (CM-T) model to ap-
prove, note or disapprove the request.
Propagate change This CM-T model takes into consideration the
bidirectional traceability of the change agents
(i.e. system stakeholders, artefacts and tools)
involved in the change request.
In Table 4.1, we provide a mapping of the identified five key steps for effective
94
requirements management and traceability processes (refer to Section 3.3.1.1)
with our proposed approach facilitated as services by the Reactive Middleware.
Figure 4.2: Overview of the Components of the Reactive Middleware
4.2.2.1 Publish/Subscribe System
This system implements a Publish/Subscribe mechanism. Here, all actors (i.e.
system stakeholders and tools) involved in the development and evolution of
an artefact subscribe to that artefact (see Figure 4.2). Artefacts can only be
accessed by specific authorised actors. The Artefacts Monitoring System notifies
the Publish/Subscribe System when there is a change made to an artefact. The
Publish/Subscribe System then identifies and notifies all the actors that have
registered their interest in the artefact.
That said, the Publish/Subscribe System specifically provides services for user
management as the stakeholders (1) register to use the Reactive Middleware,
and (2) roles and privileges are assigned to them. Also, the system provides
services for requirements management: (1) subscription to a set of artefacts to
which they (2) receive notifications.
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Table 4.2: Description of Artefacts in the Shared Artefacts Repository
SDLC Phases Artefacts Description
Requirements System models are saved as artefacts. These require-
ments artefacts are obtained from tools such as ProR.
Specification Developed system model specification are saved as
artefacts. The model specification contains elements
such as invariants, guards, actions, etc. Such ele-
ments are also extracted as dependent artefacts.
Implementation Implementable source codes of model specifications
are saved as artefacts. These source codes are gen-
erated with appropriate tools such as EB2ALL. It
supports automatic code generation from Event-B
to C, C++, Java and C. Another tool example is
EventB2Dafny. This tool extends the Boogie and
Dafny tools, and allows the use of Dafny static analy-
sis machinery based on design-by-contract principles.
This yields artefacts in the form of executable input
code for Boogie and Dafny.
Documentation Documentation artefacts are in the form of: (1) trace-
ability logs, (2) incident reports, and (3) others such
as designs, test plans, execution results, etc.
4.2.2.2 Artefacts Monitoring/Interpretation System
The Artefacts Monitoring/Interpretation System (AMS) is a subsystem of the
Reactive Middleware. This subsystem interacts with the Shared Artefacts
Repository to monitor changes made to artefacts. The OSLC technology (dis-
cussed in Sections 2.1.6 and 3.3.1) used for monitoring in AMS provides stan-
dardised methods to represent, access, and link to resources. With OSLC spec-
ifications, tools can freely understand each other’s data and artefacts. This
makes it easy to better analyse, track, and explore that data to make better
decisions. There are feature to support change management, traceability, etc.
In OSLC, resources are identified by OSLC annotations. So projects and their
composing elements being developed in IDEs are tagged with these OSLC an-
notations, to reveal their artefacts to the client plug-in. Information about
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Table 4.3: Global Software Development Management Guidelines
Guidelines
Steps ID
Guidelines
GS1 System development teams should appoint team leaders.
GS2 These team leaders will constitute the GSD change man-
agers
GS3 System requirements should be classified based on iden-
tified dependability quality attributes (i.e. safety, relia-
bility, robustness, etc.), and are then prioritised relative
to their importance to the system stakeholders.
GS4 Team leaders must assign roles to all team members with
the prioritised requirements in mind, and manage the
development process with the adapted PMBOK guide.
GS5 All other change agents especially the system engineer-
ing tools should be assigned a default privilege of review.
GS6 All system artefacts should be saved in a shared artefacts
repository.
GS7 The privileges (i.e. none, view, modify, review, own) of
system stakeholders or change agents will determine the
access privileges to system artefacts.
GS8 Change agents must subscribe to relevant artefacts after
they are created, in order to receive notifications when
they are changed.
GS9 All related artefacts must be linked together to facilitate
traceability.
GS10 Changes made to any system artefacts must be logged.
GS11 When changes affect the high priority set of require-
ments, appropriate local team leader must lead the
change request review process (i.e. involving the CM-T
model) of the GSD change managers.
GS12 On the other hand, conflicts arising from changes to low
priority set of requirements are resolved locally, lead by
the local team leader.
GS13 Changes in system artefacts should be traceable to man-
age its impact on related/linked requirements or arte-
facts.
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these resources/artefacts are gathered and formatted as XML files. These files
are sent from the client plug-in periodically to the OSLC sub-system in the
Reactive Architecture. Here, all various versions of the XML files are saved.
The main functionality of this sub-system is to ensure change management and
traceability of artefacts. For traceability, all activities on an artefact such as
creation, modification, deletion are recorded and stored. Also for change man-
agement, the latest information about artefacts is compared with information
from newly arrived XML files. Whenever a change in the files is identified, a
notification is sent to the Publish/Subscribe sub-system.
Here, the services provided are requirements management, change management
and traceability. Here, changes to artefacts relating to a set of requirements are
managed, and then traced to ensure consistency through impact management
and logging.
Different types or formats of artefacts are considered here (see Table 4.2). This
enhances the capacity of the AMS to support independent artefacts, however
metadata are created as XML formats. This format allows for managing trace-
ability.
Figure 4.3: PMBOKR© Process Group for System Engineering Life-Cycle
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4.2.2.3 Management Guidelines for System Engineering
We introduce the defined management guidelines for GSDs (see Table 4.3).
The GSD guideline essentially defines a generic development policy for software
engineering projects. As part of the GSD guidelines, we present our PMBOK
process group for managing quality system engineering processes, and then the
change management and traceability (CM-T) process model. The PMBOK
process group for managing quality system engineering life-cycle (see Figure 4.3)
plays an overarching role in the GSD guidelines. This management approach is
applied to the CM-T process model.
4.2.2.4 PMBOK 5-Step Process Group for System Engineering Life-
Cycle
The PMBOK is a project management guide that is a well accepted standard
which provides a general framework for project management. The PMBOK
contains 42 project management (PM) practices organised by two orthogonal
categories: Process Groups (PG) and Knowledge Areas (KA). Here, each of the
42 processes belongs to exactly one process group and to exactly one knowledge
area. The PG organisation shows the project’s life cycle (see Figure 4.3), in-
volving 5 groups: Initiating, Planning, Executing, Monitoring & Control, and
Closing. These five process groups are introduced below:
(a) Initiating : An idea for a project will be carefully examined to determine
whether or not it benefits the organisation. During this phase, a decision
making team will identify if the project can realistically be completed.
(b) Planning : A project plan and/or project scope may be put in writing,
outlining the work to be performed. During this phase, a team prioritises
the project, calculate a budget and schedule, and determine what resources
are needed.
(c) Executing : Resources’ tasks are distributed and teams are informed of
responsibilities. This is an appropriate time to bring up important project
related information.
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(d) Monitoring and Controlling : Project managers compare project status
and progress to the actual plan, as resources perform the scheduled work.
During this phase, project managers may need to adjust schedules or do
what is necessary to keep the project on track.
(e) Closing : After project tasks are completed and the client has approved
the outcome, an evaluation is necessary to highlight project success and/or
learn from project history.
The KA organisation groups the processes into 9 knowledge areas, according to
their application to a specific aspect of project management, such as cost, sched-
ule, quality, risks, etc. The PMBOK’s chapters follow the KA organisation,
where the order of processes in each KA is determined by their chronological
application in the project, according to the PG organisation.
4.2.2.5 Change Management and Traceability Process Model
The (CM-T) process model is expected to ensure a matured change management
and traceability processes relative to the specific practices of the CMMI Level
2. To begin the definition of the process model, we indicate the main processes
involved in validating the CM-T process model as to:
1. Provide objective(s) for building the model;
2. Show the criteria identified during the initial stages of model devel-
opment;
3. Design a validation instrument to test the success criteria (to include
methods for reporting/analysing responses);
4. Select an expert panel to reflect the population of experts in Soft-
ware Engineering, Requirements Engineering (RE), and CMMI; and
5. Present results of the validation instrument.
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Table 4.4: CM-T Process Model Validation
Criterion Purpose Rule Source
Adherence to
CMM
Characteristics
The new model should be
recognisable as a derivative of
established models - both in
structure and concept. By
tapping into the established
models, the CM-T model takes
the strengths of a proven
improvement structures and
becomes more accessible and
compatible, avoiding redundant
activities.
- CMM maturity level concepts
must be implemented
- Each level should have a
theme consistent with CMM
- Requirement engineering (RE)
processes must be integrated
- The model should be
recognisable as a CMM offshoot
- The CM-T must be
systematic and sequential
Where possible we
should adapt existing
models rather than
create new ones
Maturity levels help
characterise a process
and set out a strategy
for its improvement
Limit Scope
CMM goals, RE phases and RE
processes define the boundaries of
the model. The model does not
include all RE processes.
- Key activities relating to technical
and organisational RE processes
are included
- Processes are prioritised.
- Processes relate directly to the
CM-T process areas
- The scope/level of detail should
be appropriate (i.e. depth and
breadth of processes presented)
It is important to know
the scope of the model,
i.e. what the model
includes and excludes
Consistency
Having an acceptable level of
’construct’ validity will help users
navigate within levels of maturity
as well as between different levels
of process maturity. Model
development and adaptation
depends on an acceptable level of
consistency.
- There should be consistent use
of terms and CMM features at
this level of development
- There will be a consistency in
structure between model
components at the same level of
granularity that are modelling
different maturity levels.
To understand a model
it is important that there
is a common language.
Each stage of development
should describe
processes at similar
levels of granularity
Understandable
All users of the model should have
a shared understanding of the RE
process in order to identify where
improvement is needed. There
should be no ambiguity in
interpretation, especially when
goals are set for improvement.
- All terms should be clearly
defined (i.e. have only one
meaning).
- All relationships between
processes and model
architecture should be
unambiguous and functional.
The importance of clear
definitions. Understanding
is a prerequisite for effective
process improvement and
management
Ease of Use
Over-complex models are unlikely
to be adopted as they require extra
resources and may be too
challenging for the user to interpret
without extensive training. The
model will have differing levels of
decomposition starting with the
most high level in order to
gradually lead the user through
from a descriptive model towards a
more prescriptive solution
- The model should be
decomposed to a level that is
simple to understand
- The model should be simple yet
retain meaning
- The chunks of information should
clearly relate as they develop
into more complex structures
- The model should require little or
no training to be used
Usability is a key
requirement of any
process improvement
model
Verifiable
Model strengths and weaknesses
need to be tested to help direct
future model development.
Validation of the model will help to
improve the model, add confidence
in its representation and help with
research in this area.
- The model must be verifiable, i.e.
we must be able to test/measure
how well model meet its
objectives and whether meeting
these objectives leads to a high
quality CM-T process model.
To assess whether a
process is useful, well
implemented the model
needs to be verifiable
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Figure 4.4: Candidate Processes Reflecting a CMMI Level 2 (Baseline)
Capability
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Stakeholders Change Request
Change Request Pool
Consideration by Change ManagersRequest Noted
Request Approved
Request Disapproved
System Documentation
Effect Change
Verify and Validate Change
Update Cause-and-Effect of Change
Trace Change
Close Change Request
Figure 4.5: Change Management and Traceability Process Model
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1. Provide objective(s) for building the model
We aim to develop a model that represents key practices in RE within a maturity
framework mentioned earlier. Here, our objectives are:
(a) A primary objective of our CM-T model is to guide software stakeholders
to relate key change management and traceability processes to goals in
order to prioritise their requirements process improvement activities.
(b) The CM-T process model should strengthen components of the CMMI (in-
volving software requirements) to clearly focus on the change management
and traceability processes.
(c) Our model should complement the CMMI (Level 2) so that practitioners
are not required to learn another software process improvement method-
ology.
(d) Finally, we aim to link theory to practice through a model that is easy to
use and interpret.
2. Show the criteria identified during the initial stages of model
development
We initially identify six relevant success criteria based on CMMI Level 2 base-
line capability (see Figure 4.4) to guide the development of the CM-T model.
Success criteria were established per evaluation question. These success cri-
teria are presented in Table 4.4. The criteria were identified using a method
similar to that used in the SPICE trials (see Section 2.1.5.2) to support the
ISO/IEC 15504 emerging standard. The resulting CM-T process model (see
Figure 4.5) considers the development teams and system engineering tools as
the main agents of change. In order for the change process to be initiated, a
change request must be initiated in a GSD project. All such change requests are
drafted as a change request form. All submitted change request forms go into a
centralised change request pool. The change managers group is made up of all
the GSD team leaders and other relevant stakeholders. The change managers
consider and timely decide on all the submitted change requests. During meet-
ing sessions for considering submitted change requests, the GSD team leaders
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will lead the consideration of all change requests that originates from their team.
Team leaders are expected to have critically assessed, and understand change
requests before they are approved for submission. The decisions take a form
of an approval, disapproval, or noted. A disapproved change request means a
termination of its consideration, and hence not to be effected. Also, a noted
change request means an acknowledgement of relevance, but cannot be effected
at the point of time in the GSD project. Such a change request, can be recon-
sidered at a future time determined by the change managers or resubmitted
when deemed relevant by the initiator and approved by the GSD team leader.
On the other hand, the initiators of the change requests that are approved are
notified to effect the change. This change is verified and validated after the
change has been effected. The verification and validation process assesses the
immediate impact of the change on the GSD project. A detailed assessment
of the cause-and-effect of the change is then undertake, and all minor conflicts
(i.e. affecting less prioritised project requirements) are resolved within the local
GSD team. In situations where the initial change affects a prioritised project
requirement, the GSD team leader will advice the most relevant stakeholder to
submit a change request to the change managers for consideration. From the
point where an accepted change is being effected till the point where it has
been implemented successfully, a process to trace all the change with regards to
participating stakeholders, associated software development life-cycle (SDLC)
phase, corresponding system engineering tools, impact on other artefacts, etc.
is undertaken in parallel. This period also sees the creation or modifications to
system documentations. At this point, the change managers accept the change
and it is marked as successful. Then a generation of notification to all stake-
holders of the change, and finally the change request is closed.
3. Design a validation instrument to test the success criteria (to
include methods for reporting/analysing responses)
We design a validation instrument to test the success criteria provided in Table
4.4. We choose a questionnaire as a validation instrument since it mainly pro-
vide relatively precise responses for evaluations,compared with interviews. This
questionnaire is provided in Appendix C.15. We consider a set of experts who
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provides their responses to the questionnaire for validation.
The validation process meeting objective (i.e. 4. Select an expert panel to
reflect the population of experts in Software Engineering, Require-
ments Engineering (RE), and CMMI), and the reporting process meeting
objective (i.e. 5. Present results of the validation instrument) are pre-
sented as the validation of the CM-T process model by the expert panel and
evaluation of Reactive Middleware with regards to the services it provides re-
spectively in Section 7.1.
4.2.3 Shared Artefacts Repository System
The Shared Artefacts Repository is a component of the Reactive Architecture,
and it stores all relevant system engineering artefacts (see Table 4.2). An arte-
fact is one of many kinds of tangible by-products produced during the devel-
opment of software systems. Some artefacts (e.g. requirements, plans, designs,
source code, test plans and results, problem reports, reviews, notes, use cases,
class diagrams, and other Unified Modeling Language (UML) models and de-
sign documents) help describe the function, architecture, and design of software
systems. Other artefacts are concerned with the process of development itself
such as project plans, business cases, and risk assessments. For this version of
the architecture, focus will be on defining artefacts that describes the functions
and design of the components of the architecture.
4.2.4 System Engineering Tool Support System
The Toolbox system is composed of tools that have been classified based on
system engineering phases. The Toolbox is a component of the Reactive Ar-
chitecture. The Reactive Middleware interacts with the Toolbox by notifying
system engineering stakeholders of changes that tools in the Toolbox make to
artefacts. The tools in the Toolbox can be coordinated in a form of composi-
tions. System engineers can choose to compose the tools into either parallel or
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Table 4.5: Meeting the High Level Requirements of an Effective GSD
Framework
GSD Requirements Description of Approaches
Effective information
and knowledge sharing:
R1 : Artefact independence Artefacts in the Shared Artefacts Repository are
saved in their original formats, some generic XML
derivatives are are generated for interoperability , as
well as the generation of metadata for each artefact
in XML format to facilitate change management and
traceability. (GS6)
R2 : Supports globally dis-
tributed development
The Reactive Middleware is deployed to the cloud
environment to facilitate global accessibility. Also,
it provides GSD services towards user management,
requirement management, change management, and
traceability. (GS1, GS2, GS3, GS4, GS5, GS7)
R3 : Ability to handle dif-
ferent and large numbers of
changing artefacts
The Shared Artefacts Repository has a high scalable
capacity for varying formats of artefacts. Also, the
CM-T process model has been designed to keep up
with large volumes of changing to artefacts. An Air-
lock Control System case study has been provided in
Section 7.1.2 to assess this. (GS9, GS10, and GS11)
Automation:
R4 : Automated as far as
possible
The Reactive Middleware has been developed as a
set of cloud-based REST web services to provide
the mentioned set of GSD services. It mainly min-
imizes the manual effort involved in artefact con-
sistency management involving change management
and traceability. (GS8, GS11, GS12, and GS13)
Diversity of tools:
R5 : Tool integration The System Engineering Toolbox provides a set of
tools with different versions. These tools are inte-
grated using the OSLC technology such that a work-
flow can be created. Also, outputs of one tool is re-
formated as an input for another. Plug-in for the
toolbox is provided for variations of the Eclipse de-
velopment environment. (GS5)
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sequential scenarios. Such compositions can be applied to a set of tools that are
classified across system engineering phases. In this situation, tools that support
Requirements Engineering can be composed as a set. Also, tools that support
different system engineering phases such as Requirements and Verification, can
be composed in a workflow set. To achieve such a workflow, the OSLC technol-
ogy is used. The OSLC technology facilitates the integration of different tools
by providing a standardised liked data formats.
The Toolbox system receives requests from the Architecture Interface, which is
then directed to the specified tool(s). The Web Service running the collection of
tools implements the OSLC technology. Here, all data and artefacts generated
by the tools are annotated as resources. The annotation process allows the
definition of the format (plain text, XML, JSON-RDF, etc.) of data or artefacts.
After this process, data or artefacts can either be sent to the Shared Artefacts
Repository to be saved, or passed on to other tools in a workflow.
Developers have an option of selecting a particular set of tools from the list of
tools on the plugin’s “properties page”. With this selection, artefacts can be
passed to these particular tools. This selection can be changed at any time, but
it can only take effect in the REQUEST that follows it. We demonstrate the ap-
plication of the Toolbox to facilitate co-engineering and verification (i.e. model
checking and theorem proving) of formal models relative to their requirements
in Appendix B.12.
4.3 GSD Requirements Discussion
In Section 3.3.1.1, a set of high level requirements were discussed as optimal
for GSD in the cloud environment. Here, we want to reassess our proposed
approach of the Reactive Middleware in the context of the mentioned high level
requirements. Table 4.5 shows this assessment.
With the successful mapping of the approaches or services provided by the Reac-
tive Middleware and presented by the proposed GSD management guidelines,
to the high level requirements of a desirable framework to provide solutions
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to the state-of-the-art challenges in practicing GSD in the cloud environment,
we are confident that the Reactive Middleware will guide system engineering
to ensure the continual tight linkage of stakeholders’ requirements and system
engineering processes. That said, we evaluate this in Chapter 7.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter, we introduce a cloud-based Reactive Middleware that applies a
defined change management and traceability (CM-T) process model, within the
context of an adapted PMBOK quality process management approach to GSD.
This is in line with Objectives 1 and 2 presented in Section 1.2.2. The Reactive
Middleware provides cloud-based services for user managament, requirement
management, change management and traceability, and are facilitated by our
GSD management guidelines.
To ensure that the defined CM-T process model complies with the CMMI Level
2 (Baseline) Capability, an expert panel review process is used to validate it in
Chapter 7. Also in that chapter, we demonstrate how the Reactive Middleware
will guide system engineering to ensure the continual tight linkage of stakehold-
ers’ requirements and system engineering processes, by applying it to the GSD
of an Airlock Control System.
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Chapter 5
Designing Architectures for
Global Software Development
This chapter presents the description and the design of the Reactive Archi-
tecture. The main contributions of this chapter are the introduction of a novel
architectural trade-off analysis methodology referred to as cloud-ATAM, and the
design of the Reactive Architecture for cloud-based system engineering. These
contributions satisfy Objectives 5 and 7 respectively presented in Section 1.2.2.
The introduced methodology (see Section 1.3) assists in analysing the trade-
off of quality attributes of software architectures. Here, we focus on software
architectures with their sizes spanning the range of “base functional process”
(BFP) to “macro functional process” (MFP) as classified with functional size
measurement under the ISO/IEC 19761:2011 and COSMIC Full Function Point
2.2 standards. This size range is referred to as “small-to-medium size” in this
chapter.
In this chapter, we discuss the design and analysis of the the Reactive Architec-
ture using the cloud-ATAM. We begin by giving a preliminary introduction to
the Reactive Architecture, and describe its components (i.e. Reactive Middle-
ware, Shared Artefacts Repository System, System Engineering Toolbox, and
Cloud Accountability System) and their relationships in Section 5.1. In Section
5.2, we classify the size of the Reactive Architecture using the “COSMIC func-
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tional size measurement” approach. Section 5.3 presents a brief overview of the
Architecture Trade-off Analysis Method (ATAM) as a precursor to our derived
methodology. Then, the derived trade-off analysis methodology - cloud-ATAM
- for the design and analysis of the small-to-medium size cloud-based Reactive
Architecture is discussed. Finally, Section 5.4 concludes this chapter.
5.1 Designing the Reactive Architecture
We introduce a Reactive Architecture for system engineering in the cloud. This
architecture supports various phases of system engineering processes. The main
aim is to provide a dynamic and dependable framework that addresses the issues
of complexities of system engineering in terms of its processes.
Figure 5.1: Layered View of Reactive Architecture
The main components of this architecture are an Architecture Interface, Re-
active Middleware, Shared Artefacts Repository System, System Engineering
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ToolBox, and Cloud Accountability System (see Figure 5.1 - Layered View).
For an effective collaboration of system engineers and other stakeholders, there
should be a standardised medium or means of reliable information flow. Such
information is often a product of the system engineering process. The system
engineering process produces different types of artefacts, and changes made to
these artefacts will have to be propagated to all relevant stakeholders. There is
also a need to record all these changes as well as the system engineering tools
and system developers that/who made them. Hence, change management and
traceability of artefacts of the development process is crucial. It is therefore
necessary to support a kind of reactive system engineering. Here, system devel-
opers will be able to react to such changes and ensure traceability and change
management of all development artefacts.
To achieve this, we introduce a Reactive Middleware. Our definition of the
Reactive Middleware is a system deployed to the cloud platform that provides
services for change management, traceability, and stakeholder notification dur-
ing cloud-based system engineering. The “reactivity” feature of the architecture
is supported by this Reactive Middleware, which is largely aided by the Shared
Artefacts Repository System. The Reactive Middleware is composed of a pub-
lish/subscribe mechanism and a change monitoring system. This middleware
reacts to changes made to artefacts saved in the Shared Artefacts Repository.
This reaction involves a notification sent to the corresponding system devel-
opers and relevant stakeholders to inform them of the changes made. This
middleware introduces a form of dynamism and advancement to the system
engineering process.
At a high and abstract level, the Reactive Architecture is designed based on
the server-client relationship. Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) might be
treated as a state of the art approach to the design and implementation of
enterprise software, which is driven by business requirements. Within the last
decade a number of concepts related to SOA have been developed, including En-
terprise Service Bus (ESB), web services, design patterns, service orchestration
and choreography and various security standards. Due to the fact that there
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are many technologies that cover the area of SOA, the development and evalu-
ation of SOA compliant architectures is especially interesting. The concept of
cloud computing represents a combination of most of these concepts and hence,
serves as a good SOA example. In view of this, the Reactive Architecture con-
sists of a set of interconnected web services. We use web services as our service
delivery framework since the cloud platform mainly supports such definition of
services. Here, the architecture and its components are mainly servers. The
clients (i.e. system developers and relevant stakeholders) access the interface
of the Reactive Architecture using plug-ins, developed into integrated develop-
ment environments (IDEs). In web services, clients’ plug-ins and services are
assumed to be loosely-coupled, which means that they are stand-alone systems
independent of each other. The web service implementation details and internal
structure are hidden from clients.
These web services are classified into architecture interface, Reactive Middle-
ware, System Engineering Toolbox, Shared Artefacts Repository system, and
the Cloud Accountability System. The classified web services function differ-
ently to achieve their specific goals. All of these web services can be used by
clients (i.e. system developers) independently of the others. Here, if a client
requires the services of a model checker tool such as ProB, all other tools in
the System Engineering Toolbox, as well as all other web services can be dis-
regarded. Also, some web services can interact with each other to create work-
flows. Communication among the web services is fundamentally based on the
web standard Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), but more specifically on
JSON-RPC. JSON-RPC is a remote procedure call protocol encoded in JSON.
We use it as it is a very simple protocol, defining only a handful of data types
and commands. Also, JSON-RPC allows for (1) “notifications” where data sent
to the server does not require a response, which is suitable for workflows, and
for (2) “multiple calls” to be sent to the server which may be answered out of
order. We also make provisions for XML-RPC as an alternative communication
protocol.
The overview of the proposed architecture supporting system engineering on the
cloud (see Figure 5.1) is now described briefly in terms of interfaces, components,
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connectors, constraints, and dependability.
5.1.1 Architecture Interface
Clients send requests to the Reactive Architecture. The requests are first re-
ceived by the architecture interface. Here, requests are translated and directed
appropriately to the intended component or constituent web service. This func-
tion of the architecture interface assists in regulating all requests made to the
web services in the Reactive Architecture. In this situation, all requests that
do not conform to the expected requests format are classified as malicious; they
are dropped and noted.
5.1.2 Components
The main sub-systems of this architecture are briefly introduced as System and
Component Interfaces, System Engineering Toolbox, Shared Artefacts Repos-
itory, Reactive Middleware, and Cloud Accountability System. System and
Component Interfaces provide globally unique names of web services’ handlers,
based on internet domain names. This is generally specified as a unique uni-
form resource identifier (URI). Also, the interface determines the capacity and
ordering of resource requests. A standard of the relationships between compo-
nents are described in the component interface(s). This defines the type, means
and scope of resource request transactions between components. The System
Engineering Toolbox manages central updates of tools, defines the relationships
between tools (i.e. establishing workflow of tools), manages system artefacts
manipulation processes, and facilitates data presentation in different predefined
(standard) formats. Also, the Shared Artefacts Repository manages search
and retrieval of artefacts. This repository management supports the Reactive
Middleware. These tools and repository management together ensure real-time
monitoring of artefacts, change management, and traceability. The Toolbox
brings together various tools that support the system engineering phases. It
also provides access to various versions of tools, and facilitates communication
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between tools. The Shared Artefacts Repository stores system engineering arte-
facts (source code, test cases, models, patterns, documentations, requirements,
etc.), it employs an efficient indexing process (to facilitate prompt access to arte-
facts), and it asynchronously backs its contents up in a cloud-based repository.
The components of the Reactive Architecture are further discussed in Section
5.3.3 and in the following chapters: Reactive Middleware and Shared Artefacts
Repository in Chapter 4, and Cloud Accountability System in Chapter 6.
5.1.3 Connectors
A connector defines the type of relationships between the components of a
system. In the Reactive Architecture, we consider a set of connectors that are
appropriate to use at various facets of its design. Such connectors are:
(a) Asynchronous Event Notification (AEN) is a process or procedure
that may be used by system component targets to notify a system compo-
nent initiator of “events” that occur in the target. More specifically, we
identify some components that will be suited to the asynchronous event
notification connector:
• the Architecture Interface can use the asynchronous event notification
to notify architecture components when a request is received from a
client. Here, client requests are noted as events and the appropriate
component(s) are notified accordingly.
• with the Reactive Middleware, the asynchronous event notification is
able to identify changes made to artefacts as events in the Shared
Artefacts Repository, and all appropriate component(s) such as the
tools in the System Engineering Toolbox is/are notified.
• the coordination of tools in the System Engineering Toolbox for the
purpose of creating workflows can benefit from asynchronous event
notification connectors. Here, an event of an instruction defined by
the coordination of tools by system developers initiate tools and in
turn notify other tools in the workflow.
115
• the Cloud Accountability System can use the asynchronous event no-
tification connectors to collect dependability metrics data from tar-
get virtual machines of the Reactive Architecture. In this situation,
timed dependability metrics collection events from the target virtual
machines notify the Cloud Accountability System after metrics are
collected.
(b) Synchronous Procedure Call (SPC) is a protocol that allows the con-
struction of client-server applications, using a demand/response protocol
with management of transactions. The client is blocked until a response is
returned from the server, or a user-defined optional time-out occurs. RPC
guarantees at-most-once semantics for the delivery of the request. It also
guarantees that the response received by a client is definitely that of the
server and corresponds effectively to the request (and not to a former re-
quest to which the response might have been lost). SPC also allows a client
to be unblocked (with an error result) if the server is unreachable or if the
server (or virtual machine) has crashed before emitting a response. Finally,
this protocol supports a mechanism called abort propagation that is, when
a thread that is waiting for an reply is aborted, this event is propagated to
the thread that is currently servicing the client request. We consider the
synchronous procedure call connector between the Shared Artefacts Repos-
itory and the Back-Up Repository. Here, the extra guarantee of back-up
request of artefacts from the Shared Artefacts Repository and the Back-Up
Repository, over a dedicated channel is essential. This type of connector
assures a high level of a reliable artefacts back-up process.
5.1.4 Constraints
Some general constraints identified in the Reactive Architecture and compo-
nents design are classified as resources (time, budget, etc.), technology con-
straint, local standards (development, coding, etc.), public standards (HTTP,
XML, XML Schema, RDFXML, WSDL, WADL, etc.), standard communication
protocols, standard message formats, and skill profile of architecture developer.
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Also, project constraints (e.g., time to market or deploy, customer demands,
standards, cost, etc.) and technical constraints (e.g., COTS, interoperation
with other systems, required hardware or software platform, reuse of legacy
code, etc.).
5.1.5 Dependability
The Reactive Architecture is expected to be designed with dependability in fo-
cus. More precisely, meeting the dependability attributes’ requirements of avail-
ability, performance, and reliability are important when designing the Reactive
Architecture. The architecture’s Cloud Accountability System has respective
modules to monitor the dependability of all components in the Reactive Ar-
chitecture. These modules collect dependability metrics from corresponding
components to assess the dependability of the Reactive Architecture. Also, the
Cloud Accountability System collects dependability metrics from the Cloud Ser-
vice Provider (CSP), and compares them with those from the modules. CSPs
such as the Amazon Web Service, make dependability metrics available to all
their users’ virtual machines. These metrics are mainly classified as availability
and reliability metrics. The activities of the Cloud Accountability System is
expected to assure the dependability of the Reactive Architecture running in
the cloud, to system developers or other relevant stakeholders.
5.2 Classifying the Size of the Reactive Archi-
tecture
We complete this section by classifying the size of the Reactive Architecture.
Here, we apply the COSMIC FSM approach (see Section 2.2.6) for classifying
software project size. Also, we use the requirements (see Appendix C.13) and
more specifically the use cases (see Figure 5.2 and Appendix C.14 for functional
requirements) of the Reactive Architecture to identify functional processes for
classification.
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Figure 5.2: Overview of Reactive Architecture Use Cases
Table 5.1: COSMIC FSM Software Project Size Classification Benchmark
Size Bin (Full Functional Points)
XXS 10
XS 30
S 100
M1 300
M2 1000
L 3000
XL 9000
XXL 18000
XXXL More
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Classifying the Functional Processes derived from the Use Cases of the Reactive Architecture
Use Cases Use
Case ID
Functional Processes TOTAL
User Management
(see Figure 12)
UMUC Register (fp1), UserID (fp2), SaveUserID (fp3), ackSave (fp4),
JoinUserGroup (fp5), ackJoin (fp6), IsGroupAvailable (fp7),
ackAvailability (fp8), CreateGroup (fp9), ackCreateGroup
(fp10), AddUserToGroup (fp11), ackAdd (fp12), SetUserPriv-
ilege (fp13), ackPrivilege (fp14), UpdateGroup (fp15), ackUp-
date (fp16), Unregister (fp17), ackUnregister (fp18), Update-
GroupRemove (fp19), ackUpdateGroupRemove (fp20).
20
Adding Tools (see
Figure 13)
ATUC SelectDefaultTools (fp1), ackChoice (fp2), ParallelComposition
(fp3), ackParallelComposition (fp4), SequentialComposition
(fp5), ackSequentialComposition (fp6), SelectTool (fp7), ack-
ToolChoice (fp8), ToolSelection (fp9), ackToolSelection (fp10),
ChooseToolCoordination (fp11), ackToolCoordination (fp12),
CallTools (fp13), ackResults (fp14), ToolAddition (fp15), ack-
ToolAddition (fp16)
16
Saving Artefacts
(see Figure 14)
SAUC SelectArtefact (fp1), ackSave (fp2), ArtefactName (fp3), ack-
Choice (fp4), ArtefactHash (fp5), ackHash (fp6), ArtefactDate
(fp7), ackDate (fp8), ArtefactOwner (fp9), ackOwner (fp10)
10
Download Artefacts
(see Figure 15)
DAUC DownloadArtefact (fp1), ackDownload (fp2), ArtefactName
(fp3), ackChoice (fp4), ArtefactHash (fp5), ackHash (fp6), Arte-
factDate (fp7), ackDate (fp8), ArtefactOwner (fp9), ackOwner
(fp10)
10
Sharing Artefacts
(see Figure 16)
ShAUC ShareWith (fp1), ackAccess (fp2), SetAccessPrivilege (fp3), ack-
Privilege (fp4), SetRead (fp5), ackRead (fp6), SetWrite (fp7),
ackWrite (fp8), SetOwn (fp9), ackOwn (fp10), SetNoAccess
(fp11), ackNoAccess (fp12)
12
Change Management
(see Figure 17)
CMUC ChangeArtefact (fp1), ackNotify (fp2), IsArtChanged (fp3),
ackChange (fp4)
4
Traceability (see
Figure 18)
TAUC CreateArtefact (fp1), ackCreate (fp2), InformRepository (fp3),
ackTrace (fp4), ChangeArtefact (fp5), ackChange (fp6), In-
formRepository (fp7), ackTrace (fp8), UseTools (fp9), ackTool-
sTrace (fp10), InformMiddleware (fp11), ackTrace (fp12), ack-
ToolsChange (fp13)
13
Backup Repository
(see Figure 19)
BRUC AssynchronousBackUp (fp1), ackAssynBackUp (fp2), Syn-
chronousBackUp (fp3), ackSynBackUp (fp4), Restore (fp5), ack-
Restore (fp6)
6
Evidence Collection ECUC ChooseSystemAttribute (fp1), ackAttributeChoice (fp2), Tar-
getVM (fp3), ackTargetSet (fp4), HyperCalls (fp5), ackMet-
ricsCalls (fp6), FormatMetrics (fp7), ackMetricsFormat (fp8),
CallCloudAPI (fp9), ackAPICall (fp10), LogActivities (fp11),
ackLog (fp12)
12
Arbitrate Metrics ArMUC SortMetrics (fp1), ackSort (fp2), ExamineMetrics (fp3), ack-
Exam (fp4), LogActivities (fp5), ackLog (fp6)
6
Audit Metrics AuMUC ClassifyMetrics (fp1), ackClassify (fp2), ComputeMeans (fp3),
ackCompute (fp4), CompareMeans (fp5), ackCompare (fp6),
TriggerRM (fp7), ackTrigger (fp8), ComputeNPV (fp9), ack-
NPVCompute (fp10), DeriveMonetaryValue (fp11), ackMone-
taryValue (fp12), LogActivities (fp13), ackLog (fp14)
14
Manage Notifications MNUC SendNotification (fp1), ackNotification (fp2), ClaimCompensa-
tion (fp3), ackClaim (fp4), SendTimedReport (fp5), ackTime-
dReport (fp6), LogActivities (fp7), ackLog (fp8)
8
TOTAL 131
Table 5.2: Classification of Functional Processes based on the Reactive
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In classifying the Reactive Architecture, we apply the COSMIC FSM approach
for categorising software project size. We reference the categorisation bench-
mark of software project size with COSMIC FSM in Table 5.1, for classifying
the functional processes derived from the use cases of the Reactive Architecture
(shown in Table 5.2). Here, Bin is the COSMIC full function points, and it is
considered to be a “generic set of size category”. The total number of func-
tional processes identified from the Reactive Architecture through its use cases
are 131. At this point, we can reliably identify the Reactive Architecture as a
“level 1 medium size software project/architecture” as it falls in the M1 range
of more than 100 functional processes but less than or equal to 300 functional
processes.
5.3 Analysing the Reactive Architecture
5.3.1 Present cloud-ATAM
One of our main objectives of this chapter is to present a methodology, cloud-
ATAM for analysing the trade-off between multiple quality attributes of the
small-to-medium scale Reactive Architecture deployed to the cloud environ-
ment.
The reasoning in cloud-ATAM is not always highly formal and mathematical,
but it is predictive and repeatable. The reasoning might manifest itself as
a discussion that follows from the exploration of the architectural approaches
that address a scenario; it may be a qualitative model of attribute-specific
behaviour of the architecture; or it may be a quantitative model that represents
how to calculate a value of a particular quality attribute. Attribute-Based
Architectural Styles (ABASs) and quality attribute characterisations provide
the technical foundations for creating these reasoning models.
As introduced earlier, the ATAM is considered a mature and validated scenario-
based Software Architecture (SA) evaluation method. Similarly, the inputs of
cloud-ATAM are scenario elicited by stakeholders and documented descriptions
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Figure 5.3: cloud-ATAM Concept Interactions
of the architecture. The goal of the cloud-ATAM is to analyse architectural
approaches with respect to scenarios generated from project drivers for the
purpose of identifying “risk points” in the architecture. This is achieved by a
disciplined reasoning about SA relating to multiple quality attributes. There
are two important classifications of risk points in cloud-ATAM namely “sensi-
tivity points” and “trade-off points”. A “sensitivity point” refers to a param-
eter of the architecture that affects the achievement of one quality attribute.
On the other hand, a “trade-off point” refers to a parameter of the architec-
ture that affects the achievement of more than one quality attribute. In this
situation, one quality attribute improves and the other degrades. These risk
points, together with extensive documentations of the architecture, scenarios,
and quality-attributes analyses are the products of cloud-ATAM. The cloud-
ATAM also explicitly relates architectural risks and trade-offs to project drivers
(i.e. architectural requirements) as shown in Figure 5.3.
1. Present the cloud-ATAM
• Method
• Process
• Agenda
2. Present the Project Drivers
• Critical requirements
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• Technical constraints
• Quality attributes
3. Present the Architecture
• Architecture drivers
• High-level architecture views
• Architecture styles
• Important scenarios
4. Identify Architectural Approaches
• Architecture decisions
5. Generate the Quality Attribute Utility Tree and Scenarios
• Quality tree
• Scenarios
6. Analyse the Architectural Approaches
• Decisions
• Risks
• Trade-offs (Project drivers, Trade-off themes, and Impact of trade-off
themes on project drivers)
• Sensitivity points
7. Present Results
The seven steps of cloud-ATAM are provided above. This chapter discusses
the design of the the Reactive Architecture which is based on Steps 1 to 5.
On the other hand, Steps 6 and 7 are used to analyse or evaluate a designed
small-to-medium size cloud-based architecture.
5.3.2 Present the Project Drivers
The predominant drivers of this project are the target quality attributes: avail-
ability and performance. The expectation is that the Reactive Architecture
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Reactive Architecture Quality Attributes of Interest
Quality
Attribute
Goals
ID Attribute-Specific Requirements
Operability
O1 The Reactive Architecture must store all artefacts created in all of its
components.
O2* It must monitor and trace all changes to these artefacts to inform system
developers (i.e. clients). (also P1)
O3 The System Engineering Toolbox must facilitate sequential and parallel
execution of tools in a workflow manner.
O4 The Cloud Accountability System must gather dependability metrics
from several virtual machines, and perform a synchronous analysis of
these metrics.
Performance
P1* It must monitor and trace all changes to these artefacts to inform system
developers (i.e. clients). (also O2)
P2* The Reactive Middleware must enable heterogeneous access and analysis
operations on artefacts in the Shared Artefacts Repository. (also A2)
P3 Security mechanisms must not degrade defined performance threshold.
Specifically, response time for create, delete, update, and display artefact
operations should not exceed 5 seconds at peak cloud period and less than
1 second during off-peak period. (also S1)
P4 The Reactive Architecture must provide high performance and availabil-
ity to allow it to keep up with the sturdy stream of data and operations
on artefacts from the system engineering processes. (also A4)
Scalability
Sc1 The Reactive Architecture must support at least 20 users concurrently.
Sc2* The Reactive Architecture must provide capacity to scale quickly to ac-
commodate changing demands of system developers, and failures. (also
A1)
Availability
A1* The Reactive Architecture must provide capacity to scale quickly to ac-
commodate changing demands of system developers, and failures. (also
Sc2)
A2* The Reactive Middleware must enable heterogeneous access and analysis
operations on artefacts in the Shared Artefacts Repository. (also P2)
A3 Critical systems such as the Reactive Middleware must not constitute a
single point of failure which will affect the uptime of the system and the
Reactive Architecture. (also R1)
A4 The Reactive Architecture must provide high performance and availabil-
ity to allow it to keep up with the sturdy stream of data and operations
on artefacts from the system engineering processes. (also P4)
Maintainability M1 The Shared Artefacts Repository must be backed up asynchronously to
facilitate roll-back of repository artefacts.
Reliability R1 Critical systems such as the Reactive Middleware must not constitute a
single point of failure which will affect the uptime of the system and the
architecture. (also A3)
Security S1 Security mechanisms must not degrade defined performance threshold.
Specifically, response time for create, delete, update, and display artefact
operations should not exceed 5 seconds at peak cloud period and less than
1 second during off-peak period. (also P3)
Table 5.3: Mapping Requirements to Quality Attributes of Reactive Archi-
tecture
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will maintain a high level and healthy balance between availability and perfor-
mance. The relationship between the quality attributes are directly dependent
on the requirements provided by the stakeholders of the Reactive Architecture.
Also, the constraints of the architecture are contributory drivers of the project.
Finally, the major stakeholders of the project are presented.
5.3.2.1 Requirements
We present the requirements of the Reactive Architecture in Appendix C.13.
However, these requirements are formulated in terms of the architectural compo-
nents in Table 5.3. Also, we map the requirements of the Reactive Architecture
to identified quality attributes; operability, performance, scalability, availability,
maintainability, reliability, and security.
5.3.2.2 Constraints
The constraints affecting the Reactive Architecture are identified along two
perspectives:
(a) Reactive Architecture:
• Cost of development.
• Time to market, which is dictated by customer demands.
• Skill set of architect.
• Technical standards.
(b) Environment of Architecture (i.e. Cloud Environment):
• Co-location of potentially risky systems on a cloud server.
• Architecture is highly dependent on the dependability of the cloud
infrastructure.
• Security of the architecture and data is largely out of the control of
the architect.
• Reliance on the performance of Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS)
products on the cloud platform.
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5.3.2.3 Project Stakeholders
The main stakeholders of the Reactive Architecture are briefly introduced below
as users of the architecture, and with regards to the roles they play in GSD
projects:
• Systems Architect: They define the architecture of a computerised sys-
tem (i.e. a system composed of software and hardware) in order to fulfill
certain requirements. Such definitions include a breakdown of the system
into components, the component interactions and interfaces (with the en-
vironment, and the user), and the technologies and resources to be used
in the design. The Systems Architect’s work avoids implementation is-
sues and readily permit unanticipated extensions or modifications in future
stages. Due to the extensive experience required for this, the Systems Ar-
chitect is typically a very senior technician with substantial, but general,
knowledge of hardware, software, and similar systems. But above all, the
systems architect must be reasonably familiar with the users’ domain of
experience.
• Project Managers: A project manager is the person who has the over-
all responsibility for the successful initiation, planning, design, execution,
monitoring, controlling and closure of a project. The role of the project
manager encompasses many activities including: planning and defining
scope, activity planning and sequencing, resource planning, developing
schedules, time estimating, cost estimating, developing a budget, docu-
mentation, creating charts and schedules, risk analysis, managing risks
and issues, monitoring and reporting progress, team leadership, strategic
influencing, business partnering, working with vendors, scalability, inter-
operability and portability analysis, controlling quality, and benefits real-
isation.
• Cloud Service Provider: This is the entity that provides the cloud
service. The Cloud Service Provider (CSP) owns and controls the cloud
computing platform. The services include SaaS (Software as a Service),
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PaaS (Platform as a Service), and IaaS (Infrastructure as a Service).
Based on the services provided, the CSPs can be broadly categorised
into 3 types: Application Provider, Resource Provider, and Infrastructure
Provider. The Application Provider directly provides access to an applica-
tion without the need to know about the resources or layers underneath.
Also, the Resource Provider provides virtualisation systems on top of their
servers and lets clients buy resources such as RAM, computing cycles and
disc space. Then the Infrastructure Provider leases servers and associated
infrastructure from their datacenters. The infrastructure includes servers,
storage, bandwidth and the datacenter (with power, space and personnel
to man them).
• System Developers: The System Developer interprets business require-
ments and translates them into a deployable solution that meets func-
tional and non-functional needs. Their responsibilities are to (1) work
with Testers to iteratively develop: the deployable solution, models re-
quired for the properly controlled development of the solution, and models
and documentation required for the purpose of supporting the solution in
live use; and (2) recording/interpreting the detail of any: changes to the
detailed requirements, changes to the interpretation of requirements which
result in re-work within the solution, information likely to impact on the
ongoing evolution of the solution, adhering to technical constraints laid
out in the System Architecture Definition, adhering to standards and best
practice laid out in the Technical Implementation Standards, participating
in any quality assurance work required to ensure the delivered products
are truly fit for purpose, and testing the output of their own work prior to
independent testing.
• System Testers: The System Tester is fully integrated with the System
Development Team and performs testing in accordance with the Technical
Testing Strategy throughout the project. Their responsibilities are to work
with other roles to define test scenarios and test cases for the evolving sys-
tem. Also, in accordance with the Technical Testing Strategy, the System
Tester: carries out all types of technical testing of the solution as a whole,
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creates testing products, e.g. test cases, plans and logs, reports the results
of testing activities to the Technical Co-ordinator for Quality Assurance
purposes, and keeps the Team Leader informed of the results of testing
activities.
• Database Administrators: A Database Administrator (DBA) is respon-
sible for the performance, integrity and security of a database. They are
also involved in the planning and development of the database, as well as
troubleshooting any issues on behalf of the users. The DBA role naturally
divides into three major activities: ongoing maintenance of production
databases (operations DBA); planning, design, and development of new
database applications, or major changes to existing applications (develop-
ment DBA, or architect); and management of an organisation’s data and
metadata (data administrator). One person may perform all three roles,
but each is profoundly different.
• Tool Developers: A Tool Developer builds software tools that are used
to create, debug, maintain, or otherwise support other programs and ap-
plications. Such tools can be combined together to accomplish a software
development task in a project.
5.3.3 Present the Architecture
The Reactive Architecture provides support for system engineering to system
developers. The architecture is deployed to the cloud to make use of its benefits.
Cloud computing provides relatively cheap resources, multi-user access, global
access, scalability, etc.
We present two main views of the Reactive Architecture: layered view depicted
in Figure 5.1, and component-connector view also depicted in Figure 5.4. A
detailed description of the Reactive Architecture has been provided earlier in
Section 5.1. We then briefly introduce the components of the Reactive Archi-
tecture below.
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Figure 5.4: Component and Connector View of the Reactive Architecture
5.3.3.1 Reactive Middleware
The reactivity feature of the architecture is based on this Reactive Middleware
which is largely supported by the Shared Artefacts Repository System. This
middleware reacts to changes made to artefacts saved in the Shared Artefacts
Repository. This reaction involves a notification sent to the corresponding stake-
holders (i.e. system developers, managers) to inform them of the changes made.
This Reactive Middleware introduces a form of dynamism and advancement to
the system engineering process.
The Reactive Middleware is made up of two sub-systems: Artefacts Monitoring
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System (AMS) and Publish/Subscribe System (PSS). The PSS registers actors
(i.e. tools, and developers) to development artefacts that they are interested
in. This registration assigns permissions to only relevant stakeholders or actors.
Based on this registration, notifications are generated as a result of changes to
the artefacts and are sent to corresponding stakeholders. Also, the AMS pro-
vides an industry standard framework for system engineering tool integration
that in particular supports requirements, change management and traceabil-
ity. This AMS traces all changes made to artefacts or elements of artefacts
from integrated development environments, and links them to the stored arte-
facts in the repository. The AMS then triggers a call to the PSS to notify all
stakeholders. The Reactive Middleware is further discussed in Chapter 4.
5.3.3.2 Shared Artefacts Repository System
This system is made up of the Shared Artefacts repository and the Back-up
repository. Here, all requests from the Architecture Interface is received by the
Shared Artefacts Repository. The Shared Artefacts Repository facilitates a re-
covery process using the Back-up Repository. The Reactive Middleware is used
to collect and interlink system engineering artefacts to support traceability and
change management. By recording the history of all system development and
storing all development artefacts in the dedicated Shared Artefacts Repository,
the Reactive Architecture is able to support reactive system engineering pro-
cesses. In this situation, a change in any development artefact is propagated
to all relevant stakeholders (i.e. developers), tools, and also to dependent arte-
facts. The Shared Artefacts Repository is a critical element of this architecture.
It is important to mention that the Shared Artefacts Repository also links the
artefacts with the tools and system engineering phases in which they are either
produced or used. Here, artefacts that specify the origin of artefacts (i.e. tool
source), format, etc. are also stored. Also, a timed back-up of all the artefacts
in the Shared Artefacts Repository into the Back-up Repository is undertaken.
The Shared Artefacts Repository is further discussed in Chapter 4.
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5.3.3.3 System Engineering Toolbox
The System Engineering Toolbox is made up of tools for software projects.
All client tool-related requests to the Architecture Interface are directed to the
Toolbox. The tools in the Toolbox are classified based on the system engineering
phase (i.e. Specification, Requirements, Design, etc.) they support. These tools
are presented to be interoperable, hence can be coordinated to support system
engineering. The main artefacts generated in the toolbox system are those from
the tools: processing results, processing time, tool version, etc. These tools are
composed into either parallel coordination or sequential coordination scenarios.
Such compositions can be applied to a set of tools that supports a particular
system engineering phase. The Toolbox also supports tools management; tool
patches and updates are installed. Also, new and older versions of tools are made
available to developers. The System Engineering Toolbox is further discussed
in Chapter 4.
5.3.3.4 Cloud Accountability System
This system consists of components that collect dependability-related data from
the components of the Reactive Architecture, to assure system developers of the
dependability of the cloud-based architecture. Here, availability and reliability
metric data are collected from the Toolbox system, Reactive Middleware and
the Shared Artefacts Repository system. The data collected is passed on for ex-
amination, analyses and then compared to the CSP’s contract (i.e. Service Level
Agreement - SLA). Notifications are sent to the system developer(s), the CSP
and other stakeholders, when there is a breach to the SLA. Relevant information
is provided to the system developer towards the assurance of the dependabil-
ity of the Reactive Architecture. We discuss the Cloud Accountability System
further in Chapter 6.
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5.3.4 Identify Architectural Approaches
Our research focuses on the availability and performance quality attributes of
the Reactive Architecture, so we will then pay a closer attention to, and present
the architectural requirements related to them. We then characterise these qual-
ity attributes, and ask attribute-specific questions to have a clearer appreciation
of their interaction in the context of the Reactive Architecture. Finally, we iden-
tify architectural approaches to facilitate the achievement of the architectural
requirements.
• Availability:
(a) The Reactive Architecture must provide capacity to scale quickly to
accommodate changing demands of system developers, and failures.
(b) The Reactive Middleware must enable heterogeneous access and anal-
ysis operations on artefacts in the Shared Artefacts Repository.
(c) Critical systems such as the Reactive Middleware must not constitute
a single point of failure which will affect the uptime of the system and
the Reactive Architecture.
(d) The Reactive Architecture must provide high performance and avail-
ability to allow it to keep up with the sturdy stream of data and
operations on artefacts from the system engineering processes.
• Performance:
(a) It must monitor and trace all changes to these artefacts to inform
system developers.
(b) The Reactive Middleware must enable heterogeneous access and anal-
ysis operations on artefacts in the Shared Artefacts Repository.
(c) Security mechanisms must not degrade defined performance thresh-
old. Specifically, response time for create, delete, update, and display
artefact operations should not exceed 5 seconds at peak cloud period
and less than 1 second during off-peak period.
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(d) The Reactive Architecture must provide high performance and avail-
ability to allow it to keep up with the sturdy stream of data and
operations on artefacts from the system engineering processes.
5.3.4.1 Quality Attribute Characterisations
Evaluating an architectural design against quality attribute requirements re-
quires a precise characterisation of the quality attributes of concern. From the
knowledge that is already in the various quality attribute communities, we apply
an already created characterisations for the quality attributes of performance
and availability. These characterisations have been discussed in Section 2.2.3.
5.3.4.2 Attribute-Specific Questions
Some attribute-specific questions are asked to help narrow the design of the
Reactive Architecture, and clarify the expectations of the architecture. Through
these questions and the understanding of the attribute characterisations, we aim
to improve the architectural documentation. The questions asked are:
• What facilities exist in the software architecture (if any) for self-testing
and monitoring of software components? (Availability)
• What facilities exist in the software architecture (if any) for redundancy,
liveness monitoring, and fail-over? (Availability)
• How is data consistency maintained so that one component can take over
from another and be sure that it is in a consistent state with the failed
component? (Availability)
• What is the process and/or task view of the system, including mapping
of these processes/tasks to hardware and communication mechanisms be-
tween them? (Performance)
• What functional dependencies exist among the software components? (Per-
formance)
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• What data is kept in the database? How big is it, how much does it change,
who reads/writes it? (Performance)
• How are resources allocated to service requests? (Performance)
• What are the anticipated frequency and volume of data transmitted among
the system components? (Performance)
5.3.4.3 Architectural Approaches
We identify some architectural approaches to meet the requirements of the
Reactive Architecture, and are enumerated below:
(a) We use the component-and-connector architectural style to represent the
various components and connections/interfaces of the Reactive Architec-
ture. This is particularly relevant because it expresses the runtime be-
haviour of the architecture under review.
(b) We avoid the distributed data repository approach in designing the Shared
Artefacts Repository. This prevents situations such as issues with database
consistency and possible modifiability concerns.
(c) The client-server approach is a best fit for the data-centric Shared Arte-
facts Repository system.
(d) The Reactive Middleware will be adequately represented using the client-
server approach.
(e) Since the Reactive Middleware and the Shared Artefacts Repository con-
stitute a single point of failure, we present the following approaches:
i. Backup of artefacts in the Shared Artefacts Repository. (towards the
architecture’s availability requirements)
ii. Distributed services (or modular set of services) for the components
of the Reactive Middleware. (towards the architecture’s availability
requirements)
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Identified Architectural Styles in Reactive Architecture
Architectural
Styles
ID Requirements
Data-Centered
DC1 The Reactive Architecture must store all
artefacts created in all the components of the
main composing systems.
DC2 The Reactive Middleware must enable het-
erogeneous access and analysis operations on
artefacts in the Shared Artefacts Repository.
Client-Server
CS1 It must monitor and trace all changes to
these artefacts to inform system developers
(i.e. clients).
CS2 The System Engineering Toolbox must facili-
tate sequential and parallel execution of tools
in a workflow manner.
CS3 The Cloud Accountability System must
gather dependability metrics from several
virtual machines, and perform a synchronous
analysis of these metrics.
Event-Driven ED1 The Shared Artefacts Repository must be
backed up asynchronously to facilitate roll-
back of repository artefacts.
Peer-To-Peer P2P1 The Cloud Accountability System must
gather dependability metrics from several
virtual machines, and perform a synchronous
analysis of these metrics.
Table 5.4: Mapping Architectural Styles to Requirements of Reactive Ar-
chitecture
(f) Schema-free NoSQL data management system (DMS) is necessary for the
Shared Artefacts Repository to minimise or remove bottlenecks. (towards
the architecture’s performance requirements)
(g) An independent communication components approach for communication
between the Reactive Middleware together with the Shared Artefacts Repos-
itory, and the Cloud Accountability System. Such communication ap-
proach is particularly relevant for the distributed components of the Cloud
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Accountability System.
Each of these approaches was probed for risks, sensitivities, and trade-offs via
our attribute-specific questions. Also, we have presented some architectural
styles that correspond to some of the Reactive Architecture requirements being
considered (see Table 5.4).
Figure 5.5: Utility Tree with Prioritised Scenarios
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5.3.5 Generate the Quality Attribute Utility Tree and
Scenarios
5.3.5.1 Eliciting and Prioritising Scenarios
Scenarios are elicited and prioritised in cloud-ATAM using different mechanisms
at different times with different stakeholder participation. The two mechanisms
used here are utility trees and structured brainstorming. We apply the utility
tree mechanism to elicit and prioritise scenarios at this point. We organise a
scenario brainstorming with the stakeholder community to reconcile the util-
ity tree. This scenario brainstorming mechanism used, and the reconciliation
process are discussed in Chapter 7. The description of our utility tree scenario
elicitation approach is provided below.
5.3.5.2 Utility Tree
The utility tree generated in this exercise is shown in Figure 5.5. This pre-
sented utility tree guides the remaining analysis process. It is important at
this point to prioritise, and refine the Reactive Architecture’s most important
quality attribute goals. The utility tree starts with “Utility” as the root node.
This indicates the general “goodness” of the Reactive Architecture. The sec-
ond level is constituted with the quality attributes of interest: performance
and availability. In the third level, there are specific quality attribute refine-
ments. From the performance quality attribute, we identify “data latency” and
“transaction throughput” as relevant refinements. Such refinements are major
determinants of performance. Also, availability is refined to “hardware failures”
and “software failures”. From this point, we are able to identify attribute goals
as “quality attribute scenarios” that are concrete enough for prioritisation and
analysis. These quality attribute scenarios form the “leafs” of the utility tree.
Here, the “hardware failures” (i.e. see third level) refined from availability is
further refined into “power outage at Availability Zone 1 requires traffic redirect
to Availability Zone 2 in less than 5 seconds”, “disk crash must have a backup
that takes over in less than 3 seconds”, and “network failure is detected and
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recovered in 10 seconds”. These specific scenarios are prioritised relative to each
other and then analysed in Chapter 7.
Table 5.5: Classified Quality Attribute Scenarios according to Types
Scenario
Type
Scenario
Type ID
Quality Attribute Scenarios Scenario
ID
Use Case USC1 Deliver change requests and re-
ports in real-time.
P1
USC2 Reduce storage latency for users
to 200 milliseconds.
P2
Growth GS1 Disk crash must have a backup
that takes over in less than 3 sec-
onds.
A2
GS2 Network failure is detected and
recovered in 10 seconds.
A3
GS3 COTS/Third party software up-
date with bug that causes fail-
ures is reverted to stable version
in less than 5 seconds.
A4
GS4 One system (e.g. Reactive Mid-
dleware) should not constitute a
lag greater than 1 second.
P3
GS5 Accommodate over 500 queries
per second.
P4
Exploratory ES1 Power outage at Availability
Zone 1 requires traffic redirect to
Availability Zone 2 in less than
5 seconds.
A1
In cloud-ATAM, we use three types of scenarios: (1) use case scenarios; (2)
growth scenarios; and (3) exploratory scenarios. Use case scenarios involve typ-
ical uses of the existing system, and are used for information elicitation. Also,
growth scenarios cover anticipated changes to the system. Then, exploratory
scenarios cover extreme changes that are expected to “stress” the system. These
different types of scenarios are used to probe a system from different angles, to
further optimise the chances of identifying architectural decisions that are at
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risk. In this work, we consider some scenarios bordering use case, growth and
exploration. We have provided some use cases derived from our scenarios in
Appendix C.14. The scenarios are classified and shown in Table 5.5.
5.3.6 Analyse the Architectural Approaches
As mentioned earlier in Section 5.3, the Steps 6 and 7 of the cloud-ATAM in-
volves the analysis/evaluation and results presentation of a small-to-medium
size cloud-based architecture. For the analysis process, we adopt a two-staged
approach to qualitatively and quantitatively analysing the design of the Reac-
tive Architecture: Utility Tree analysis, Scenario Brainstorming (stakeholder
group work) constitute qualitative analysis approach, and the Attribute-Based
Architectural Style (i.e. reliability tri-modular redundancy) facilitate the quan-
titative reasoning of the quality attributes of the Reactive Architecture.
(a) Utility Tree Analysis:
This mechanism involves the use of the discussed utility tree (see Figure
5.5) for the analysis of quality attribute scenarios to identify sensitivities
and trade-offs.
(b) Scenario Brainstorming (Stakeholders’ Group Work):
The scenario brainstorming mechanism is stakeholder-centric, which elicits
points of view from a more diverse and larger group of stakeholders, and
verifies, and then builds on the results of the first phase. It involves the
evaluation of the cloud-ATAM, and this is undertaken through an organised
group work of stakeholders who analyse the trade-off themes on the project
drivers.
The two qualitative reasoning approaches are conducted and discussed in detail
in Chapter 7.
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5.3.7 Present Results
The presented set of Reactive Architecture requirements related to the avail-
ability and performance quality attributes (see Section 5.3.2) have all been met
by first considering relevant “quality attribute-specific questions” in Section
5.3.4, which then led to the identification of appropriate architectural styles or
approaches in Section 5.3.4.3.
Based on the information collected during the design of the Reactive Architec-
ture with the cloud-ATAM, the cloud-ATAM team of architects presents the
findings to the stakeholders and writes a report detailing this information along
with any proposed mitigation strategies. As mentioned earlier, this section is
presented in detail in Chapter 7.
5.4 Summary
In this chapter, we contribute a Reactive Architecture for cloud-based system
engineering (see Section 1.3). The cloud-ATAM is introduced for the design,
analysis and evaluation of small-to-medium size cloud-based architectures (see
Objective 5 of Section 1.2.2.
The cloud-ATAM presents a derived seven-step methodology from an estab-
lished architecture evaluation methodology known as Architecture Trade-off
Analysis Method (ATAM). The Reactive Architecture is designed using the
cloud-ATAM (see Objective 7 of Section 1.2.2, and also analysed using a focal
pair of quality attributes (i.e. availability and performance) and the relevant
identified quality attribute scenarios of the Reactive Architecture.
Further analysis of the architecture is discussed in Chapter 7. Our study can
help system engineers to design and analyse small-to-medium size cloud-based
software architectures with quality attributes (such as availability, performance)
trade-off being the main focal point. This approach is very practical and dy-
namic as the deployment environment (i.e. cloud platform) is unpredictable and
changes often, hence affecting the quality attributes of systems.
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Chapter 6
Cloud Accountability
This chapter contributes a novel methodology for assuring cloud dependability,
and the Cloud Accountability System (CAS) which is a component of the Reac-
tive Architecture. The Reactive Architecture is deployed to the cloud platform.
The CAS facilitates the Cloud Accountability Method (CAM) that enables the
provision of assurance for dependability (i.e. availability, reliability) of the
cloud-based Reactive Architecture for system engineering (refer to Objectives 9
and 10 in Section 1.2). Our work discusses this methodology which is guided by
a well-established digital forensic model to assure and inform system engineers
of cloud dependability during the use of cloud resources. This digital forensic
model shows how digital forensics can support incident handling.
In this chapter, Section 6.1 introduces our research, and the Cloud Accountabil-
ity System is introduced in Section 6.2. The Cloud Accountability Methodology
that facilitates the assurance of dependable cloud environments is presented in
Section 6.3. Finally, the conclusions of this research are drawn and presented
in Section 6.4.
140
6.1 Introduction
Cloud computing promises to be an effective business model for staging varying
sizes of enterprise systems to provide services to intended users. It is a model for
enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable
computing resources (e.g. servers, storage, etc.) that can be rapidly provisioned
and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction.
Figure 6.1: Conceptual Model of the Cloud Accountability System
From our literature review (see Section 2.3.4.3), we identify that there is no
work that employs forensic auditing techniques to check the CSPs’ SLA to-
wards the assurance of dependability especially for availability and reliability.
It is relevant that cloud users such as system engineers are assured of the avail-
141
ability and reliability of the cloud platform they use for GSD. In this work, we
collect data from the CSPs and also from the cloud server’s hypervisor. The
collection of this pair of data until it is processed into evidence, is guided by a
digital forensic model. This model is standardised by NIST SP800-86 to support
incident handling.
6.2 Cloud Accountability System
The Cloud Accountability System is constituted by four main components (Fig-
ure 6.1). These components are the Evidence Collector, Auditor, Reactive Mid-
dleware, and a Logging System. The functions of these components are briefly
introduced.
Figure 6.2: Evidence Collector
(a) Evidence Collector (EC): This system collects data for the availability
and reliability metrics from the required set of the RA’s VM hypervisor
using two main approaches; Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI) tech-
nique and the Cloud Management System (CMS). Refer to steps 2 and 3
of Figure 6.1. The VMI uses a VMI library in C language, and Python
scripts to collect these metrics data. Also, the CMS uses Amazon Web
Services (AWS) API known as the AwsSdkMetrics. Figure 6.2 provides
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an overview of the Evidence Collector system. The Arbitrator sub-system
reconciles the data from the two sources to support data integrity. All
relevant activities in steps 2 and 3 are saved as logs (see step 5 in Figure
6.1).
(b) Auditor: The Auditor conducts an evidence-based trust analysis. Here,
a simplistic yet relatable and effective weighted trust value approach is
used. All systems are initialised to zero, the absence of violations gets one,
however the presence of it gets negative one. Generally, the Auditor works
by collating the set of metrics data relating to availability and reliability
from the Evidence Collector (see step 4 in Figure 6.1). Then the availabil-
ity and reliability are computed for each system being monitored. At this
point, the availability and reliability values from each monitored system
are obtained from the CSPs API, and then compared with those from the
VMI. Violations from the two data sources are checked in the context of
the stipulated SLA. A call is triggered to the Reactive Middleware if there
are violations (see step 6 in Figure 6.1). Also, the Auditor computes the
Net Present Value (NPV) of the investments that cloud agents (i.e. system
developers) have made subject to the recorded dependability violations. In
this process, the system derives the monetary value of the dependability
violations over time to provide a clearer understanding to the investor or
cloud agents typically, the system developers. All activities are saved as
logs (see step 5 in Figure 6.1). These logs are periodically updated since
cloud service performance varies due to the dynamic quality attributes
which affects the metrics over time.
(c) Reactive Middleware (RM): The RM helps to manage notifications.
The RM notifies system agents of dependability violations, and afford them
the option of managing these violations (see step 7 in Figure 6.1). All
violations, activities in response to the violations, NPV computations and
responsible agents are documented as logs. Also, the cloud agents can
access the logs of their systems (see step 8 in Figure 6.1).
(d) Logging System (LS): In this system, all the activities of the CAS com-
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ponents are documented and saved as logs. This is where all the generated
evidence and associated cloud events are stored. These logs can be used
as evidence to claim compensation (i.e. “Service Credits”), and also serve
as a source of data for predicting dependability violations using a form of
machine learning.
The CAS is implemented to collect data from the RA’s VM in run-time as per
the metrics that are related to the architecture reliability and availability. Such
metrics are Mean Time to Failure (MTTF) or Mean Time Between Failures
(MTBF), Mean Time to Repair (MTTR), system operation time, etc. The
data gathered are compared with those from the cloud platform and the SLA,
and then notifications are triggered to the cloud agents: the system developers,
the cloud service provider, and the cloud regulators if there are dependability
violations. Figure 6.1 provides a conceptual overview of the CAS.
Figure 6.3: Forensic Process
6.3 Cloud Accountability Methodology
This research introduces a Cloud Accountability Method (CAM), which is fa-
cilitated by the CAS. This methodology is guided by a digital forensics model.
The model is based on the well-established and widely accepted standard of
NIST SP800-86. The NIST SP800-86 guide shows how digital forensics can
support incident handling.
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The forensic process shown in Figure 6.3 comprises the following basic phases:
• Collection: The first phase in the process is to identify, label, record, and
acquire data from the possible sources of relevant data, while following
guidelines and procedures that preserve the integrity of the data. Collec-
tion is typically performed in a timely manner because of the likelihood of
losing dynamic data such as current network connections.
• Examination: Examinations involve forensically processing large amounts
of collected data using a combination of automated and manual methods to
assess and extract data of particular interest, while preserving the integrity
of the data.
• Analysis: The next phase of the process is to analyse the results of the
examination, using legally justifiable methods and techniques, to derive
useful information that addresses the questions that were the reason for
performing the collection and examination.
• Reporting: The final phase is reporting the results of the analysis, which
may include describing the actions used, explaining how tools and proce-
dures were selected, determining what other actions need to be performed
(e.g. forensic examination of additional data sources, securing identified
vulnerabilities, improving existing security controls), and providing recom-
mendations for improvement to policies, guidelines, procedures, tools, and
other aspects of the forensic process. The formality of the reporting step
varies greatly depending on the situation.
The steps of our proposed cloud accountability method as well as its algorithm
(see Algorithm 1) are provided below:
1. The Evidence Collector (EC) is assigned to the composing systems of the
Reactive Architecture (RA), deployed on virtual machines (VMs) in the
cloud.
2. The EC collects metrics data for availability, [A] and reliability, [R], in-
cluding processing times in a synchronised manner from their respective
VMs at a defined constant time duration, [ti, ti+1] (i is initialised to zero).
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3. The gathered metrics data are sorted and examined for data integrity by
the Arbitrator.
4. The set [A,R]N is sent to the Auditor using synchronous procedure calls
(SPC).
5. The Auditor initialises the trust values of the VMs to 0.
6. The Auditor classifies [AN] and [RN] for the VMs.
7. The Auditor compares the sets of metrics data from the cloud evidence
sources (i.e. VMI, CMS) to understand their relationship based on the
SLA (i.e. acceptable metric range, [AMR]mc ) of the cloud platform.
8. If any metric data of the two evidence sources violates the SLA’s [AMR]mc ,
the Auditor assigns a value of -1 to the trust value of the related VM, and
then triggers a call to the Reactive Middleware (RM).
9. All activities including VM users, duration of VMs observation, date, de-
tails of failed VMs, analysis of failure, etc. are logged.
10. The RM then sends a notification to the cloud agents when all VMs are
“unavailable”.
11. The RM provides options such as requesting for “Service Credits” from
the CSP using the log from (9).
12. The Auditor also computes the Net Present Value (NPV) of the set of cloud
resources with respect to the processing times from (7), and/or violations
from (8).
13. If there was no violation from (8), the Auditor assigns 1 to the trust value
of the related VM, an analysis of the comparison in (7), and the NPV from
(12) are saved as a log, [lN].
14. This log, [lN] is sent as a notification to the cloud agents as periodic reports
(e.g. monthly, yearly).
15. The method continues in a loop at (2) for time duration,[ti, ti+1] if none of
the assigned VMs in (1) failed.
16. If there is any recorded failure, the method will continue in a loop at (1)
for the given time duration, [ti, ti+1].
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Algorithm 1 Analyse Data from Cloud for Evidence-Based Dependability Assurance
Require: VMRM(A,R), V MSET (A,R), V MSAR(A,R), V MFDS(A,R)
Ensure: notify (lN)
1: ECRM ← VMRM(A,R)
2: ECSET ← VMSET (A,R)
3: ECSAR ← VMSAR(A,R)
4: ECFDS ← VMFDS(A,R)
5: duration← 0
6: i← 0
7: trustVMN ← 0
8:
9: top:
10: while ti ≤ duration ≤ ti+1 do
11: arbitratetime(ECRM , ECSET , ECSAR, ECFDS)
12: auditSPC(ECRM , ECSET , ECSAR, ECFDS)
13: auditclassify(ECRM , ECSET , ECSAR, ECFDS)
A
R
14: computeAN , RN
15: auditmetricsdata(ECRM , ECSET , ECSAR)
VMI
CMS
16:
17: if (ECRM , ECSET , ECSAR, ECFDS)
VMI
CMS violates SLA
′s[AMR]mc then
18: trustVMN ← −1
19: lN(violationVM , trust)
20: notify (lN)
21: requestServiceCredit()
22:
23: if VM is unavailable then
24: notify (lN)
25: auditNPV (auditmetricsdata(), violationVM())
26: else {lN(auditmetricsdata(), auditNPV ()}
27: end if
28:
29: else {lN(auditNPV (), auditmetricsdata(), violationVM())}
30: trustVMN ← 1
31: lN(violationVM , trust)
32: end if
33:
34: end while
35: goto top
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6.4 Summary
In this chapter, we make two contributions: a novel methodology for assuring
cloud dependability, and the Cloud Accountability System that facilitates the
aforementioned methodology. This meets Objectives 9 and 10 in Section 1.2.
Our work aims to provide a meaningful level of assurance of cloud dependability
in terms of availability and reliability of cloud based architectures. This assur-
ance is enabled by the proposed methodology. This approach is guided by a well
established digital forensic model to assure cloud agents of cloud dependability.
This model is standardised by NIST SP800-86 to support incident handling.
Here, cloud agents are provided with logs that give concise information about
cloud resource activities. The information from our work aims to provide more
detailed assessment of the cloud agents’ cloud-based resources than what is pro-
vided from the CSPs. Here, we check the data based on the SLA from the CSPs,
with those collected from the digital forensic process. An evidence-based trust
analysis is then conducted.
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Chapter 7
Evaluation
The aim of this chapter is to report on the evaluation of the Reactive Archi-
tecture proposed in Chapter 3. We conduct three main evaluations which are
discussed below. Section 7.1 presents the evaluation of the Reactive Middleware
which is undertaken using expert panel review process for validating the matu-
rity of the CM-T process model (see Section 7.1.1). In Section 7.1.2, an Airlock
Control System case study is used as a running example for the presented GSD
guidelines facilitated by the Reactive Middleware. These are aimed to meet
Objectives 3 and 4 in Section 1.2.2.
Also, Section 7.2 presents and discusses the evaluation of the Cloud Account-
ability Method. Here, the method is applied to the Reactive Architecture to
evaluate how meaningful the cloud accountability method can be used to assure
availability and reliability of cloud-based systems, relative to the cloud plat-
form’s service level agreement. This is in line with meeting Objective 11 in
Section 1.2.2.
Then in Section 7.3, we evaluate the Reactive Architecture using a two-staged
analysis approach defined by cloud-ATAM. This work mainly contributes the
qualitative trade-off reasoning of quality attributes of a cloud-based Reactive
Architecture using the two-staged analysis approach of cloud-ATAM (see Ob-
jective 8 in Section 1.2.2). Finally, we draw conclusion in Section 7.4.
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7.1 Reactive Middleware
The research evaluates the Reactive Middleware discussed Chapter 4. First,
we validate the “change management and traceability (CM-T) process model”
by conducting an “expert panel review process” in Section 7.1.1. This is used
to assess the maturity of the CM-T process model in light of the CMMI Level
2 specific practices - requirements change management. The next section (i.e.
Section 7.1.2) demonstrates the continuous tight linkage between requirements
and system engineering processes provided by the introduced GSD guidelines,
by an Airlock Control System case study.
At this point, we present our research question as “How can the Reactive Mid-
dleware guide system engineering to ensure the continual tight linkage of stake-
holders’ requirements and system engineering processes?”, and a validating hy-
pothesis below:
H1: Changes in system requirements’ artefacts are captured and consistently
propagated to all the related system engineering processes and stakeholders
using a matured process model.
7.1.0.1 Panel Review Process
At this stage, we evaluate whether the motivation for building the Reactive Mid-
dlware’s CM-T process model is justified, and if the process model is matured
in relation to the CMMI Level 2 practice for managing change and traceability.
We have motivated the use of expert panels to review or validate a software
process model in Section 2.1.5.4. Also, the constitution of the expert panel
is presented as a table (i.e. Table 2) in Appendix A.8. Then, we present our
analysis of the feedback from the experts on the maturity of the CM-T model
processes in light of the CMMI Level 2 (baseline) capability (refer to Table 7.1).
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Table 7.1: Evaluation Criteria and Related CMMI Level 2 Capability Ques-
tions
Validation
Criteria (Table
4.5)
Rule (Table 4.5) CMMI Level 2 Capa-
bility Questions (Fig-
ure 4.4)
Adherence to
CMM
Charateristics
- CMM maturity level concepts must be
implemented - Each level should have a
theme consistent with CMM - Require-
ment engineering (RE) processes must
be integrated - The model should be
recognisable as a CMM offshoot - The
CM-T must be systematic and sequen-
tial.
How repeatable are the
following processes: (1)
change management, (2)
Traceability, (3) Analysis
& Negotiations, (4) Doc-
umentation, and (5) Val-
idation
Limited Scope - Key activities relating to technical
and organisational RE processes are in-
cluded - Processes are prioritised. -
Processes relate directly to the CM-T
process areas - The scope/level of de-
tail should be appropriate (i.e. depth
and breadth of processes presented)
How repeatable are the
following processes: (3)
Analysis & Negotiations,
and (4) Documentation
Consistency - There should be consistent use of
terms and CMM features at this level
of development - There will be a consis-
tency in structure between model com-
ponents at the same level of granular-
ity that are modelling different matu-
rity levels
How repeatable are the
following processes: (1)
change management, (2)
Traceability, (3) Analysis
& Negotiations, (4) Doc-
umentation, and (5) Val-
idation
Understandable - All terms should be clearly defined
(i.e. have only one meaning). - All rela-
tionships between processes and model
architecture should be unambiguous
and functional.
How repeatable are the
following processes: (3)
Analysis & Negotiations,
and (4) Documentation
Ease of Use - The model should be decomposed to
a level that is simple to understand
- The model should be simple yet re-
tain meaning - The chunks of informa-
tion should clearly relate as they de-
velop into more complex structures -
The model should require little or no
training to be used
How repeatable are the
following processes: (3)
Analysis & Negotiations,
and (4) Documentation
Verifiable The model must be verifiable, i.e. we
must be able to test or measure how
well model meet its objectives and
whether meeting these objectives leads
to a high quality CM-T process model.
How repeatable are the
following processes: (4)
Documentation, and (5)
Validation
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7.1.1 Analysis of Expert Review
In this expert review, a panel of sixteen experts are constituted to validate
the change management and traceability (CM-T) process model. Here, seven
experts are from the industry, while nine are from academia. Experts from the
industry are selected based on their experience in requirements engineering (RE)
and software process improvement (SPI). Also, the research focus (i.e. RE and
SPI) and publications of academics informed the selection of these academics.
To facilitate the collection of data from the panel, a designed questionnaire
is used as our data collection method. A questionnaire is appropriate for the
type and nature of data we aim to collect and analyse. In terms of the type and
nature of data for our analysis, we classify the questionnaire in relevant sections
covering the “assessment of expertise” and the six relevant success criteria for
validating the CM-T model. The related analysed results are provided as bar
charts in Appendix A. For the type and nature of questions, the responses
from the experts are expected to be classified as “Strongly agree”, “Agree”,
“Neutral”, “Disagree”, “Strongly disagree”. The “Neutral” option caters for
both “uncertainty” and “no opinion” or “unwillingness to answer”. In our
analysis, we disregard the reasons for all the selected “Neutral” option. The
classification of the questionnaire and the analysed results are provided below:
(A) Self-Assessment of Expertise
In the assessment of the expertise of the panel, we identified that 100% of the
experts indicated their expertise in both “Software” or “System Engineering”,
“RE” and in “SPI”. However out of the sixteen experts, one indicated no ex-
pertise in “CMMI”.
(B) Validating the CM-T Model
• Validation Overview
(a) “A matured model for change management and traceability is very
relevant for requirement engineering?”
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Towards the validation of the CM-T model, 100% of the experts’ responses
are supportive to question 1 above. Here, seven (7) experts “strongly
agree” and nine (9) of them “agree” to this question.
• Success Criteria One “Adherence to CMMI Characteristics”
(a) “The classification of questions is representative of the CMMI Level 2
goal?”
In assessing the adherence of the CM-T process model to CMMI char-
acteristics, 62.5% of the experts “agree”. However, six (6) experts
indicated “neutral”. Here, one (1) of the experts commented that
CMMI is not his particular area of expertise, but the five (5) remain-
ing experts chose not to provide further comments on this question.
(b) “The CMMI processes have been adequately mapped to the identified
questions?”
Unanimously, all the sixteen (16) experts agree that the CMMI pro-
cesses have been adequately mapped to the identified questions. Here,
four (4) experts “strongly agree”, and twelve (12) “agree”.
• Success Criteria Two “Limited Scope”
(a) “How complete is the CM-T model relative to the CMMI Level 2
processes?”
In the assessment of the completeness of the CM-T model relative
to the baseline processes of the CMMI Level 2, twelve (12) experts
“agree” and four (4) are “neutral”.
(b) “How appropriate is it to include change management processes and
traceability processes in one model?”
Most of the experts (i.e. 87.5%) “agree” that it is appropriate to com-
bine change management processes with traceability process in one
model. More precisely, four (4) “strongly agree”, and ten (10) “agree”.
However, one (2) remained “neutral” in response to this question.
(c) “How well do the questions and assigned processes cover the key ac-
tivities in change management and traceability of requirements?”
The experts assessed how well the questions and assigned processes
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cover the key activities in change management and traceability of re-
quirements, and they were generally supportive: Four (4) “strongly
agree”, and eight (8) “agree”. However, four (4) chose to be “neu-
tral”.
• Success Criteria Three “Consistency”
(a) “How consistent is the level of detail given within the CM-T model?”
The assessment of the consistency of the level of detail given within
the CM-T model is very supportive (i.e. 100%). Here, five (5) experts
“strongly agree”, and eleven (11) “agree”.
(b) “All key processes are represented (at a baseline level)?”
The experts provided a mostly supportive (i.e. 75.0%) response to
the assessment that all the key processes associated with the defined
questions (see Figure 4.4) are represented at a CMMI Level 2 baseline.
Here, two (2) expert “strongly agree”, as ten (10) “agree”. On the
other hand, four (4) provided a “neutral” response.
(c) “All processes listed are at a similar level of abstraction?”
In assessing the similarity of the level of abstraction for all the pro-
cesses, the experts are mostly in agreement (i.e. 75.00%) in their re-
sponse. This assessment shows five (5) experts “strongly agree”, and
seven (7) “agree”. It was noticed that four (4) indicated a “neutral”
position on this “consistency” question.
• Success Criteria Four “Understandability”
(a) “How easy is it to understand the path from initial goal, to question,
to final process?”
In assessing the “understandability” of the CM-T model, the experts’
response to “question 1” above is largely supportive (i.e. 87.50%): one
(1) expert “strongly agree”, and thirteen (13) others “agree”. How-
ever, two (2) expert indicated a “neutral” option for this question.
(b) “Each individual process is easy to understand (i.e. they are clearly
defined and unambiguous)?”
The experts are generally supportive (i.e. 68.75%) in response to “ques-
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tion 2”. Seven (7) experts “strongly agree” and four (4) experts
“agree” that each individual process is easy to understand. However,
five (5) experts chose the “neutral” option to this question.
(c) “How clear is this presentation of the model?”
Based on the relevant information about the CM-T model presented
to the experts, they unanimously agree that the presentation was clear
to understand. More specifically, three (3) experts “strongly agree”,
as thirteen (13) “agree” to “question 3” above.
• Success Criteria Five “Ease of Use”
(a) “Do you think that a considerable amount of prior knowledge of CMMI
is needed to be able to interpret the CM-T model?”
To assess the “ease of use” of the CM-T model, all the experts “dis-
agree” that a considerable amount of prior knowledge of CMMI is
needed to be able to interpret the CM-T model. Here, five (5) experts
“strongly disagree” and eleven (11) “disagree” to “question 1”.
(b) “Dividing the RE process into smaller activities in this way will help
practitioners to implement the process?”
Most of the experts (i.e. 87.50%) support the claim that dividing the
requirements engineering process into smaller activities in the CM-T
model will help practitioners to implement the process. Specifically,
five (5) experts “strongly agree”, and nine (9) “agree” to “question
2”. However, two (2) experts chose to be “neutral”.
• Success Criteria Six “Verifiability”
(a) “Has the level of detail provided with the questionnaire allowed you
to give a fair assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the CM-T
model?”
In assessing the verifiability of the CM-T model, a majority of the
experts (i.e. 81.25%) are supportive that the level of detail provided
allowed them to give a fair assessment of the strengths and weaknesses
of the CM-T model. To provide more details, five (5) experts “strongly
agree”, and eight (8) others “agree” to this question. That said, three
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(3) experts remained “neutral” in their response.
In terms of validating the CM-T model, a total average of 84.38% of the ex-
perts at least agree (i.e. indicating “Strongly agree” and “Agree”) to the six (6)
success criteria of the CM-T model. This high percentage of acceptance indi-
cates the high level of conformance of the CM-T model to the CMMI Level 2
baseline processes. The composition of this high percentage is that, an average
of 60.94% of the experts “strongly agree”, and also an average of 23.44% of
the experts “agree” to the questions in the questionnaire relating to the suc-
cess criteria of the CM-T model. That said, 100% of the experts “disagree”
that “a considerable amount of prior knowledge of CMMI is needed to be able
to interpret the CM-T model” under the “ease of use” success criteria. With
this supportive choice, a new total average of 85.58% of the experts accept the
maturity of the CM-T model. It must also be mentioned that an average of
14.42% chose to remain “neutral” on the questions.
Figure 7.1: The Airlock Control System
For those who remained “neutral”, we gathered three general comments from
them, that we will consider in future work:
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(a) Ambiguous process definitions for the “Consistency” criteria.
(b) The CM-T process model is incomplete for the “Adherence to CMMI Char-
acteristics” criteria.
(c) The assessment component is not self-explanatory for the “Verification”
criteria.
After validating the CM-T process model, we then apply the defined GSD guide-
lines (composing of the PMBOK project quality management approach and the
CM-T model) to an airlock control system (ACS) case study.
7.1.2 Airlock Control System Case Study
A submarine airlock control system (ACS) (see Figure 7.1) case study from [94]
is used to demonstrate the proposed management guidelines provided by the
Reactive Middleware. The main function of the ACS is to separate two areas
(i.e. external and internal) with different air pressures and allow users to pass
safely between the areas. Let us assume that the pressure outside is lower than
inside. In order to allow a user to pass from inside through the airlock into the
external area, the system needs to perform the following steps:
• equalise the chamber pressure to that of the internal environment,
• open the second door to allow the user into the chamber,
• close the second door,
• equalise the pressure in the airlock to that of the external environment,
and
• open the first door to let the user out.
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Table 7.2: Classified Requirements of the Airlock Control System
Airlock Control System Requirements (Resilient Quality Attribute - SAFETY)
Requirements
Classification
ID Requirements
Environment
ENV1 The airlock system separates two different environ-
ments. The pressure of the external environment is lower
than that of the internal one.
ENV2 In order to maintain different pressures, the two envi-
ronments must be physically separated.
ENV3 The system has two doors and a chamber. Each door
when closed separates the chamber from the appropriate
environment.
ENV4 Each door is equipped with three positioning sensors and
a two-way motor. The sensors consist of two boolean
sensors representing the fully closed (SNS CLOSED)
and opened (SNS OPENED) door states, and a range-
value position sensor (SNS POS ) that returns values in
a range between the fully closed and the fully opened
states inclusively. The two-way motor (ACT MOTOR)
is the actuator that can open and close the door within
its physical range of movement.
ENV5 There is a pressure sensor in each of the ar-
eas, three in total (SNS PRESSURE OUT,
SNS PRESSURE CHAMBER, SNS PRESSURE IN ).
ENV6 The pressure in the chamber can be changed by the
pump actuator (ACT PUMP).
ENV7 Any of the sensors and actuators may fail to provide a
correct function.
Safety
SAF1 The pressure in the chamber must always be between
the lower external pressure and the higher internal one.
SAF2 A door can only be opened if the pressure values in the
chamber and the conjoined environment are equal.
SAF3 Only one door is allowed to be opened at any moment
of time.
SAF4 The pressure in the chamber shall not be changed unless
both doors are closed.
Function FUN1 When in operation, the airlock system must be able to
let users pass safely between the two environments via
the airlock.
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Moreover, the opposite scenario needs to be performed to allow the user pass
from outside through the airlock into the external area. The system is equipped
with a number of actuators - door motors, a pressure pump, as well as sensors
- pressure sensors, door positions sensors and buttons. The goal of the GSD
Team members spread over three geographical areas (i.e. Europe, Africa and
Australia), is to develop control software that would allow a user to safely pass
through the airlock. The GSD teams at Europe, Africa and Asia prioritise the
safety and liveness properties (i.e. SAF1, SAF2, SAF3 and SAF4) of the ACS,
leaving aside issues of its usability, operation speed, reliability and maintain-
ability. It must be mentioned that safety properties described in this section
do not completely cover all safety concerns that would arise for a real system.
For example, a user would be required to wear special equipment while in the
chamber in order to survive the change of pressure. We implicitly assume that
this and other possible safety requirements are satisfied. We only focus on a
particular part of system properties described in this section to limit the context
of the case study. The high-level requirements of the system are presented in
Table 7.2.
Table 7.3: Classified GSD Guidelines Steps
Classification of The GSD Guidelines Steps Into Stages/Services
Stages/Services GSD Guidelines Steps ID
User Management GS1 and GS2
Requirement Management GS3 and GS4
Change Management GS5, GS6, GS7, GS8, GS10, GS11, and
GS12
Traceability GS9 and GS13
Airlock Control System Development Using the GSD Guidelines
The ACS case study is used as a running example of the Reactive Middleware’s
GSD guidelines in this section. In this activity, we develop a prototype of the
Reactive Middleware and use it to demonstrate its set of services (or func-
tionalities). Here, the development of Company X’s (i.e. an assumed owning
company name with simulated developers) ACS case study is guided by this
set of guidelines. The set of GSD guidelines can be classified with respect to
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the Reactive Middleware’s services (i.e. User Management, Requirement Man-
agement, Change Management, and Traceability - see Table 7.3). However, the
ACS case study presents the above classification under the five basic “process
groups” (PG) (i.e. Initiating, Planning, Executing, Monitoring and Controlling,
and Closing) of the PMBOK specific “knowledge area” (KA) of “project quality
management”. Company X expects that an effective change management and
traceability in the development process of the ACS will improve the quality of
the management of the project.
7.1.2.1 Initiating the ACS Project
The ACS is the core product of Company X. Company X sends some of its de-
velopment activities offshore, but maintains a team of practitioners (i.e. Team
Europe) in the European based central office who work mainly from 9 am to 5
pm five days a week. This team focuses on requirements gathering, prioritis-
ing requirements (and focus on “safety-related requirements”), developing their
core product (i.e. the ACS), managing the offshore or GSD teams, and test-
ing the bespoke software. The GSD teams (i.e. Team Africa and Team Asia)
are more focused on product deployment and integration. Such a geographical
spread of the set of teams is critical for Company X to be competitive in the
airlock control system market, by managing a continuous “follow-the-sun” de-
velopment approach. This approach ensures a continuous and around the clock
development of the ACS, as well as having access to global skilled labour.
As part of Company X’s ACS development policy, the Reactive Middleware
(RM) is used to aid the effective management of the project, as well as to
provide an automated facility to ensure that a matured (i.e. CMMI-compliant)
change management and traceability process model is applied.
7.1.2.2 Planning the ACS Project
Team Europe focuses on the development of the airlock chamber (see Figure
7.1) of the ACS. Since the airlock chamber interfaces with both the external
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environment and internal environment, the team can manage the changes that
affect the “safety properties” of the ACS, and their traceability. Also, Team
Africa and Team Asia are responsible for developing the external environment
and internal environment respectively. In this project, the GSD teams use
the cloud-based Reactive Middleware to manage the changes and traceability
affecting the “safety properties” of the ACS during development. It is also
identified to be essential that the development processes meet the “CMMI Level
2 practice”. Company X decides to apply the GSD guidelines to its development
process. Before the execution of the ACS project, Team Europe generates some
project diagrams to guide the execution process. Here, a class diagram (see
Figure 9), a package diagram (see Figure 8), and an interaction diagram (see
Figure 10) are provided.
7.1.2.3 Executing the ACS Project
At this point, team leaders are appointed for the three respective GSD teams
(i.e. Team Europe, Team Africa, Team Asia). These activities are guided by
the user management set of guidelines (i.e. GS1 and GS2) defined under the
GSD guidelines.
GS1: System development teams should appoint team leaders.
GS2: These team leaders will constitute the GSD change managers.
Here, team leaders play the role of “Team Leader” with an associated privilege
of “Own” where they have permission to perform any activities on development
artefacts (such as specification, requirements, configurations, documentation,
etc.). In the same light, team leaders assign roles (e.g.“Reviewer”, “Modifier”,
“Pawn”, etc.) and privileges (i.e.“Review”, “Modify”, “View” respectively) to
team members. Then the team leaders form the development supervisory team
referred to as the GSD Change Managers. This GSD Change Managers team
performs a crucial role of managing changes that affects prioritised ACS “safety
requirements”, and “trace” the changes’ cause-and-effect on requirements and
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Figure 7.2: Snippet of the Terminal Output for the Reactive Middleware
User Management Service for the Airlock Control System Case Study
associated artefacts. Figure 7.2 shows a snippet of the Reactive Middleware’s
user management service.
The next set of activities relating to the ACS requirements are guided by the re-
quirements management set of guidelines (i.e.GS3 and GS4) defined under
the GSD guidelines.
GS3: System requirements should be classified based on identified re-
silient quality attributes (i.e. safety, reliability, robustness, etc.), and are
then prioritised relative to their importance to the system stakeholders.
GS4: Team leaders must assign roles to all team members with the
prioritised requirements in mind, and manage the development process
with the adapted PMBOK guide.
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Figure 7.3: Snippet of the Terminal Output for the Reactive Middleware
Requirements Management Service for the Airlock Control System Case
Study
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Figure 7.4: Snippet of the Terminal Output for the Reactive Middleware
Requirements Management Service (Priority) for the Airlock Control Sys-
tem Case Study
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Firstly, the ACS requirements are assigned as either a priority or not, and then
they are uniquely identified (see Figure 7.3). The GSD Change Managers set
the safety requirements as the priority of the project’s quality attributes (see
Figure 7.4).
After all these activities have been undertaken, the three GSD teams begin the
development of the ACS. Here, the development of the three ACS environments
are initialised as well as the doors, sensors and actuators.
7.1.2.4 Monitoring and Controlling the ACS Project
The GSD Change Managers together with some project stakeholders at the
European based central office, “monitor and control” the development process
to meet the project requirements. Particular attention is placed on the set of
safety related ACS requirements. In this activity, a set of the GSD guidelines
are for change management (i.e.GS5, GS6, GS7, GS8, GS10, GS11, and
GS12) and traceability (i.e.GS9 and GS13).
GS5: All other change agents especially the system engineering tools
should be assigned a default privilege of review.
GS6: All system artefacts should be saved in a shared artefacts reposi-
tory.
GS7: The privileges (i.e.none, view, modify, review, own) of system
stakeholders or change agents will determine the access privileges to sys-
tem artefacts.
GS8: Change agents must subscribe to relevant artefacts after they are
created, in order to receive notifications when they are changed.
GS10: Changes made to any system artefacts must be logged.
GS11: When changes affect the high priority set of requirements, ap-
propriate local team leader must lead the change request review process
(i.e.involving the CM-T model) of the GSD change managers.
GS12: On the other hand, conflicts arising from changes to low priority
set of requirements are resolved locally, lead by the local team leader.
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Figure 7.5: Snippet of the Terminal Output for the Reactive Middleware
Change Management Service for the Airlock Control System Case Study
During the development process, a set of “change requests” relative to the
ACS requirements are raised. This process requires the Change Management
and Traceability (CM-T) process model (see Section 4.2.2.5) of the Reactive
Middleware. The steps of the CM-T process model are followed to resolve all
“change requests”.
Change requests are expected to contain information about the artefact in-
volved, the identification of the initiating stakeholder, the relevant requirement
identification, and the change request details. Here, two change requests are
submitted to the change request pool (see Figure 7.5). The GSD Change Man-
agers consider the change requests based on their priority, and then select which
one to make a decision on. At this point, GSD Change Managers decide that the
change request with a unique identification CR1685232414 is of high priority
(i.e. as a safety related request - SAF3) and needs to be considered further.
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Figure 7.6: Snippet of the Terminal Output for the Reactive Middleware
Traceability Service for the Airlock Control System Case Study
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The change request with a unique identification CR280744458 is related to the
ACS’ environmental requirements (i.e. ENV3).
That said, the details of the change request being considered is that ’prioritising
the opening of door requests from both the internal and external environments’.
The team leader for the team (i.e.Team Asia) that presented the change request
defends the criticality of the request, and leads the decision-making process.
This is a critical change request as it is important to only have one door of the
ACS open at a given time, and hence door opening requests that occur simulta-
neously from both the internal and external environments must be prioritised.
This ensures a level of safety. As a result of the need for such a change, the
change request (i.e. CR1685232414 ) is approved by the GSD Change Managers.
The decision taken for CR1685232414 is logged as part of the documentation
of the change request. The initiator (i.e.R003 ) of the change request is notified
to “effect the change”. Effecting this change requires a close monitoring by the
team leader of Team Asia to make sure that it is undertaken as expected. When
the process of effecting the change is completed. The team leader assesses the
process, and then “verifies and validates” the change. The log of the verified
and validated change is updated accordingly.
The next step undertakes a detailed assessment of the “cause-and-effect” of
the change on project artefacts, and all minor conflicts (i.e.involving less pri-
oritised project requirements) are resolved within the local GSD team. In sit-
uations where the initial change affects a prioritised project requirement, the
team leader advises the most relevant stakeholder to submit a change request
to the GSD change managers for consideration. During the assessment of the
“cause-and-effect” of the change, it identified to have an impact on three re-
quirement artefacts (see Figure 7.6). The affected requirements are ENV6,
SAF2, and SAF4. Here, the minor conflict relating to the ENV6 ACS environ-
ment requirement is resolved within Team Asia. However, the conflict involving
prioritised safety requirements (i.e.SAF2 and SAF4) are submitted as change
requests to the change request pool to be considered by the GSD Change Man-
agers. This requires the spawning of a new change process based on the CM-T
168
process model.
Figure 7.7: Snippet of the Terminal Output for the Reactive Middleware
Notification Service for the Airlock Control System Case Study
From the point where an “approved” change is effected till the point where it has
been implemented successfully, a process to “trace” this change with regards to
participating stakeholders, associated software development life-cycle (SDLC)
phase, corresponding system engineering tools, impact on other artefacts, etc.
is undertaken in parallel. The activities for tracing changes also facilitates “roll-
back” in situations where the resulting conflicts from the “cause-and-effect” of a
change is highly undesirable relative to the project requirements. This activity
is guided by the set of GSD guidelines (i.e. GS9 and GS13). During this process,
the log of this change is updated.
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GS9: All related artefacts must be linked together to facilitate traceabil-
ity.
GS13: Changes in system artefacts should be traceable to manage its
impact on related/linked requirements or artefacts.
Lastly, the GSD Change Managers accept the change and the change process
is marked as successful. Then a “notification” is generated and distributed to
all the relevant stakeholders of the change in Team Asia (see Figure 7.7). The
change request is then “closed”.
7.1.2.5 Closing the ACS Project
After the ACS development process involving a series of change processes that
are “monitored and controlled” relative to the ACS requirements, the system is
demonstrated to the project stakeholders (i.e.Project Approval Board of Com-
pany X, and relevant users). The stakeholders undertake an evaluation of the
ACS according to the prioritised requirements and expectations. During the
evaluation process, highlights of the ACS development process are identified
and discussed. Also, lessons are learnt from the process.
7.1.2.6 Summary
In this section, we introduce a cloud-based Reactive Middleware that applies a
defined change management and traceability (CM-T) process model, within the
context of an adapted PMBOK quality process management approach to GSD.
This is in line with Objectives 1 and 2 presented in Section 1.2.2. The Reactive
Middleware provides cloud-based services for user managament, requirement
management, change management and traceability, and are facilitated by our
GSD management guidelines.
To ensure that the defined CM-T process model complies with the CMMI Level
2 (Baseline) Capability, the CM-T process model is validated using an expert
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panel review process (see Section 7.1.1) where a total average 85.58% of the ex-
perts supported the maturity of the CM-T process model. Also, we demonstrate
the application of the GSD management guidelines provided by the Reactive
Middleware with an Airlock Control System case study (see Section 7.1.2). Here,
we highlight the continual tight linkage of stakeholders’ requirements and system
engineering processes towards change management and traceability, through the
application of our prototype of the Reactive Middleware to the case study. This
continual tight linkage between the set of requirements and the system engi-
neering processes is enabled using the Reactive Middleware which supports the
bidirectional tracking of prioritised system requirements.
7.2 Cloud Accountability System
In this section, we aim to provide support for assuring the dependability (i.e.
availability and reliability) of the cloud for system engineering with a cloud
accountability method (see Objective 5 of Section 1.2.2). This assurance is
achieved in relation to the CSPs’ SLA. We however, conduct an assessment of
the SLA for the relevant cloud platform to this work in Section 2.3.3.1. Here, a
set of assured values for cloud availability and compensation or “service credit”
are also identified. To achieve our objective, we define our research question as
“Can a cloud accountability method be used to meaningfully assure availability
and reliability of deployed systems?”
Figure 7.8: AWS/EC2 CAS Test-Bed Instances
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In this section, we evaluate our work by answering our research question and
draw conclusions on this chapter. We begin by describing how we apply the
cloud accountability method (CAM) (see Section 6.3) to the Reactive Architec-
ture (RA). To achieve this, we implement a prototype of the cloud accountability
system (CAS) to facilitate the active monitoring of the RA. Our evaluation is
performed using a cloud-based test-bed in the Amazon Web Service (AWS)
Elastic Cloud Compute (EC2) environment. The AWS/EC2 test-bed is run
in the eu-west-1b and eu-west-1c availability zones (i.e.geographic locations of
AWS cloud infrastructure/service) in Ireland. Such a decision is necessary since
these availability zones provide the least network latency to Newcastle Univer-
sity where the evaluation is conducted. It also allows for the monitoring or
introspection of the group of VMs for the set of RA components from another
availability zone. For the test-bed, we create a set of 5 Linux virtual machines
(i.e. Ubuntu 16.04 x64 t2.micro with 1 GB of memory, 1 vCPU, SSD Volume
Type and variable ECU - see Figure 7.8).
Figure 7.9: Test-Bed’s VMs Introspection in Two AWS Availability Zones
The 5 instances are classified into two main VMs; the target VMs and the moni-
toring VM (see Figure 7.9). The target VMs are constituted with vmiGuestFDS
(i.e. Formal Decomposition System), vmiGuestRM (i.e. Reactive Middleware),
vmiGuestSAR (i.e. Shared Artefacts Repository), and vmiGuestSET (i.e. Sys-
tem Engineering Toolbox) VM instances. The target VMs are located at the
eu-west-1b availability zone. Also, the monitoring VM is the vmiMONITOR
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VM instance located at the eu-west-1c availability zone. The separation of
the availability zones allows for the effective introspection of the target VMs
by the vmiMONITOR VM, without being subjected to the same dependability
situation at the eu-west-1b availability zone.
Table 7.4: Classified Steps of Cloud Accountability Method with The Foren-
sic Process Phases (NIST SP800-86 Guide)
The Forensic Process Phases
(NIST SP800-86 Guide)
Cloud Accountability
Method Steps
Collection 1, 2, 4, 5, 15 and 16
Examination 3 and 6
Analysis 7, 8, 11 and 12
Reporting 9, 10, 13, and 14
Accountability Method for Cloud Dependability Assurance
We classify the steps of the presented cloud accountability method according to
the phases of the NIST SP800-86 guide (see Table 7.4). The conceptual model
(i.e. Figure 6.1) of the cloud accountability system is also used to support this
classification.
7.2.1 Collection
To implement the CAS, we look at the source of digital evidence collection. In
our work, we identify two sources for accessing data related to dependability
metrics from the hypervisor of the RA virtual machines (discussed in Section
2.3.4.1). The choice for the two sources of data is because the data from the
CSPs are perceived to be untrustworthy, so a second data source using a reliable
digital forensic approach is considered to check the former data source. These
are:
7.2.1.1 AWS CloudWatch
The API used here is the AmazonCloudWatchClient API, which provides data
related to metric statistics. The metrics data provided by the AWSCloudWatch-
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Client API also provide information for CPU utilisation, status checks for VMs
and system, network packets, network state, disk write operations, disk read
operations, CPU credit usage, and CPU credit balance.
Figure 7.10: Some AWS/EC2 Instance and System Metrics
Status check metrics are available at 1 and 5 minute frequencies. However,
we focus exclusively on the CPU utilisation, status checks for VMs, and status
check for system metrics data collected at a frequency of 5 minutes. This
time frequency is appropriate since it is long enough to accommodate our 1
minute data collection call from the target VMs, and network latency which
can be unpredictable. We believe that this set of metrics are representative
for providing a reliable picture of the dependability of a set of cloud-based
VMs. All the mentioned metrics are also provided to users of AWS as graphs
in AWS CloudWatch relative to users’ AWS resources (e.g. EC2). In this work,
we consider metrics from the AWS CloudWatch API, as well as the generated
graphs from AWS CloudWatch. In Figure 7.10, we provide a brief description of
some of the focal metrics we consider in our evidence collection. Also, a snippet
of Java code showing the implementation of AWS/EC2 CloudWatch API for
collecting the data for the CPU utilisation metric in Listing 1 (see Appendix
D.16). This same approach is used to collect the other three focal metrics.
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Figure 7.11: vmiGuestFDS: AWS CloudWatch Line Graphs for Some Met-
rics
Figure 7.12: vmiGuestRM: AWS CloudWatch Line Graphs for Some Met-
rics
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Figure 7.13: vmiGuestSAR: AWS CloudWatch Line Graphs for Some Met-
rics
Figure 7.14: vmiGuestSET: AWS CloudWatch Line Graphs for Some Met-
rics
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(a) Page Table Lookup Function
(b) System Map Function
Figure 7.15: LibVMI API Functions used in the vmiMONITOR Instance
Initially, we took a look at the focal metrics as presented by the AWS Cloud-
Watch for the test-bed. From Figures 7.11, 7.12, 7.13, and 7.14, we observed
a set of line graphs that indicate that the instances are “healthy” per the set
of metrics. Here, the data for the status checks metrics indicate results of “0”,
implying that there has not been any recorded failures for the target VMs in
the 3-hour observation period. That said, our work takes a step further to col-
lect our own set of evidence relative to the said set of metrics. We consider a
well used digital forensic process known as virtual machine introspection as our
reliable means of accessing such data. This process is discussed below. Here,
with the aid of the metrics provided by the APIs, we aim to deduce the state of
dependability of the CAS target VM instances by obtaining the mean time to
failure (MTTF ) or mean time between failures (MTBF ), mean time to recover
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(MTTR), and system operation time.
7.2.1.2 Virtual Machine Introspection (LibVMI)
The LibVMI API for virtual machine introspection is considered for evidence
collection. Here, we first install Xen with dom0 getting 1GB RAM assigned and
1 dedicated vCPU core on the vmiMONITOR VM. The LibVMI API provides
functions such as “vmi-pagetable-lookup”, specifically “vmi-pagetable-lookup-
extended” to check the performance status of VMs. Importantly, it returns
VMI SUCCESS for an “active” and “healthy” VM, or VMI FAILURE if the
VM is “invalid” or “inactive”. To further check for VM introspection failure,
we consider “vmi-get-linux-sysmap” to show a linux system path to an active
VM. Figure 7.15 shows the set of LibVMI API functions that are considered for
introspection by the Evidence Collector system on the four target VMs.
1: The Evidence Collector (EC) is assigned to the composing systems of
the Reactive Architecture (RA), deployed on virtual machines (VMs) in
the cloud.
2: The EC collects metrics data for availability, [A] and reliability, [R],
including processing times in a synchronised manner from their respective
VMs at a defined constant time duration, [ti, ti+1] (i is initialised to zero).
4: The set [A,R]N is sent to the Auditor using synchronous procedure
calls.
5: The Auditor initialises the trust values of the VMs to 0.
It must be said that other equally effective LibVMI API functions can be used,
but we are also cautions since the performance of both the monitoring VM (i.e.
vmiMONITOR) and the target VMs are sensitive to the size of request parame-
ters and the resulting return values. The API functions called by “module-list”
(such as “vmi-pagetable-lookup-extended()”) have fewer parameters and small
return values (i.e., primitive variable type) compared to “process-list” such as
“vmi read pa( )”, which returns specified size of physical memory in binary will
introduce more significant overhead. This identified API function call is used to
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help in observing the times between VMs fail (i.e. obtaining MTBF or MTTF),
times for VMs to recover (i.e. obtaining MTTR), and system operation time.
That said, we proceed to apply our defined CAM to the CAS test-bed.
With the provided overview for our evidence collection approach supported by
Steps 1, 2, 4 and 5, we synchronise the collection of operation times for the
respective VMs from both the AWS CloudWatch and LibVMI APIs evidence
sources. This activity is undertaken between 11:00 GMT and 14:00 GMT which
falls within the range of time considered to be AWS/EC2 peak time in the
Ireland availability zone. Such a time period sees a higher level of user requests,
processing and scaling of AWS/EC2 resources. We presume that it will be
relatively easier to identify dependability issues at this time period. Also, the
“trust values” for the VMs are initialised to 0.
15: The method continues in a loop at (2) for time duration,[ti, ti+1] if
none of the assigned VMs in (1) failed.
16: If there is any recorded failure, the method will continue in a loop at
(1) for the given time duration, [ti, ti+1].
During the 3-hour period, the evidence collection process for both evidence
sources is repeated every 5 minutes in line with Steps 15 and 16 of the cloud
accountability methodology.
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(a) LibVMI API (b) AWS CloudWatch API
Figure 7.16: Processing Times (ms) from the Evidence Sources
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7.2.2 Examination
3: The gathered metrics data are sorted and examined for data integrity
by the Arbitrator.
6: The Auditor classifies [AN] and [RN] for the VMs.
The two sets of collected processing times are first assessed by the Arbitrator for
“outliers” in relation to Step 3. Here, we consider processing times that span
a period of 100 ms to 650 ms as the acceptable processing time, and hence any
other processing time is classified as an “outlier”. However, we identify process-
ing times less than 100 ms as a “failure” of the VM. This failure classification is
informed by an earlier assessment of the the minimum latency to each VM, and
it was observed to be an average of 119 ms. Also, this decision is complemented
by at least one evidence source API check of the VM in consideration.
Following from this, an “outlier” was observed for the vmiGuestRM instance
at 12:15 GMT (see Figure 7.16). The LibVMI and AWS CloudWatch API
recorded processing times of about 93.23 ms and 84.53 ms respectively. Since
the recorded processing times are below 100 ms, the Arbitrator indicates a VM
failure. However, the next sets of processing times recorded after 5 minutes
shows values of an average of 300 ms. This shows the vmiGuestRM instance
“recovered” during the said time. Such recovery is made possible by cloud
virtualisation features such as snapshot, autoscaling, load balancing, etc. All
other processing times are considered to be “acceptable” by the Arbitrator, and
hence passed on to the Auditor.
Table 7.5: Classification of Availability and Reliability for the Test-Bed
VMs
Instances [SN]
Availability Reliability
MTBF/MTTF (hr) MTTR (hr) [AN] MTBF/MTTF (hr) TIME (hr) [RN]
vmiGuestFDS 3 0 1 3 3 0.36788
vmiGuestRM 1.15 0.30 0.7931 1.15 3 0.07363
vmiGuestSAR 3 0 1 3 3 0.36788
vmiGuestSET 3 0 1 3 3 0.36788
The computation of system availability and reliability is often a laborious and
complex process requiring system observation of many months to a year, or even
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longer. This period usually records several incidents of failure and recovery from
failure, which facilitates a more easily acceptable analysis of system availability
and reliability. We are however limited by time to conduct such a detailed
process; the amount of data to analyse from the two evidence sources; and by the
cost of using the cloud platform over a prolonged period. Our aim for this work
is to provide information towards the assurance of cloud platform’s availability
and reliability. That said, we base our analysis on the data collected during 3
hours of the peak time for the AWS cloud platform, to mainly demonstrate that
our methodology can provide relatively more information towards the assurance
of cloud dependability to cloud agents.
In this context, we proceed to Step 6, where the availability, [AN] and reli-
ability, [RN] of the Reactive Architecture VMs are derived and classified. A
classification of [AN] and [RN] values with respect to their corresponding VMs
is shown in Table 7.5. Using the autoscaling feature for AWS VMs, a stop-start
cycle for recovering from failure is provided as less than three minutes. So
in computing the availability, [ARM] of vmiGuestRM after its failure at 12:15
GMT, we consider the MTTR as three minutes instead of five minutes for our
evidence collection frequency.
7.2.3 Analysis
We analyse the examined processing times from the Evidence Collector towards
meaningfully assuring availability and reliability of deployed cloud-based sys-
tems using the presented cloud accountability method. The processing times
for the set of VMs from the two evidence sources are compared to identify
significant variance(s) that may exist between the two sets of processing times.
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7: The Auditor compares the sets of processing times from the cloud
evidence sources (i.e. VMI, CMS) to understand their relationship based
on the SLA (i.e. acceptable metric range, [AMR]mc ) of the cloud platform.
8: If any metric data of the two evidence sources violates the SLA’s
[AMR]mc , the Auditor assigns a value of -1 to the trust value of the related
VM, and then triggers a call to the Reactive Middleware (RM).
Figure 7.17: Evidence-based Trust Analysis of Reactive Middleware’s VM
We also observed that the AWS CloudWatch API collected evidence at an
average of 48.25 ms faster than that of the LibVMI API. We believe that the
implementation of the LibVMI API introduces some overhead cost which affects
its processing time, and/or it is as a result of efficiency on the part of the AWS
CloudWatch API. That said, comparing the failure incident of vmiGuestRM at
12:15 GMT recorded by both the AWS CloudWatch API and LibVMI APIs,
with the AWS CloudWatch generated line graph (refer to Figure 7.12) shows
a supportive recording. Here, the AWS CloudWatch line graph shows a drop
in network data for both NetworkIn and NetworkOut metrics. However, this
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drop in network data does not seem out of place. The oscillation of the network
data in the line graph seems to follow a regular pattern. Furthermore, the
StatusCheckFailed, StatusCheckFailed System, and StatusCheckFailed Instance
metrics from the AWS CloudWatch generated line graph indicates no failure for
the vmiGuestRM VM.
Here, our evidence-based trust analysis which has been assigning trust value of
1 to VMs with no violations to the SLA, and -1 to to VMs with violations, a
resulting graph is generated as Figure 7.17. With the recorded failure incident of
vmiGuestRM at 12:15 GMT, a trust value of -1 is assigned to this VM. A history
of the trust values are made available to cloud agent for their consideration. As
mentioned earlier, trust values are assigned to all VMs every five minute cycle
to assure real-time monitoring.
11: The RM provides options such as requesting for “Service Credits”
from the CSP using the log from (9).
12: The Auditor also computes the Net Present Value (NPV) of the cloud
resources with respect to the identified processing times from (7), and/or
violations from (8).
Since there is no justified reason according to the AWS SLA to request for
“Service Credit” compensation, Step 11 is not undertaken. At this point, the
Auditor computes the net present value (NPV) of the Reactive Architecture’s
VMs as in Step 12. The formula for NPV varies slightly depending on the
consistency with which returns are generated, and if the investment was a one-
time event. Also, since each period generates returns in equal amounts and the
observation time is relatively short, the mathematical expression for the NPV
in our case is:
NPV =
C
(1 + r)i
− C0 (7.1)
where;
C - the expected cash flow per period (i.e. $ 96.82 per 3 hours for
5 AWS t2.micro VMs including data transfer cost, storage cost, and
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VAT. Exchange Rate: £77.5602 as $1 to £0.801077 at 30/01/17),
r - the required rate of return. The recommended UK public service
discount rate is 3.5%,
T - the number of periods over which the project is expected to
generate income (i.e. 3 hours), and
C0 - the initial investment (no initial investment is made here).
NPV =
77.5602
(1 + 0.035)3
− 0 (7.2)
NPV = £69.9548 (7.3)
The positive NPV value from equation (7.3) indicates that the investment in
the 5 AWS virtual machines is desirable subject to its prevailing discount rate
over the three-hour period. Since there was no violation to the SLA, the NPV
value indicates the value of the cloud investment after the said time.
7.2.4 Reporting
Generally, our examination and analysis of evidence using a wide range of anal-
ysis options (i.e. availability and reliability classification, evidence-based trust
analysis, and line graphs from two evidence sources), combined with a widely
accepted forensic process model, make our analysis considerably trustworthy.
Here, our analysis provide relatively more detailed information than the state-
of-the-art towards the assurance of dependability (i.e. availability, reliability) of
the cloud-based Reactive Architecture.
185
Figure 7.18: CAS XML Log for Cloud Agents
9: All activities including VM users, duration of VMs observation, date,
details of failed VMs, analysis of failure, etc. are logged.
10: The RM then sends a notification to the cloud agents when all VMs
are “unavailable”.
13: If there was no violation from (8), the Auditor assigns 1 to the trust
value of the related VM, an analysis of the comparison in (7), and the
NPV from (12) are saved as a log, [lN].
14: This log, [lN] is sent as a notification to the cloud agents as periodic
reports (e.g. monthly, yearly, etc.).
The cloud agents are provided with a log of the analysis (i.e. comparison of the
processing times, and the NPV). Refer to Figure 7.18 for an XML presentation
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of the mentioned log. This log, together with the figures (including the evidence-
based trust graph - Figure 7.17) and tables generated in the forensic process is
provided to the cloud agents for assuring dependability of AWS resources. This
activity is in line with Steps 9, 10, 13, and 14.
To compare our analysis to a relevant benchmarking of the performance of
cloud infrastructure, we realised that the closest work is the Standard Per-
formance Evaluation Corporation (SPEC)’s Cloud IaaS 2016 Benchmark (see
Section 2.3.3.2). SPEC’s key benchmarking metrics are scalability, elasticity,
and “mean instance provisioning time”, and this performance evaluation is con-
ducted over a period of “forty-six minutes”. This evaluation period mentioned
justifies our 3-hour period as a suitable time interval to observe cloud-based
resources for analysis. That said, in a survey reported by [69] of the 40 largest
CSPs, an average cloud service availability in 2010 was 99.948%, equivalent to
273 minutes of downtime per year. AWS EC2 (99.95% yearly) met their SLA
but their S3 service (99.9% monthly) fell short. Based on the “downtime per
week” availability from the “Nines of Availability” (refer to Figure 2.11), our
3-hour AWS EC2 peak time recording which was 94.828% (refer to Figure 7.5),
has 2.8 hours of weekly downtime. This indicates about 99.0% availability (i.e.
2 nines) with a potential 3.65 days downtime per year. The reliability during
the said time is 0.2943175.
7.2.5 Summary
We undertake our evaluation by implementing a prototype of the cloud account-
ability system (CAS) to facilitate the active monitoring of the Reactive Archi-
tecture (RA) components. Our evaluation is performed using a cloud-based
test-bed in the Amazon Web Service (AWS) Elastic Cloud Compute (EC2) en-
vironment comprising 5 Linux VMs over a period of 3 hours. The 5 instances
are classified into two main VMs; the “target VMs” of the RA components
and the “monitoring VM” of the CAS. The Forensic Process Model (NIST
SP800-86) is used to guide the collection, examination, analysis, and report-
ing of dependability metrics as digital evidence to assure dependability of the
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AWS cloud environment. Here, we identified the failure of vmiGuestRM VM
at 12:15 GMT that was not reported by the CSP to the cloud agents especially
to the system engineers. The CAS reports relevant cloud related activities such
as failures, conducted availability and reliability computations, evidence-based
trust analysis, the net present value of cloud resource investment, and a log
supported by graphical representations of our analysis. These logs can be used
as: (1) evidence to claim compensation (i.e. “Service Credits”), and also (2)
serve as a source of data for predicting dependability violations using a form
of machine learning. With these in place, we are convinced that our Objective
11 and 12 of Section 1.2.2 have been met, and that the cloud accountability
method is sufficiently capable of being used to meaningfully assure availability
and reliability of deployed systems in the cloud.
7.3 Reactive Architecture
In this section, cloud-ATAM is presented as a method for analysing and eval-
uating the trade-off of quality attributes for small-to-medium size cloud-based
systems. The novelty of this method is identified and validated using a com-
parative study. These are in line with Objectives 6 and 8 in Section 1.2.2. The
cloud-ATAM has been used to design the Reactive Architecture based on the
performance and availability quality attributes in Chapter 3. Here, we analyse
and evaluate the Reactive Architecture.
This work focuses on analysing the Reactive Architecture using the defined
two-staged approach (see Figure 7.19) of the cloud-ATAM. This approach is
(1) stakeholder-centric, (2) elicits points of view from a more diverse and larger
group of stakeholders, and (3) verifies and then builds on the results of the
architecture design in Chapter 3.
Here, the cloud-ATAM uses a non-trivial set of scenarios to analyse the cloud-
based architecture. A final report of the analysis results include a summary
of the project drivers, the architectural approaches, a utility tree, the analysis
of each chosen scenario, and important conclusions drawn. All these results
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Figure 7.19: cloud-ATAM Two-Staged Evaluation Approach
are recorded visually, so stakeholders can verify the correct identification of the
results. cloud-ATAM presents an enrichment in terms of coverage to ATAM
in the form of the two-staged scenario-based analysis approach. The research
question asked for this section is “what is the trade-off between availability and
performance quality attributes identified by the cloud-ATAM for the cloud-
based Reactive Architecture?”
The comparative study to validate cloud-ATAM is presented in Section 7.3.1.
Also, the mentioned two-staged analysis approach defined in cloud-ATAM is
respectively discussed in the following sections of the chapter: Section 7.3.2 and
Section 7.3.3.
7.3.1 Comparative Study
The Architecture Trade-off Analysis Method (ATAM) has been presented as
a very effective state-of-the-art architecture analysis method. This was estab-
lished in a comparative study in Section 2.2.5.1. cloud-ATAM is derived from
from ATAM. We argue that even though ATAM is very relevant as a method,
it is overly general in its application, and hence ideal for analysing large ar-
chitectures owned by large organisations. Here, its relevance and effectiveness
may be challenged in analysing architectures of a smaller size, varying opera-
tional environments of architectures, number of stakeholders available, budget
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constraints, etc.
To get a better appreciation of the differences, we conduct a comparative study
of cloud-ATAM and ATAM software system architecture evaluation methods,
based on a defined set of criteria. Considering the rapidly evolving nature of the
cloud platform as a currently popular and suitable deployment environment for
most software systems, we provide the main criteria for our comparative study
as:
(a) A goal of sensitivity and trade-off analysis:- In a rapidly evolving
environment, an efficient evaluation method should be capable of identi-
fying the quality attributes that change relative to others. Also, it must
be able to inform architectural decisions regarding an acceptable trade-off
between quality attributes.
(b) A focus on multiple quality attributes:- In the described environment
above, typically there will be multiple competing quality attributes. It
is, however, relevant that an appropriate evaluation method can consider
varying quality attributes.
(c) A focus on applicable architecture size:- In the cloud environment,
there are several elements that are changing rapidly. This therefore neces-
sitates that at least the size of the architecture being analysed be known
and catered for. Also, it affords the methodology the opportunity to pro-
vide specialised features to that type of architecture. Such features can be
the support of an ideal but specific number of stakeholders to undertake a
set of activities.
(d) Nature of method to guide design and analysis:- An architecture
analysis method should not be limited to post design activities, but present
itself in a way as to facilitate design. This makes such a method useful
and versatile for both design and analysis of cloud-based architectures.
(e) Relevance of method for cloud environment in terms of complex-
ity:- Architecture analysis methods must have reasonably shorter processes
and activities. The cloud environment hosts mainly small-to-medium size
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architectures and are deployed by small organisations with fairly limited
resources. A complex method requiring big budgets and many stakeholders
may not be attractive.
(f) Tool support:- To reduce the introduction of errors by stakeholders dur-
ing analysis, some form of automation or tool support will be beneficial.
Table 7.6: Comparative Study of ATAM and cloud-ATAM
Criteria ATAM cloud-ATAM
(a) Method goal Sensitivity and trade-
off analysis
Sensitivity and trade-
off analysis
(b) Quality
attributes
Multiple Multiple
(c) Applicable
architecture size
Any Small-to-medium
(d) Nature of
method
Architectural analysis Architectural design
and analysis
(e) Relevance of
method for cloud
environment
Complex and generic,
hence well suited to
large architectures
Fewer activities
with good sup-
port especially for
small-to-medium size
architectures
(f) Tool support No No, but Reactive Ar-
chitecture can be ex-
tended to support the
method
7.3.1.1 Discussion of Comparative Study Results
The comparative study has been provided in Table 7.6. In this study, there are
the same or similar features in terms of criteria (a), (b) and (f). This because
both methods are fundamentally (i.e.Method goal, Quality attributes, and Tool
support) the same. A slight distinction regarding criteria (f) (i.e.Tool support)
is that cloud-ATAM’s facilitating framework - Reactive Architecture - can be
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extended to provide tool support. This framework supports cloud-based system
engineering.
The distinguishing set of criteria can be identified as (c), (d) and (e). For criteria
(c): (Applicable architecture size), ATAM is presented as generic method that
can be used to analyse any size of architecture. Here, the nine-step method with
several activities has been daunting for analysing especially small architectures.
On the other hand, cloud-ATAM specialises on small-to-medium size architec-
ture. Most architectures in the world fall under this classification. That said,
even though this focus is narrow, its application has a wider potential. Criteria
(d) looks at the nature of the methods with regards to their applicability to
architectures in system engineering projects. As discussed earlier, ATAM is a
popular method for architecture analysis. In this light, ATAM is limited to only
analysing architectures whiles cloud-ATAM is used to design and analyse archi-
tectures. Finally, for criteria (e): (Relevance of method for cloud environment),
ATAM is shown to be relatively complex and generic. ATAM is relatively com-
plex and typically requires large organisations with large resources and experts
to effectively conduct its analysis. This may not be particularly appealing to
a greater number small and medium size organisations which are increasingly
dominating the cloud environment. That said, cloud-ATAM presents relatively
fewer steps and activities which does not compromise its effectiveness for design
and analysis of cloud-based architectures.
The following section provides qualitative analysis of the Reactive Architecture
using the utility tree analysis mechanism.
7.3.2 Utility Tree Analysis Mechanism
As discussed earlier in Chapter 3, the utility tree analysis mechanism is pre-
sented as a top-down mechanism for directly and efficiently translating the
business drivers of a system into concrete quality attribute scenarios. For ex-
ample, in an e-commerce system two of the business drivers might be stated as:
“security is central to the success of the system since ensuring the privacy of our
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customers’ data is of utmost importance”; and “modifiability is central to the
success of system since we need to be able to respond quickly to a rapidly evolv-
ing and very competitive marketplace.” Before we can assess the architecture,
these system goals must be made more specific and more concrete. Moreover,
we need to understand the relative importance of these goals versus other qual-
ity attribute goals, to determine where we should focus our attention during
the architecture evaluation. Utility trees help to prioritise quality goals.
Quality goals of a system are often presented as a set of system descriptions
to facilitate modular system analysis. Typically the first job of an architec-
ture analysis is to precisely elicit the specific quality goals against which the
architecture will be judged. The mechanism that we use for this elicitation is
the “scenario”. Scenarios are applied not only to determine if the architecture
meets a functional requirement, but also for further understanding of the sys-
tem’s architectural approaches and the ways in which these approaches meet
the quality requirements such as performance, availability, modifiability, and so
forth. They represent specific examples of current and future uses of a system.
They are useful in understanding both vague development-time qualities (e.g.
modifiability) and run-time qualities (e.g. performance, availability). In terms
of run-time qualities, scenarios specify the kinds of operations over which per-
formance needs to be measured, or the kinds of failures the system will have
to withstand. The utility tree generated in this exercise with a set of scenarios
based on the Reactive Architecture is shown in Figure 5.5.
The presented utility tree guides the remaining analysis process. It is important
at this point to prioritise, and refine the Reactive Architecture’s most important
quality attribute goals. The utility tree presented starts with “Utility” as the
“root node”. This indicates the general “goodness” of the Reactive Architec-
ture. The “second level” is constituted with the quality attributes of interest:
“performance” and “availability”. In the “third level”, there are specific quality
attribute refinements. From the “performance” quality attribute, we identify
“data latency” and “transaction throughput” as relevant refinements. Such
refinements are major determinants of performance. Also, “availability” is re-
fined to “hardware failures” and “software failures”. From this point, we are
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Table 7.7: Prioritised Quality Attribute Scenarios
Quality Attribute Scenarios Scenario
ID
Relative
Ranking
[X,Y]
Numbered
Value
[X,Y]
Power outage at Availability
Zone 1 requires traffic redirect to
Availability Zone 2 in less than 5
seconds
A1 [L, M] [3, 2]
Disk crash must have a backup
that takes over in less than 3 sec-
onds
A2 [H, L] [1, 3]
Network failure is detected and
recovered in 10 seconds
A3 [M, L] [2, 3]
COTS/Third party software up-
date with bug that causes fail-
ures is reverted to stable version
in less than 5 seconds
A4 [M, M] [2, 2]
Deliver change requests and re-
ports in real-time
P1 [H, M] [1, 2]
Reduce storage latency for users
to 200 milliseconds
P2 [H, L] [1, 3]
One system (e.g. Reactive Mid-
dleware) should not constitute a
lag greater than 1 second
P3 [M, L] [2, 3]
Accommodate over 500 queries
per second
P4 [H, M] [1, 2]
able to identify attribute goals as “quality attribute scenarios” that are concrete
enough for “prioritisation” and “analysis”. These “quality attribute scenarios”
form the “leafs” of the utility tree. Here, the “hardware failures” (i.e. see
“third level”) refined from “availability” is further refined into “power outage
at Availability Zone 1 requires traffic redirect to Availability Zone 2 in less than
5 seconds”, “disk crash must have a backup that takes over in less than 3 sec-
onds”, and “network failure is detected and recovered in 10 seconds”. These
constitute specific “scenarios” that can be prioritised relative to each other and
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Table 7.8: Prioritised Quality Attribute Scenarios. Ordered based on the
importance of each scenario to the success of the Reactive Architecture (X)
No. Quality Attribute Scenarios Scenario
ID
Numbered
Value
1 Disk crash must have a backup that
takes over in less than 3 seconds
A2 1
2 Deliver change requests and reports in
real-time
P1 1
3 Reduce storage latency for users to 200
milliseconds
P2 1
4 Accommodate over 500 queries per sec-
ond
P4 1
5 Network failure is detected and recov-
ered in 10 seconds
A3 2
6 COTS/Third party software update
with bug that causes failures is reverted
to stable version in less than 5 seconds
A4 2
7 One system (e.g. Reactive Middleware)
should not constitute a lag greater than
1 second
P3 2
8 Power outage at Availability Zone 1
requires traffic redirect to Availability
Zone 2 in less than 5 seconds
A1 3
also analysed.
The utility tree is prioritised based on “the importance of each scenario to
the success of the Reactive Architecture (X)” and “the degree of perceived risk
posed by the achievement of this node (Y)” (i.e.how easy the architecture teams
feel this level of performance or availability will be to achieve). To facilitate the
prioritisation process, we apply a relative rankings approach such as High (H),
Medium (M), and Low (L). These will be assigned to the scenarios as a pair (i.e.
[H,M]) to represent a “high” importance in terms of (X), and medium level of
perceived risk in terms of (Y)). Furthermore, we assign a numbered value such
as (H) corresponds to 1, (M) corresponds to 2, and (L) corresponds to 3 (see
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Table 7.9: Classified Quality Attribute Scenarios according to Types
Scenario
Type
Scenario
Type ID
Quality Attribute Scenar-
ios
Scenario
ID
Use Case USC1 Deliver change requests and re-
ports in real-time.
P1
USC2 Reduce storage latency for
users to 200 milliseconds.
P2
Growth GS1 Disk crash must have a backup
that takes over in less than 3
seconds.
A2
GS2 Network failure is detected and
recovered in 10 seconds.
A3
GS3 COTS/Third party software
update with bug that causes
failures is reverted to stable
version in less than 5 seconds.
A4
GS4 One system (e.g. Reactive Mid-
dleware) should not constitute
a lag greater than 1 second.
P3
GS5 Accommodate over 500 queries
per second.
P4
Exploratory ES1 Power outage at Availability
Zone 1 requires traffic redirect
to Availability Zone 2 in less
than 5 seconds.
A1
Table 7.7). This is relevant in making the ordering process easy by arranging
the numbered values in an ascending order. With this method, the high priority
quality attribute scenarios will be arranged from the top of the list or table to
the low priority at the base. That said, we proceed with the analysis of the
quality attribute scenarios based on the relative rankings of the importance of
each scenario to the success of the Reactive Architecture (X) (see Table 7.8).
In cloud-ATAM, we use three types of scenarios: use case scenarios (these in-
volve typical uses of the existing system and are used for information elici-
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Table 7.10: Prioritised Quality Attribute Scenarios (Ordered)
No. Quality Attribute Scenarios Scenario
ID
Numbered
Value
1 Disk (i.e. data repository) crash must
have a back-up that takes over in less
than 3 seconds
A2 1
*2* Deliver change requests and re-
ports in real-time
P1 1
3 Reduce storage latency for users to 200
milliseconds
P2 1
4 Accommodate over 500 queries per sec-
ond
P4 1
5 Network failure is detected and recov-
ered in 10 seconds
A3 2
6 COTS/Third party software update
with bug that causes failures is reverted
to stable version in less than 5 seconds
A4 2
7 One system (e.g. Reactive Middleware)
should not constitute a lag greater than
1 second
P3 2
8 Power outage at Availability Zone 1*
requires traffic redirect to Availability
Zone 2* in less than 5 seconds
A1 3
tation); growth scenarios (these cover anticipated changes to the system), and
exploratory scenarios (these cover extreme changes that are expected to “stress”
the system). These different types of scenarios are used to probe a system from
different angles, optimising the chances of surfacing architectural decisions at
risk. In this work, we consider some scenarios bordering “use case”, “growth”
and “exploration”. We have provided an introduction to some “use case sce-
narios” in Appendix C.14. The scenarios are classified and shown in Table
7.9.
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Figure 7.20: Component and Connector View of Reactive Architecture for
Scenario (P1) Analysis
198
Table 7.11: Analysis of Sensitivities, Trade-offs, Risks & Non-Risks for the
Utility Tree
Sensitivities: * S1: Concern over network latency.
* S2: Using a data-centric and client-server approach
for the central repository can facilitate data integrity
and consistency, but it makes the architecture sensitive
to its faults and bottlenecks.
* S3: Similarly, the central role played by the Reactive
Middleware makes the architecture sensitive to faults,
resource (i.e. CPU, memory) malfunctions or unavail-
ability.
Trade-offs: * T1: Availability (+) vrs Performance (-) vrs Relia-
bility (-): defining a central artefacts repository makes
artefacts readily available, but may be faced with bottle-
necks when there are a burst of queries on the repository.
* T2: Availability (+) vrs Performance (+): using APIs
for component interfaces facilitate readily access to re-
sources, and boosts performance.
* T3: Availability (+) vrs Performance (-): client-server
approach for the Reactive Middleware allows for multi-
client service, but there can be an overwhelming network
management performance constraint.
* T4: Availability (+) vrs Performance (-) vrs Reliabil-
ity (+): backing up the artefacts in the primary Shared
Artefacts Repository allows for fail-over assurance and
increased reliability, but the asynchronous back-up pro-
cess can affect performance.
Risks: * R1: Data integrity.
* R2: The risk is that the Reactive Middleware and the
Shared Artefacts Repository constitute a single point of
failure.
Non-Risks: * N1: The non-risk is the use of application program-
ming interface (API) approach which should stay com-
patible.
* N2: The independent communication connections
should enable real-time data transfer.
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Table 7.12: Analysis of Performance Scenario - P1 - (see Table 7.11 for
the description of S1, S2, T1, etc.) and (C&C + API: Component-and-
connector architectural style and API, SAR: Shared Artefacts Repository,
RM: Reactive Middleware, and ICC: Independent Communication Com-
ponents)
Analysis of Architectural Approach using a Performance-related Scenario
Scenario ID :
P1
Scenario: Deliver change requests and reports in real-time
Attribute(s) Performance
Environment Normal Operations
Stimulus Responsiveness to change events
Response real-time
Architectural
Decisions
Sensitivity Trade-off Risk Non-Risk
AD1 C&C + API S1 N1
AD2
AD3 Client-Server SAR S2 T1 R1, R2 N1
AD4 Client-Server RM S3 T3 R2 N1
AD5 Back-up S1,S2 T4 N1
AD6 DS RM S1 R1 N1
AD7 Schema-free-SAR R2
AD8 ICC S1 N2
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7.3.2.1 Analysis Process
The analysis process begins by considering a high priority scenario of the Re-
active Architecture. From Table 7.8, all generated scenarios of the Reactive
Architecture are identified and ordered based on their importance to the suc-
cess of the architecture. These scenarios are considered to be of high priority
in the analysis of the architecture. At this point, we consider scenario P1
(i.e.“Deliver change requests and reports in real-time” - see Table 7.10) for fur-
ther analysis towards the identification of sensitivity points (i.e. trade-off and
risk points).
Considering scenario P1, we first identify the related components of the Reac-
tive Architecture. The interactions of such components will help us to identify
and understand the sensitivity points. Now from scenario P1, we notice “change
requests and reports” which constitutes the main feature of both the Reactive
Middleware and the Shared Artefacts Repository. The Reactive Middleware
provides facilities to stakeholders to submit “change request” affecting “high
priority system artefacts” for consideration by change managers. Such artefacts
are stored in the Shared Artefacts Repository. Also, the decision made by the
change managers is delivered to the stakeholder as a report. Hence, the inter-
action between the Reactive Middleware and the Shared Artefacts Repository
is relevant in our analysis at this point (see Figure 7.20).
From the interactions of the mentioned components, some sensitivity points
(i.e. S1, S2, S3) were identified (see Table 7.11). A further assessment of
these sensitivity points introduced trade-off points (i.e. T1, T2, T3, T4), and
risk points (i.e. R1, R2). Also, some Non-Risk points (i.e. N1, N2) were
identified. However, a Non-Risk point (i.e. N1) mitigates the trade-off point (i.e.
T2) involving application programming interfaces (APIs). Here, no risks were
identified to make the trade-off (i.e. T2) necessary for further consideration.
Finally, an overview of our analysis is provided in Table 7.12.
After the analysis of the Reactive Architecture with the Utility Tree Analysis
Mechanism, we continue the analysis process by soliciting the opinion of the
system stakeholders on this analysis approach in the next section.
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7.3.3 Stakeholders’ Brainstorming Analysis Mechanism
At this point, the cloud-ATAM as well as the analysis conducted with the utility
tree analysis mechanism are presented to the stakeholders, to brainstorm and
provide their feedback on them. A stakeholders’ brainstorming group work is
organised between the team of system analysts (i.e. designers and analysts of
the Reactive Architecture) and the relevant stakeholders (i.e. owners, users,
software testers, database administrators, legal team, auditors, etc. of the Re-
active Architecture).
7.3.3.1 Stakeholders’ Brainstorming Group Work
In the stakeholders’ group work, stakeholders numbering up to twenty-on (21)
were specifically introduced to the Architecture Trade-off Analysis Methodology
(ATAM) as the parent methodology, the cloud-based Reactive Architecture,
and our utility tree analysis with the derived methodology - cloud-ATAM. To
these three sections, stakeholders were asked to provide some answers to some
questions. Here, a “questionnaire” is designed to facilitate the data gathering
from the feedback of the stakeholders (see Appendix C.15).
We considered the following questions:
• SECTION 1: Presentation of ATAM
(a) The overview of architecture evaluation and ATAM were presented
reasonably well?
(b) Quality attributes (i.e. availability, performance, etc.) play a critical
role in architecture evaluation?
(c) Scenario-based architecture evaluation methods are adequate in analysing
software architecture of varying sizes?
(d) ATAM presents a matured/convincing approach to architectural eval-
uation?
• SECTION 2: Reactive Architecture
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(a) The Reactive Architecture was clearly presented?
(b) The requirements of the Reactive Architecture are representative enough?
(c) The presented constraints and focal quality attributes are relevant to
the architecture?
(d) The architecture components, their relationships, and initial scenarios
are useful in understanding the Reactive Architecture?
• SECTION 3: cloud-ATAM Evaluation and Results
(a) The cloud-ATAM was clearly presented?
(b) The quality attribute characterisation was well presented?
(c) The attribute-specific questions and the identified approaches provide
adequate coverage of the quality attribute characterisation?
(d) The presented scenario (generated from the utility tree) was ade-
quately analysed?
(e) The reasoning behind the analysis process was sound?
Stakeholders were encouraged to provide their answers in the range of the clas-
sification: (1) “Strongly agree”, (2) “Agree”, (3) “Neutral”, (4) “Disagree”, and
(5) “Strongly disagree”. However, some questions (such as questions 1 of both
Section 1, and Section 2 ) only required either a “Yes” or “No” answer. They
were provided the option to comment about each of the three sections of the
questionnaire, and also to provide general comments.
7.3.3.2 Analysis of Stakeholders’ Feedback
In our approach to analyse the feedback from the stakeholders, we consider each
of the questions and their corresponding responses. We begin by taking a look
at question 1 from Section 1. Question 1 seeks to understand if the overview
of architecture evaluation and ATAM were presented reasonably well. There
was a unanimous agreement that the mentioned topics were reasonably well
presented. This however provides a good basis for an adequate representation
of the perception of the stakeholders.
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(a) Pie Chart (b) Bar Chart
Figure 7.21: The Role Played by the Quality Attributes in Architecture
Evaluation
We proceed to question 2 of Section 1, which seeks to identify if in the opinion
of the stakeholders, quality attributes play a critical role in architecture evalua-
tion. The feedback is shown graphically in Figure 7.21. This figure specifically
shows a pie chart depicting a percentage distribution of the feedback, and a bar
chat also showing the frequency of the feedback of stakeholders relative to this
question. From Figure 7.21, 13 of the stakeholders (representing 62% ) indicated
strongly in agreement that quality attributes play a critical role in architecture
evaluation. Also, 7 of the stakeholders (representing 33% ) indicated that they
agree, whiles 1 stakeholder (representing 5% ) was neutral. Here, none of the
stakeholders either disagreed or disagreed strongly to our claim.
The responses to question 3 (i.e. adequacy of Scenario-Based Methods for Ar-
chitecture Evaluation? ) of Section 1 was generally positive (see Figure 7.22).
Here, 2 of the stakeholders (representing 9% ) responded strongly in agreement,
and 10 stakeholders (representing 48% ) agree to our claim. However, the re-
maining 9 stakeholders (representing 43% ) were neutral in their response to
this question.
With question 4 of Section 1, we seek to solicit the opinion of the stakeholders if
“ATAM presents a matured/convincing approach to architectural evaluation?”
(see Figure 7.23). We identified that 2 of the stakeholders representing 10%
strongly agreed to this claim, whiles 12 stakeholders representing 57% agree.
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(a) Pie Chart (b) Bar Chart
Figure 7.22: Adequacy of Scenario-Based Methods for Architecture Evalu-
ation
(a) Pie Chart (b) Bar Chart
Figure 7.23: Maturity of ATAM for Architecture Evaluation
However, 7 stakeholders were neutral, and no one disagreed to this claim.
Considering the Reactive Architecture being analysed by cloud-ATAM in Sec-
tion 2, we received very positive responses. With regards to: question 1 - “The
Reactive Architecture was clearly presented?”, question 2 - “The requirements
of the Reactive Architecture are representative enough?”, question 3 - “The
presented constraints and focal quality attributes are relevant to the architec-
ture?”, and question 4 - “The architecture components, their relationships,
and initial scenarios are useful in understanding the Reactive Architecture?”
the responses are categorised respectively as:
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(a) Pie Chart (b) Bar Chart
Figure 7.24: Representativeness of the Reactive Architecture’s Require-
ments
(a) Pie Chart (b) Bar Chart
Figure 7.25: Relevance of the Reactive Architecture’s Constraints and
Quality Attributes
• 21 representing 100% of the stakeholders thought that the Reactive Ar-
chitecture was clearly presented,
• Strongly agree: 4 representing 19%, Agree: 16 representing 76%, Neutral:
1 representing 5% (see Figure 7.24),
• Strongly agree: 1 representing 5%, Agree: 16 representing 76%, Neutral:
4 representing 19% (see Figure 7.25),
• Strongly agree: 6 representing 28%, Agree: 9 representing 43%, Neutral:
6 representing 29% (see Figure 7.26).
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(a) Pie Chart (b) Bar Chart
Figure 7.26: Usefulness of Reactive Architecture’s Components, Relation-
ships and Scenarios
(a) Pie Chart (b) Bar Chart
Figure 7.27: Clarity of the Presentation of cloud-ATAM
In the final section, we seek to present cloud-ATAM, our evaluation and results,
and then assess how the stakeholders appreciate our approach. Here, we identi-
fied that 24% (i.e. 5) of the stakeholders strongly agree that the presentation of
the cloud-ATAM was clear (see Figure 7.27). Also to this question (i.e. ques-
tion 1), 57% (i.e. 12 ) of the stakeholders agree. However, the remaining 29%
(i.e. 4 ) were neutral in their response.
The second question in Section 3 looks at how well the presentation of quality
attribute characterisation was. The characterisation of the quality attributes
(i.e. availability and performance), are very relevant and serves as the foundation
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(a) Pie Chart (b) Bar Chart
Figure 7.28: Well Presentation of Quality Attribute Characterisation
of the analysis with cloud-ATAM. From Figure 7.28, we identify that 38% (i.e.
8) of the stakeholders strongly agree and 43% (i.e. 9) of the stakeholders agree
that the presentation went well. That said, the remaining 19% (i.e. 4) of the
stakeholders were neutral.
(a) Pie Chart (b) Bar Chart
Figure 7.29: Coverage of Attribute-Specific Questions
Focusing on the analysis of the Reactive Architecture with cloud-ATAM, we
begin by building on the quality attribute characterisation by assessing the
coverage of attribute-specific questions. From our assessment (see Figure 7.29),
14% (i.e. 3 ) of the stakeholders strongly agree whiles 62% (i.e. 13 ). Also, 24%
(i.e. 5 ) of the stakeholders are neutral.
From the attribute-specific questions asked, we are able to understand the
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(a) Pie Chart (b) Bar Chart
Figure 7.30: Adequately Analysed Scenarios of Reactive Architecture
(a) Pie Chart (b) Bar Chart
Figure 7.31: Sound Reasoning of cloud-ATAM Analysis
how the identified quality attributes will be achieved using the architectural
approaches or decisions for the Reactive Architecture. In this process, use
architecture-related scenarios to analyse the Reactive Architecture. At this
point, we ask the stakeholders to assess the adequacy of the scenario-based
analysis of the Reactive Architecture using the cloud-ATAM. The responses
gathered are shown in Figure 7.30. Here, 38% (i.e. 8 ) of the stakeholders
strongly agree, and 48% (i.e. 10 ) of the stakeholders agree that our analysis
was adequately undertaken. That said, 14% (i.e. 3 ) are neutral to the claim.
Finally, we asked the stakeholders if the reasoning behind the analysis process
was sound after identifying sensitivity points, trade-off points, and risky points
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in the Reactive Architecture design. From Figure 7.31, the stakeholders who
strongly agree with the soundness of the analysis were 14% (i.e. 3 ), and those
who agree are 62% (i.e. 13). The stakeholders who were neutral are 5 consti-
tuting 24%.
7.3.4 cloud-ATAM Analysis Report
The cloud-ATAM delivers the main products: sensitivities, trade-offs, and archi-
tectural risks from the two-staged analysis approach (see Figure 7.19). Firstly,
the Utility Tree Analysis Mechanism delivered the analysis products in Table
7.11. From Table 7.12, the cloud-ATAM completed a full cycle by linking the
“architectural decisions” to the “quality attributes” (i.e. availability, perfor-
mance), and back to the “business goals” of the Reactive Architecture. The
results from Tables 7.11 and 7.12 indicate that the cloud-ATAM found some
trade-offs (i.e. T1, T3, T4).
Also, the Stakeholders’ Brainstorming Analysis Mechanism was used to assess
the Utility Tree Analysis Mechanism approach. Here, the cloud-ATAM, and the
Utility Tree Analysis Mechanism approach were presented to the stakeholders of
the Reactive Architecture. They were expected to brainstorm and provide their
feedback on the methodology and analysis. We then gathered the opinion of the
stakeholders about the presentation and our analysis, using a facts gathering
approach where a designed “questionnaire” was used. In the three sections of
the questionnaire, we identified that the stakeholders were very appreciative of
the information we provided to them, and generally supportive of our analysis
process. Here, 77.818% of the stakeholders on an average “strongly agreed”
or “agreed” to all of our presentation and analysis. However, an average of
22.182% (i.e. almost 5 ) of the stakeholders chose to be “neutral” in all of the
questions from the questionnaire. Their concerns were that:
(a) the description of ATAM was not clear,
(b) a concrete case study of ATAM would be useful in the presentation,
(c) the distinction between ATAM and cloud-ATAM was not clear,
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(d) they wanted to know how quality attributes apply in real-world,
(e) if the scenario analysis is manually done or it is automated,
(f) the scenarios were not clear,
(g) they wanted to know the use of the Reactive Architecture, and
(h) whether the Reactive Architecture is a software and/or hardware.
Such concerns afforded the team of analysts the opportunity to respond by
clarifying some aspects of our analysis and providing further information.
7.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have conducted evaluations for three main sections: the
Reactive Middleware, the Cloud Accountability System, and the Reactive Ar-
chitecture. We briefly present them below.
A summary of the main activities for evaluating the Reactive Middleware have
been presented in Section 7.1.2.6. These are in line with Objectives 1 and 2
presented in Section 1.2.2.
Also, the Cloud Accountability System facilitates the Cloud Accountability Sys-
tem. In this section, we have demonstrated the method by applying it to a
cloud-based test-bed of the Reactive Architecture. Also, we have conducted an
evidence-based trust analysis on the derived evidence for assuring the depend-
ability of the cloud-based Reactive Architecture. With these two activities, we
are convinced that our Objective 11 and 12 of Section 1.2.2 have been met,
and that the cloud accountability method is sufficiently capable of being used
to meaningfully assure availability and reliability of deployed systems in the
cloud.
We have also motivated the need for architecture evaluation methods suitable
for the dynamic unpredictable cloud environments. In particular, we have pre-
sented an evaluation method - cloud-ATAM - derived from Architecture Trade-
off Analysis Method (ATAM) for evaluating the availability and performance
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quality attributes of a cloud-based Reactive Architecture (see Objective 5 in
Section 1.2.2). We have validated cloud-ATAM with a comparative study with
ATAM (see Objective 6 in Section 1.2.2). This methodology specifically presents
a two-staged analysis approach (i.e. (1) Utility Tree Analysis Mechanism, and
(2) Stakeholders’ Brainstorming Analysis Mechanism) for analysing the cloud-
based Reactive Architecture. Approaches (1) and (2) are for qualitative system
analysis, whiles approach (3) is for quantitative system analysis. However,
this methodology as well as the two-staged analysis approach are generic for
analysing cloud-based architecture with particular focus on small-to-medium
sized systems. This section also presents the results which led us to conclude
that the cloud-ATAM is able to identify trade-offs between the availability and
performance quality attributes for the Reactive Architecture.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Work
This chapter summarises the contributions of the thesis in Section 8.1. We also
show some threats to the validity of our work in Section 8.2, and some of the
possible directions of future research in Section 8.3.
8.1 Conclusion
The research presented in this thesis makes several key contributions:
1. The design, development and evaluation of a novel Reactive Middleware,
that supports a set of management guidelines for a high quality GSD
change management and traceability. The middleware facilitates a novel
change management and traceability process model (meets Objective 1 pre-
sented in Section 1.2.2), within the context of quality management for GSD
projects (meets Objective 2 ). An expert review panel process is conducted
to assess the maturity of the process model (meets Objective 3 ). Also, an
Airlock Control System case study is used to demonstrate the GSD man-
agement guidelines (meets Objective 4 ). Chapters 4 and 7 present this
contribution.
2. The proposal of a novel methodology for the design and analysis of small-
to-medium size cloud-based systems (meets Objective 5 ). This method
considers the unpredictable character and rapidly evolving topology of the
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cloud deployment environment, and its impact on dependability in the
bespoke design of systems to be deployed to the cloud. The methodology
targets systems that are classified within the range of small to medium size.
A comparative study of the current state-of-the-art methods is initially
undertaken to identify methods that present a high potential to remedy this
challenge (meets Objective 6 ). The method is demonstrated by applying
it to the design of the Reactive Architecture (meets Objective 7 ), and then
an analysis of the quality attribute trade-off of the Reactive Architecture
is conducted to meet Objective 8. This contribution is met in Chapters 5
and 7.
3. The design, development and evaluation of the Reactive Architecture,
which is used for cloud-based system engineering (refer to Objectives 7 and
8 ). The Reactive Architecture presents critical components for system
engineering such as the introduced Reactive Middleware, with a Shared
Artefacts Repository, and a System Engineering Toolbox. Here, this con-
tribution is satisfied in Chapters 3 and 7.
4. The proposal of a novel methodology for assuring cloud accountability in
terms of dependability to meet Objective 9. A forensic analysis process
is taken to guide the data collection, examination, evidence analysis, and
reporting of information (meets Objective 11 ). This contribution is met in
Chapters 6 and 7.
5. The design and development of the Cloud Accountability System to facil-
itate the cloud accountability methodology (meets Objective 10 presented
in Section 1.2.2). The Cloud Accountability System is used to conduct
virtual machine introspection of some key components of the Reactive Ar-
chitecture, where data is collected also from the Cloud Service Providers
based on availability and reliability related metrics. Also, an evidence-
based trust analysis of the reported information from the forensic process
is conducted, to assure cloud users of the dependability of the cloud envi-
ronment (meets Objective 12 ). This contribution is met in Chapters 6 and
7.
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Table 8.1: Mapping High-Level Requirements to Components of Reactive
Architecture
ID High-Level
Requirements
Reactive Architecture
Components
R1 Artefacts independence Shared Artefacts
Repository (see Chapter 4)
R2 Supports globally
distributed development
Reactive Middleware (see
Chapter 4, 5)
R3 Ability to handle different
and large numbers of
changing artefacts
Reactive Middleware (see
Chapter 4) and Shared
Artefacts Repository (see
Chapter 4, 5)
R4 Automated as far as
possible
Reactive Middleware (see
Chapter 4, 6)
R5 Diversity of tools System Engineering
Toolbox (Chapter 4)
We also introduced a set of high-level requirements for a framework that has
the potential of addressing the state-of-the-art challenges of GSD: (1) effective
information and knowledge sharing, (2) automation, and (3) diversity of tools.
At this point we relate the components of our proposed Reactive Architecture
with these high-level requirements in Table 8.1.
8.2 Limitations
8.2.1 Designing a Cloud-Based Architecture
This work has introduced cloud-ATAM for the design and analysis of small-
to-medium size cloud-based architectures. This method has been presented
as a qualitative architecture reasoning approach. This however introduces a
threat to the validity of cloud-ATAM. This is so because, qualitative reason-
ing approaches are subjective and may not be widely accepted as a wholly
accurate method. We are motivated by the quantitative reasoning approaches
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provided by ATAM through the Attribute-Based Architectural Styles (ABASs).
An example which is the Reliability Tri-modular Redundancy (RTmR) ABAS
provides a means to design and analyse a system that focuses on providing the
facility to quantitatively assess the trade-off between a set of quality attributes.
8.2.2 Ensuring Traceability with the Reactive Middle-
ware
The Reactive Middleware introduces a change management and traceability
(CM-T) process model. This process model is facilitated in terms of change
management and traceability by the open services for lifecycle management
(OSLC) approach. In this regard, the limitation of this process model is that
the correctness of each consistency management stage is heavily reliant upon
the correctness of trace links. OSLC is very effective in identifying artefacts
and resources within artefacts. The dependence on trace links between artefacts
(including these resources) raises the question of how CM-T process model could
be more tolerant to errors introduced during trace creation, especially for a GSD
service (i.e. change management and traceability-as-a-service: CM-TaaS) based
on the rapidly evolving cloud platform. This is a significant issue considering
that the current approach to creating trace links using the OSLC, by nature,
is not likely to provide 100% accuracy. Thus, user intervention is required to
ensure correct links are established prior to consistency management.
8.2.3 Cloud Accountability Analysis
The cloud accountability analysis undertaken in this thesis presents two main
threats to validity. First, the evidence-based trust analysis conducted in this
work can be perceived as simplistic even though it is considerably effective in
assigning trust values to introspected virtual machines. This simple approach
is preferred to make the analysis readily accessible and acceptable to cloud
agents. We however take note that there are other established and widely
applied evidence-based trust analysis approaches that can be accepted widely
216
in the niche research community.
Also, the reliability analysis was undertaken over a very limited time frame.
Typically, reliability analysis is conducted over a protracted period of time (e.g.
three months, six months, a year, etc.). The major constraint was the cost of
using the cloud environment over a longer period.
8.2.4 Constitution of the Expert Panel
The choice of using an expert panel process to validate the change management
and traceability (CM-T) process model has proved very useful in identifying
some of the process model’s potential strengths and weaknesses. We believe
that the involvement of such a high calibre panel adds weight and rigor to
our results. The high response rate and the many additional comments and
contributions made, suggest that the experts to the task seriously. Also, the
range of responses elicited from this relatively small group formed a good basis
for us to guage how the CM-T process model might be viewed in practice.
The constitution of the expert panel is from colleagues at Newcastle University,
researchers and practitioners from conferences attended, and other experts who
were identified through their research or industrial work. These experts were
selected exclusively based on their expertise. That said, the varying levels of
the relationship between some of the experts and the author could be perceived
as a source of bias. Despite some polarisation of views, there was relatively
strong agreement that the requirement engineering process is in need of further
support and hence, the CM-T process model has a high potential of enhancing
this process.
8.3 Future Work
The work described in this thesis can be extended in a number of ways. We
consider the use of repository mining and machine learning approaches for the
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stock of development artefacts in the Shared Artefacts Repository, the automa-
tion support for the cloud-ATAM for architecture design and analysis, and the
consideration of a larger set of dependability attributes for cloud accountability.
We discuss these areas in order of relative importance. We complete this section
by looking at a future case study.
8.3.1 Shared Artefacts Repository Mining and Machine
Learning
In this thesis, and specifically in Chapters 2 and 4, we introduce a Shared Arte-
facts Repository with a Reactive Middleware as an important consideration for
GSD as an effective information and knowledge-sharing mechanism. However,
we realise that this repository has a large collection of artefacts spanning var-
ious software development life-cycle (SDLC) phases. This is a vital resource
for system engineering as critical patterns and correlations can be drawn for
process optimisation and efficiency. Such a collection can be mined to ascertain
correlations between GSD team dynamics and the SDLC phases, the develop-
ment behaviour of different GSD teams to understand the impact of culture
and perception of authority on the SDLC phases, etc. Such correlations can
be appropriately identified using the increasingly popular concept of machine
learning. This will then align our work with the domain of data science for the
identification of patterns which otherwise would be unknown.
8.3.2 Tool Support for the cloud-ATAM
In Chapter 3, we introduced the cloud-ATAM for designing and evaluating
small-to-medium size cloud-based architectures. We then presented the seven
derived steps of the cloud-ATAM, which are used to guide the design of the
Reactive Architecture. To analyse the architectural approaches (i.e. Step 6 of
cloud-ATAM), cloud-ATAM further provides a two-staged scenario-based anal-
ysis approach in a form of Utility Tree and Stakeholders’ Brainstorming (see
Chapter 7). We believe that the automation of the cloud-ATAM will help to
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further make the design and analysis processes efficient. This is motivated by
the partial tool support (i.e. Ex:SAAMTOOL) for the Software Architecture
Analysis Method (SAAM) discussed in Section 2.2.5. Even though cloud-ATAM
presents a lean methodology compared to ATAM, it is still considerably com-
plex, and the use of a tool here will reduce inefficiencies (including those from
human experts) that may be present. Furthermore, presenting this tool as an
open source and cloud-based will enable a wider global accessibility, where more
data can be obtained towards optimising cloud-ATAM.
With such a tool support, we can consider more quality attributes in the design
and analysis phases of cloud-ATAM. This is important since multiple quality
attribute analysis will provide a better representation of the quality of small-to-
medium size architectures in their deployed cloud environments. It is obvious
though that multiple quality attribute analysis will lead to more complex design
and analysis processes. However, this automation process will be beneficial in
taking away most of the workload by human-experts.
8.3.3 Cloud Accountability of Other Dependability At-
tributes
In Chapter 6, we identify an area that can be improved. The evaluation of
the Reactive Architecture with the cloud accountability method was limited in
terms of the 3-hour observation period. In this work, we argue that the Stan-
dard Performance Evaluation Corporation (SPEC)’s Cloud IaaS 2016 Bench-
mark used less than one hour for performance evaluation. However, an effective
analysis of the Reactive Architecture’s quality attributes (i.e. availability, relia-
bility) could not be undertaken in our work. Even though, our availability and
reliability analysis fit well with our objective of providing information to assure
cloud agents, it fell short of a regular and acceptable analysis for the quality
attributes. To further this work, an observation period of at least six months
will be used for a more critical analysis of multiple quality attributes, and hence
obtaining a larger set of data for effective analysis.
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8.3.4 Future Case Study: Artificial Bee Colony Model-
Inspired Traffic Light Control System
To apply cloud-ATAM to the design, analysis and evaluation of a more complex
system, we plan to create a traffic light control system (TLCS). The TLCS
is aimed at providing an optimised alternative to the coordination of vehicles
and pedestrians at traffic lights and at a wide geographical location. This
approach is motivated by the artificial bee colony model. The system works
by networking traffic light systems. Each traffic light system is referred to as
a hive, and each hive has a queen bee and a pool of worker bees. The queen
bee is the local coordinating server at a traffic light location that determines
the order of movement of vehicles and pedestrians based on priorities, and the
worker bees are the vehicles and pedestrians. Priorities are given to emergency
service vehicles, and to pedestrians at certain times of the day. The network of
queen bees facilitate an intelligent coordination of traffic, as the state of traffic
at individual hives are considered for an equitable and efficient traffic control
mechanism. This mechanism can only be influenced at a control center. A
facilitating framework is provided and deployed to the cloud to benefit from its
elasticity and scalability. The safety and security of the coordination mechanism
and the framework forms the focus for the design, analysis and evaluation with
cloud-ATAM.
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Appendix A: Expert Review of
Change Management and
Traceability Process Model
This appendix contains the results of the feedback analysis from the expert
review for the change management and traceability process model discussed in
Chapter 4. This analysis is presented here as bar graphs, and classified under
seven (7) sections of the developed questionnaire.
A.1 Overview of CM-T Process Model
Figure 1: (A.1) Overview of CM-T Process Model
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A.2 Adherence to CMMI Characteristics
(a) The classification of questions is representative of the CMMI
Level 2 goal?
(b) The CMMI processes have been adequately mapped to the iden-
tified questions?
Figure 2: (A.2) Adherence To CMMI Characteristics
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A.3 Limited Scope
(a) How complete is the CM-T model relative to the CMMI
Level 2 processes?
(b) How appropriate is it to include change management
processes and traceability processes in one model?
(c) How well do the questions and assigned processes cover
the key activities in change management and traceability
of requirements?
Figure 3: (A.3) Limited Scope
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A.4 Consistency
(a) How consistent is the level of detail given within the
CM-T model?
(b) All key processes are represented (at a baseline level)?
(c) All processes listed are at a similar level of abstraction?
Figure 4: (A.4) Consistency
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A.5 Understandability
(a) How easy is it to understand the path from initial goal,
to question, to final process?
(b) Each individual process is easy to understand (i.e. they
are clearly defined and unambiguous)?
(c) How clear is this presentation of the model?
Figure 5: (A.5) Understandability
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A.6 Ease of Use
(a) Do you think that a considerable amount of prior
knowledge of CMMI is needed to be able to interpret the
CM-T model?
(b) Dividing the RE process into smaller activities in this
way will help practitioners to implement the process?
Figure 6: (A.6) Ease of Use
A.7 Verifiability
Figure 7: (A.7) Verifiability - How clear is this presentation of the model?
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A.8 Constitution of the Expert Panel
Table 2: (A.8) The Expert Panel
Name of
Participant
Current Institution Position/Relevant Experience
1. M. Mehr (Ph.D.) School of Computer Science, New-
castle University, UK
Researcher (expert in RE methods
and Security)
2. S. Alajrami
(Ph.D.)
Praqma, Norway DevOps Consultant, and trained
SPICE Assessor
3. R. Ebrahimy
(Ph.D.)
DTU, Denmark Post-Doc (expert in RE methods)
4. D. M. Dias (Ph.D.) SIGMA Consult, Germany IT Business Analyst and Program-
mer
5. R. Materre (Ph.D.) School of Computer Science, New-
castle University, UK
Post-Doc (expert in RE methods)
6. S. F. Shahandashti
(Ph.D.)
Department of Computer Science,
University of York, UK
Lecturer (expert in RE methods and
Security)
7. L. L. Bastos Accenture, Newcastle, UK Software Engineer and trained ISO
9001 Auditor
8. P. B. Mahama Blue Oak System Ltd., Ghana Quality Manager, IT Business An-
alyst - requirements, and Program-
mer
9. E. Dadzie IT Systems Quality Control, United
States Department of Agriculture,
USA
Quality Manager and SPICE Asses-
sor
10. E. Toreini (Ph.D.) School of Computer Science, New-
castle University, UK
Post-Doc (expert in RE methods)
11. R. Ahmed Department of Computer Science,
Sulaimani Polytechnic University,
Iraq
Lecturer (expert in RE methods and
Security)
12. Z. Wen (Ph.D.) School of Informatics, University of
Edinburgh, UK
Post-Doc (expert in RE methods)
13. M. Dzandu School of Computer Science, Univer-
sity of Reading, UK
Ph.D. Student and Lecturer (expert
in RE methods)
14. Anonymous TalkTalk, UK SCRUM Master and Quality Man-
ager
15. Anonymous School of Computer Science, Tallinn
University, Estonia
Senior Lecturer (expert in RE meth-
ods)
16. Anonymous Institute for Applied Software Sys-
tems Engineering, Clausthal Univer-
sity of Technology, Germany
Senior Research Associate (expert in
RE methods)
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Appendix B: Reactive
Middleware Implementation
Details
B.9 Package Diagram of the Airlock Control
System Case Study
Figure 8: (B.9) Package Diagram of the Airlock Control System Case Study
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B.10 Class Diagram of the Airlock Control Sys-
tem Case Study
Figure 9: (B.10) Class Diagram of the Airlock Control System Case Study
258
B.11 Interaction Diagram of the Artefacts Mon-
itoring System
Figure 10: (B.11) Interaction Diagram of the Airlock Control System Case
Study
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B.12 Applying the System Engineering Tool-
box to Formal Verification
The Toolbox system has been introduced in [99], [96], [98]. The Toolbox has
been developed as a web service that is deployed to the Amazon Web Service’
Elastic Cloud Compute’s (EC2) environment. This system has been applied
to formal verification involving our model checking web service and theorem
proving web service. These applications are discussed below.
Model Checking Tool
In this project, a model-checker called ProB [81] is wrapped as a web service
based on the REST protocol to become part of the architecture toolbox. A
client plug-in created for the SafeCap IDE [95] sends specifications of railway
signalling models for verification on the developed web service. The web service
is deployed on Tomcat Server 6.0. The main CRUD (Create, Read, Update and
Delete) operation used is the POST to receive REQUESTS from client IDEs as
new entries of data (JSON file) into the web service. Another operation, GET
is used to facilitate a RESPONSE with POST to return the verification results
to the client.
Theorem Provers on the Cloud
In this work [97], we have created a theorem prover tool as part of our architec-
ture toolbox and a plugin that connects the Rodin IDE [60] to this tool. The
Rodin Platform supports modelling in the Event-B specification language and
features a set of automated provers (pp, npp and AtelierB provers) as well an
interactive proving environment. The tool is using the Why3 software [32] that
brings together a collection of some well-known theorem provers (Alt-Ergo, Z3,
Yices, Vampire, SPASS, etc.). The web service is hosted on the Amazon AWS
cloud. The plugin maps Event-B mathematical language into the Why3 nota-
tion, the tool uses Why3 to implement subsequent translation into TPTP [213]
and SMT-LIB formats compatible with a wide range of existing provers.
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Figure 11: (B.12)Theorem Provers ToolBox Interactions in the AWS ECS
Cloud
The main steps of this cloud-based verification tool-chain (see overview from
Figure 11) are: (1) a client generates n verification conditions; (2) these are
sent, individually to a scalable, cloud-based service; (3) each verification con-
dition spawns, through a private sub-service, n prover instances; since provers
are services themselves and the proof load is evenly distributed over physical
nodes of the cloud; (4) prover results are collated and, if necessary, some prover
instances are terminated before they complete; and (5) an adjudicated response
is communicated back to the client.
Table 3: (B.13) Performance Benchmark
Model Total
POs
Open,
built-in
Open, built-in
FA
Open, built-in
+ z3(c · ∗)
prime15r3 625 281 18 201
paxos3a3 348 121 4 27
fishers 82 14 0 14
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There are two significant points presented by this project. First is the fact
that a prover is internally accessed as a service to make use of cloud elasticity
in resource scaling. Second is the prover managing facility that distributes
verification conditions to prover services.
The connection with the Rodin IDE provides an immediate access to hundreds
of formal specifications containing many thousands of verification conditions.
It also significantly strengthens the Platform (i.e. Open, built-in + FA) proving
capability as illustrated in Table 3. In one of the models, fishers, the addition
of the service makes the proof completely automatic; even more impressive is
the fact that 14 previously undischarged proofs included two long interactive
proofs which, originally, took several days to complete. For the case of paxos3a3
model, the service proofs all but 4 POs which are genuinely challenging and
require manually setting up an induction scheme. Finally, model prime15r3
had 18 proof obligations (POs) undischarged due to a combination of incomplete
axiomatisation of the Event-B language and a fairly short prover time-out hard-
wired into the Platform. The last column of the table gives the performance of
a scenario made of a single, though quite capable prover, - z3 [144].
We have also created and experimented with a Shared Artefact Repository (see
Section 4.2.3) as part of our Reactive Architecture. The cloud-based theorem
prover service keeps a detailed record of all artefacts for every proof attempt
in the shared artefact repository. These artefacts are mainly proof obligations,
supporting lemmas and translation rules. Provisions are made to obfuscate sen-
sitive proof obligations. The repository is a relational database service running
on the Amazon AWS cloud [9]. Here, all queries from the prover service are
made as HTTP requests using the repository’s URI.
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Appendix C: Requirements and
Sample Use Cases of the
Reactive Architecture
C.13 Requirements
We present the requirements of the Reactive Architecture below:
(a) The Reactive Architecture must store all artefacts created in all of its
components.
(b) It must monitor and trace all changes to these artefacts to inform system
developers.
(c) The Reactive Architecture must support at least 20 users concurrently.
(d) The Reactive Architecture must provide capacity to scale quickly to ac-
commodate changing demands of system developers, and failures.
(e) The Reactive Architecture must enable heterogeneous access and analysis
operations on saved artefacts.
(f) All saved artefacts must be backed up asynchronously to facilitate roll-back
of artefacts.
(g) Critical systems that manage developers and artefacts must not constitute
a single point of failure which will affect the uptime of the system and the
Reactive Architecture.
(h) The toolbox must facilitate sequential and parallel execution of tools in a
workflow manner.
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(i) The Reactive Architecture must provided a high capacity and dedicated
channel to coordinate real-time analysis on artefacts for local client com-
puters and on remote cloud environment.
(j) The Reactive Architecture must gather dependability metrics from several
virtual machines, and perform a synchronous analysis of these metrics.
(k) Security mechanisms must not degrade defined performance threshold.
Specifically, response time for create, delete, update, and display arte-
fact operations should not exceed 5 seconds at peak cloud period and less
than 1 second during off-peak period.
(l) The Reactive Architecture must provide high performance and availability
to allow it to keep up with the sturdy stream of data and operations on
artefacts from the system engineering processes.
C.14 Use Cases
To provide a clarification of the functional requirements of the Reactive Archi-
tecture, we present some of its use cases. The set of use cases presents possible
sequences of interactions between the components of the Reactive Architecture,
and with the clients of the architecture in the cloud environment. These iden-
tified interactions or activities in the use cases have significance to the clients
of the Reactive Architecture. Some of such use cases are: client management
(i.e. registration, collaboration, etc.), how to add tools to the toolbox, sav-
ing artefacts, sharing artefacts, upload and download artefacts, notification to
stakeholders resulting from change to artefacts, and repository back-up or fail-
over support. These use cases are briefly introduced below.
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Figure 12: (C.14) UML Sequence Diagram: Client Management
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Figure 13: (C.15) UML Sequence Diagram: Adding Tools to the Supporting
Toolbox
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Client Architecture Interface Shared Artefacts Repository
SelectArtefact()
ArtefactName()
“ackCHOICE”
ArtefactHash()
“ackHASH”
ArtefactDate()
“ackDATE”
ArtefactOwner()
“ackOWNER”
“ackSAVE”
Figure 14: (C.16) UML Sequence Diagram: Saving Artefacts
Client Architecture Interface Shared Artefacts Repository
DownloadArtefact()
ArtefactName()
“ackNAME”
ArtefactHash()
“ackHASH”
ArtefactDate()
“ackDATE”
ArtefactOwner()
“ackOWNER”
“ackART”
Figure 15: (C.17) UML Sequence Diagram: Download Artefact
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Figure 16: (C.18) UML Sequence Diagram: Sharing Artefacts
C.14.1 Client Management
Every client (i.e. system developer) of this architecture should register to use
the Reactive Architecture. All transactions with the architecture or other clients
will bare a unique identification for authentication. In the case of the formation
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Client/Project Team Reactive Middleware Shared Artefacts Repository
ChangeArtefact()
IsArtefactChanged()
“ackCHANGE”
“ackNOTIFY”
Figure 17: (C.19) UML Sequence Diagram: Change Management of Arte-
facts
Client/Project Team Shared Artefacts Repository Reactive Middleware Toolbox
CreateArtefact()
Inform()
“ackTRACE”
“ackCREATE”
ChangeArtefact()
Inform()
“ackTRACE”
“ackCHANGE”
UseTools()
ChangeArtefact()
InformMiddleware()
“ackTRACE”
“ackCHANGE”
“ackTOOLTRACE”
Figure 18: (C.20) UML Sequence Diagram: Traceability of Artefacts
of a collaborating group for a project, the group leader will invite or add system
developers to a group using their unique identifications. In such a situation, a
group name will be provided including the client identification of the team
creator/leader. The client identification also helps to track the activities of
system developers in a project, which is necessary for traceability. It must
be mentioned that clients can switch from local system development to cloud-
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Shared Artefacts Repository Primary BackUp Repository
AssynchronousBackUp()
“ackBACKUP”
SynchronousBackUp()
“ackBACKUP”
Restore()
“ackRESTORE”
Figure 19: (C.21) UML Sequence Diagram: Primary Repository Back-Up
based development provided by the Reactive Architecture. Figure 12 provides
a sequence diagram that illustrates the introduced use case.
C.14.2 Adding Tools to the Supporting Toolbox
The Toolbox provides a set number of tools by default. These tools are classified
based on the development phase they support, and there are different versions
to also support back-ward compatibility. However, client can add new tools to
the Toolbox (see Figure 13). Also, some of the tools can be composed either
in a parallel or sequential order. This facilitates a form of workflow among the
tools.
C.14.3 Saving Artefacts
Most activities with the Reactive Architecture generate a form of artefact.
These artefacts are saved to the Shared Artefacts Repository (see Figure 14).
External artefacts have to be saved by the system developer. Here, the client
selects the artefacts on his local computer, provide details about the artefacts
and the client identification, in order to save those artefacts.
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C.14.4 Downloading Artefacts
System developers can download artefacts from the Shared Artefacts Reposi-
tory. This activity requires the system developer to either provide the name
of the artefact or select the artefact from a list of all permissible artefacts (see
Figure 15). The downloaded artefact is stored on the local computer of the
client.
C.14.5 Sharing Artefacts
Saved artefacts can be shared by the system developer who created them, with
other collaborating system developers. Here, the creator of the artefact provides
the client identifications of the collaborating developers, which are then assigned
to the artefacts to allow access. The system developer also assigns varying levels
of permissions (i.e. read, write, own) to the artefacts for the collaborating
developers. The collaborating developers can now access these artefacts, but
within the restrictions of their permissions (see Figure 16).
C.14.6 Change Management of Artefacts
Artefacts such as model specifications and their composing elements are moni-
tored to observe changes made to them. So whenever changes are made to an
artefact, a notification is triggered to all collaborating system developers who
have permissions (through subscription) to the artefact. Here, a Publish/Sub-
scribe mechanism is used to distribute these notifications (see Figure 17).
C.14.7 Traceability of Artefacts
The traceability scenario is directly linked to the artefact change management
scenario presented above. All changes to artefacts are traced. The tracing
process identifies all “subscribers” to an artefact, name of system engineering
team, name of artefact, unique identification of the artefacts (i.e. name and
hash) that are derived or dependent on the artefacts to be traced, and all
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associated artefacts (see Figure 18). Here, “subscribers” to an artefact can
either be a client or tool. These are the primary change agents.
C.14.8 Primary Back-Up Repository
A back-up repository is provided for the Shared Artefacts Repository. The
group leader(s) set the frequency of back-up. The frequency options are for
asynchronous and synchronous back-ups. Synchronous back-up is preferred
to guarantee up to date or real-time back-up, but it introduces latency as it
interrupts the operations of the Shared Artefacts Repository. Asynchronous
back-up provides timely and off-peak back-up of all the contents of the Shared
Artefacts Repository. The main function of the Back-up Repository is to provide
fail-over support for the Shared Artefacts Repository (see Figure 19).
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C.15 Questionnaire for cloud-ATAM Stakehold-
ers’ Brainstorm
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Appendix D: Cloud
Accountability System
Implementation Details
D.16 Java Code Snippet for Metrics Data Col-
lection on AWS
Listing 1: Snippet of Java Code for Collecting “CPUUtilization” Metric
using AWS/EC2 CloudWatch API
1 private static GetMetricStatisticsRequest request(final
2 String instanceId) {
3 final long twentyFourHrs = 1000 * 60 * 60 * 24;
4 final int oneMin = 1 * 60;
5 return new GetMetricStatisticsRequest ()
6 .withStartTime(new Date(new Date()
7 .getTime()- twentyFourHrs ))
8 .withNamespace("AWS/EC2")
9 .withPeriod(oneMin)
10 .withDimensions(new Dimension ()
11 .withName("InstanceId")
12 .withValue(instanceId ))
13 .withMetricName("CPUUtilization")
14 .withStatistics("Average", "Maximum")
15 .withEndTime(new Date ()); }
16
17 private static GetMetricStatisticsResult result(
18 final AmazonCloudWatchClient client ,
19 final GetMetricStatisticsRequest request) {
20 return client.getMetricStatistics(request ); }
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